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commit 06ab30034ed9c200a570ab13c017bde248ddb2a6 upstream.
A kernel WARNING in snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() is triggered by
syzkaller fuzzer:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 20739 at sound/core/rawmidi.c:1136
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82999e2d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff81352089>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:482
[<ffffffff813522b9>] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:515
[<ffffffff84f80bd5>] snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x275/0x400 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1136
[<ffffffff84fdb3c1>] snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x4b1/0x5a0 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:163
[< inline >] snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150
[<ffffffff84f87ed9>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x549/0x780 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1223
[<ffffffff84f89fd3>] snd_rawmidi_write+0x543/0xb30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1273
[<ffffffff817b0323>] __vfs_write+0x113/0x480 fs/read_write.c:528
[<ffffffff817b1db7>] vfs_write+0x167/0x4a0 fs/read_write.c:577
[< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:624
[<ffffffff817b50a1>] SyS_write+0x111/0x220 fs/read_write.c:616
[<ffffffff86336c36>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Also a similar warning is found but in another path:
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82be2c0d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff81355139>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:482
[<ffffffff81355369>] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:515
[<ffffffff8527e69a>] rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x24a/0x3b0 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1133
[<ffffffff8527e851>] snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x51/0x80 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1163
[<ffffffff852d9046>] snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x2b6/0x570 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:185
[< inline >] snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150
[<ffffffff85285a0b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x4bb/0x760 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1252
[<ffffffff85287b73>] snd_rawmidi_write+0x543/0xb30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1302
[<ffffffff817ba5f3>] __vfs_write+0x113/0x480 fs/read_write.c:528
[<ffffffff817bc087>] vfs_write+0x167/0x4a0 fs/read_write.c:577
[< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:624
[<ffffffff817bf371>] SyS_write+0x111/0x220 fs/read_write.c:616
[<ffffffff86660276>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
In the former case, the reason is that virmidi has an open code
calling snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() with the value calculated outside
the spinlock. We may use snd_rawmidi_transmit() in a loop just for
consuming the input data, but even there, there is a race between
snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and snd_rawmidi_tranmit_ack().
Similarly in the latter case, it calls snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and
snd_rawmidi_tranmit_ack() separately without protection, so they are
racy as well.
The patch tries to address these issues by the following ways:
- Introduce the unlocked versions of snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and
snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() to be called inside the explicit lock.
- Rewrite snd_rawmidi_transmit() to be race-free (the former case).
- Make the split calls (the latter case) protected in the rawmidi spin
lock.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+YPq1+cYLkadwjWa5XjzF1_Vki1eHnVn-Lm0hzhSpu5PA@mail.gmail.com
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+acG4iyphdOZx47Nyq_VHGbpJQK-6xNpiqUjaZYqsXOGw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 435f49a518c78eec8e2edbbadd912737246cbe20 upstream.
We used to protect against overflow, but rather than return an error, do
what read/write does, namely to limit the total size to MAX_RW_COUNT.
This is not only more consistent, but it also means that any broken
low-level read/write routine that still keeps counts in 'int' can't
break.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit a539f3533b78e39a22723d6d3e1e11b6c14454d9 upstream.
Add SECTION_ALIGN_UP() and SECTION_ALIGN_DOWN() macro which aligns given
pfn to upper section and lower section boundary accordingly.
Required for the latest memory hotplug support for the Xen balloon driver.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <dkiper@net-space.pl>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: only needed for next patch]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 5e1033561da1152c57b97ee84371dba2b3d64c25 upstream.
KASAN found that our additional element processing scripts drop off
the end of the VPD page into unallocated space. The reason is that
not every element has additional information but our traversal
routines think they do, leading to them expecting far more additional
information than is present. Fix this by adding a gate to the
traversal routine so that it only processes elements that are expected
to have additional information (list is in SES-2 section 6.1.13.1:
Additional Element Status diagnostic page overview)
Reported-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Tested-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit 344d6d02690a650607e6372bce8fe40e647a51b5)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 60bc851ae59bfe99be6ee89d6bc50008c85ec75d upstream.
Using bit fields is dangerous on ppc64/sparc64, as the compiler [1]
uses 64bit instructions to manipulate them.
If the 64bit word includes any atomic_t or spinlock_t, we can lose
critical concurrent changes.
This is happening in af_unix, where unix_sk(sk)->gc_candidate/
gc_maybe_cycle/lock share the same 64bit word.
This leads to fatal deadlock, as one/several cpus spin forever
on a spinlock that will never be available again.
A safer way would be to use a long to store flags.
This way we are sure compiler/arch wont do bad things.
As we own unix_gc_lock spinlock when clearing or setting bits,
we can use the non atomic __set_bit()/__clear_bit().
recursion_level can share the same 64bit location with the spinlock,
as it is set only with this spinlock held.
[1] bug fixed in gcc-4.8.0 :
http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=52080
Reported-by: Ambrose Feinstein <ambrose@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit 2ee9cbe7e7bfe2d36374288b818aa31b2c4981db)
[wt: adjusted context]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ Upstream commit 01ce63c90170283a9855d1db4fe81934dddce648 ]
Dmitry Vyukov reported that SCTP was triggering a WARN on socket destroy
related to disabling sock timestamp.
When SCTP accepts an association or peel one off, it copies sock flags
but forgot to call net_enable_timestamp() if a packet timestamping flag
was copied, leading to extra calls to net_disable_timestamp() whenever
such clones were closed.
The fix is to call net_enable_timestamp() whenever we copy a sock with
that flag on, like tcp does.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP is newly defined]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit d85242d91610acbe4f905624a5758a01ae7bb32c)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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declaration
commit 7bbadd2d1009575dad675afc16650ebb5aa10612 upstream.
Docbook does not like the definition of macros inside a field declaration
and adds a warning. Move the definition out.
Fixes: 79462ad02e86180 ("net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: keep open-coding U8_MAX]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit 35da6d62b608fd3beb576d72e48e2bc866d714c9)
[wt: adjusted context]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 upstream.
éæ°¸å reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: éæ°¸å <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: open-code U8_MAX; adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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This reverts commit c507639ba963bb47e3f515670a7cace76af76ab6.
As reported by Michal Kubecek, this fix doesn't handle truncated
reads correctly. Next patch from Eric fixes it better.
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c upstream.
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32:
- Access sk_sleep directly, not through sk_sleep() function
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ Upstream commit 8fa677d2706d325d71dab91bf6e6512c05214e37 ]
Under low memory conditions, tcp_sk_init() and icmp_sk_init()
can both iterate on all possible cpus and call inet_ctl_sock_destroy(),
with eventual NULL pointer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit f79c83d6c41930362bc66fc71489e92975a2facf)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Without this length argument, we can read past the end of the iovec in
memcpy_toiovec because we have no way of knowing the total length of the
iovec's buffers.
This is needed for stable kernels where 89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb
csum races when peeking") has been backported but that don't have the
ioviter conversion, which is almost all the stable trees <= 3.18.
This also fixes a kernel crash for NFS servers when the client uses
-onfsvers=3,proto=udp to mount the export.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context in include/linux/skbuff.h]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit 127500d724f8c43f452610c9080444eedb5eaa6c)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 6037b715d6fab139742c3df8851db4c823081561 upstream.
Expand security_capable() to include cred, so that it can be usable in a
wider range of call sites.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
[wt: needed by next patch only]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 764ad8ba8cd4c6f836fca9378f8c5121aece0842 upstream.
The current buffer is much too small if you have a relatively long
hostname. Bring it up to the size of the one that SETCLIENTID has.
Reported-by: Michael Skralivetsky <michael.skralivetsky@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit ef24842ca0c24ef7223a0853f7603b1afe7deb11)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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same_thread_group/has_group_leader_pid
commit e1403b8edf669ff49bbdf602cc97fefa2760cb15 upstream.
task_struct->pid/tgid should go away.
1. Change same_thread_group() to use task->signal for comparison.
2. Change has_group_leader_pid(task) to compare task_pid(task) with
signal->leader_pid.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@huawei.com>
(cherry picked from commit a7b4d51399316329b6a3d9eaeab224d83eeebe67)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 12b18fdbbda747ad22a7684413a6559b681e503c upstream
When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.
Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit b69040d8e39f20d5215a03502a8e8b4c6ab78395)
CVE-2014-3687
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1386392
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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This commit updates the kernel LZO code to the current upsteam version
which features a significant speed improvement - benchmarking the Calgary
and Silesia test corpora typically shows a doubled performance in
both compression and decompression on modern i386/x86_64/powerpc machines.
Signed-off-by: Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer <markus@oberhumer.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8b975bd3f9089f8ee5d7bbfd798537b992bbc7e7)
[wt: this update was only needed to apply the following security fixes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 9de7922bc709eee2f609cd01d98aaedc4cf5ea74)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ Upstream commit b9cd18de4db3c9ffa7e17b0dc0ca99ed5aa4d43a ]
The 'sysret' fastpath does not correctly restore even all regular
registers, much less any segment registers or reflags values. That is
very much part of why it's faster than 'iret'.
Normally that isn't a problem, because the normal ptrace() interface
catches the process using the signal handler infrastructure, which
always returns with an iret.
However, some paths can get caught using ptrace_event() instead of the
signal path, and for those we need to make sure that we aren't going to
return to user space using 'sysret'. Otherwise the modifications that
may have been done to the register set by the tracer wouldn't
necessarily take effect.
Fix it by forcing IRET path by setting TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME from
arch_ptrace_stop_needed() which is invoked from ptrace_stop().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: fixes CVE-2014-4699]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ Upstream commit 07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92 ]
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[wt: fixes CVE-2014-4652]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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While an interface is down, many implementations of
ethtool_ops::get_link, including the default, ethtool_op_get_link(),
will report the last link state seen while the interface was up. In
general the current physical link state is not available if the
interface is down.
Define ETHTOOL_GLINK to reflect whether the interface *and* any
physical port have a working link, and consistently return 0 when the
interface is down.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit e596e6e4d578f2639416e620d367a3af34814a40)
Cc: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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pending data
CVE-2013-4162
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1205070
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(back ported from commit 8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 upstream
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Various drivers end up replicating the code to mmap() their memory
buffers into user space, and our core memory remapping function may be
very flexible but it is unnecessarily complicated for the common cases
to use.
Our internal VM uses pfn's ("page frame numbers") which simplifies
things for the VM, and allows us to pass physical addresses around in a
denser and more efficient format than passing a "phys_addr_t" around,
and having to shift it up and down by the page size. But it just means
that drivers end up doing that shifting instead at the interface level.
It also means that drivers end up mucking around with internal VM things
like the vma details (vm_pgoff, vm_start/end) way more than they really
need to.
So this just exports a function to map a certain physical memory range
into user space (using a phys_addr_t based interface that is much more
natural for a driver) and hides all the complexity from the driver.
Some drivers will still end up tweaking the vm_page_prot details for
things like prefetching or cacheability etc, but that's actually
relevant to the driver, rather than caring about what the page offset of
the mapping is into the particular IO memory region.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit b4cbb197c7e7a68dbad0d491242e3ca67420c13e)
[WT: only needed in 2.6.32 for next commit]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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functions
[ Upstream commit 85fbaa75037d0b6b786ff18658ddf0b4014ce2a4 ]
Commit bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69 ("inet: prevent leakage
of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls") conditionally updated
addr_len if the msg_name is written to. The recv_error and rxpmtu
functions relied on the recvmsg functions to set up addr_len before.
As this does not happen any more we have to pass addr_len to those
functions as well and set it to the size of the corresponding sockaddr
length.
This broke traceroute and such.
Fixes: bceaa90240b6 ("inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls")
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Reported-by: Tom Labanowski
Cc: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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CVE-2013-7266
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1267081
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(back ported from commit f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ Upstream commit 61e76b178dbe7145e8d6afa84bb4ccea71918994 ]
RFC 4443 has defined two additional codes for ICMPv6 type 1 (destination
unreachable) messages:
5 - Source address failed ingress/egress policy
6 - Reject route to destination
Now they are treated as protocol error and icmpv6_err_convert() converts them
to EPROTO.
RFC 4443 says:
"Codes 5 and 6 are more informative subsets of code 1."
Treat codes 5 and 6 as code 1 (EACCES)
Btw, connect() returning -EPROTO confuses firefox, so that fallback to
other/IPv4 addresses does not work:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=910773
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ Upstream commit f46078cfcd77fa5165bf849f5e568a7ac5fa569c ]
It is not allowed for an ipv6 packet to contain multiple fragmentation
headers. So discard packets which were already reassembled by
fragmentation logic and send back a parameter problem icmp.
The updates for RFC 6980 will come in later, I have to do a bit more
research here.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ Upstream commit b1a5a34bd0b8767ea689e68f8ea513e9710b671e ]
Ver and type in pppoe_hdr should be swapped as defined by RFC2516
section-4.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ Upstream commit e87b3998d795123b4139bc3f25490dd236f68212 ]
dst->xfrm is conditionally defined. Provide accessor funtion that
is always available.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ Upstream commit c52e2421f7368fd36cbe330d2cf41b10452e39a9 ]
TCP stack should make sure it owns skbs before mangling them.
We had various crashes using bnx2x, and it turned out gso_size
was cleared right before bnx2x driver was populating TC descriptor
of the _previous_ packet send. TCP stack can sometime retransmit
packets that are still in Qdisc.
Of course we could make bnx2x driver more robust (using
ACCESS_ONCE(shinfo->gso_size) for example), but the bug is TCP stack.
We have identified two points where skb_unclone() was needed.
This patch adds a WARN_ON_ONCE() to warn us if we missed another
fix of this kind.
Kudos to Neal for finding the root cause of this bug. Its visible
using small MSS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 331415ff16a12147d57d5c953f3a961b7ede348b upstream
Many drivers need to validate the characteristics of their HID report
during initialization to avoid misusing the reports. This adds a common
helper to perform validation of the report exisitng, the field existing,
and the expected number of values within the field.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
[jmm: backported to 2.6.32]
[wt: dev_err() in 2.6.32 instead of hid_err()]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 43622021d2e2b82ea03d883926605bdd0525e1d1 upstream
The "Report ID" field of a HID report is used to build indexes of
reports. The kernel's index of these is limited to 256 entries, so any
malicious device that sets a Report ID greater than 255 will trigger
memory corruption on the host:
[ 1347.156239] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88094958a878
[ 1347.156261] IP: [<ffffffff813e4da0>] hid_register_report+0x2a/0x8b
CVE-2013-2888
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
[jmm: backport to 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit d5ccd496601b8776a516d167a6485754575dc38f upstream
Attempt to reduce the number of IP packets emitted in response to single
SCTP packet (2e3216cd) introduced a complication - if a packet contains
two COOKIE_ECHO chunks and nothing else then SCTP state machine corks the
socket while processing first COOKIE_ECHO and then loses the association
and forgets to uncork the socket. To deal with the issue add new SCTP
command which can be used to set association explictly. Use this new
command when processing second COOKIE_ECHO chunk to restore the context
for SCTP state machine.
Signed-off-by: Max Matveev <makc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Thomas Bork reported that commit c6203cd ("scsi: use __uX
types for headers exported to user space") caused a regression
as now he's getting this warning :
> /usr/src/linux-2.6.32-eisfair-1/usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:108:
> found __[us]{8,16,32,64} type without #include <linux/types.h>
This issue was addressed later by commit 10db4e1 ("headers:
include linux/types.h where appropriate"), so let's just pick the
relevant part from it.
Cc: Thomas Bork <tom@eisfair.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ Backport of upstream commit 87c48fa3b4630905f98268dde838ee43626a060c ]
Fernando Gont reported current IPv6 fragment identification generation
was not secure, because using a very predictable system-wide generator,
allowing various attacks.
IPv4 uses inetpeer cache to address this problem and to get good
performance. We'll use this mechanism when IPv6 inetpeer is stable
enough in linux-3.1
For the time being, we use jhash on destination address to provide less
predictable identifications. Also remove a spinlock and use cmpxchg() to
get better SMP performance.
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[bwh: Backport further to 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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[ This combines upstream commit
2f53384424251c06038ae612e56231b96ab610ee and the follow-on bug fix
commit 35f9c09fe9c72eb8ca2b8e89a593e1c151f28fc2 ]
vmsplice()/splice(pipe, socket) call do_tcp_sendpages() one page at a
time, adding at most 4096 bytes to an skb. (assuming PAGE_SIZE=4096)
The call to tcp_push() at the end of do_tcp_sendpages() forces an
immediate xmit when pipe is not already filled, and tso_fragment() try
to split these skb to MSS multiples.
4096 bytes are usually split in a skb with 2 MSS, and a remaining
sub-mss skb (assuming MTU=1500)
This makes slow start suboptimal because many small frames are sent to
qdisc/driver layers instead of big ones (constrained by cwnd and packets
in flight of course)
In fact, applications using sendmsg() (adding an additional memory copy)
instead of vmsplice()/splice()/sendfile() are a bit faster because of
this anomaly, especially if serving small files in environments with
large initial [c]wnd.
Call tcp_push() only if MSG_MORE is not set in the flags parameter.
This bit is automatically provided by splice() internals but for the
last page, or on all pages if user specified SPLICE_F_MORE splice()
flag.
In some workloads, this can reduce number of sent logical packets by an
order of magnitude, making zero-copy TCP actually faster than
one-copy :)
Reported-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 upstream.
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[dannf/bwh: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 0720a06a7518c9d0c0125bd5d1f3b6264c55c3dd upstream.
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[bwh: Bakckported to 2.6.32: drop Hyper-V change]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit eeb5b4ae81f4a750355fa0c15f4fea22fdf83be1 upstream.
I found that the length of a file name when created cannot exceed 255
characters, yet, pathconf(), via statfs(), returns the maximum as 260.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Dankwardt <k@kcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Commit 9e4f5e29 ("FC Pass Thru support") exported a number of header files
in include/scsi to user space, but didn't change the uX types to the
userspace-compatible __uX types. Without that you'll get compile errors
when including them - E.G.:
include/scsi/scsi.h:145: error: expected specifier-qualifier-list before `u8'
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@sunsite.dk>
Cc: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Cc: James Smart <james.smart@emulex.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 083c8c1e60e5c27a277e87dbeb6b89b47937559f)
Cc: Thomas Bork <tom@eisfair.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b22d127a39ddd10d93deee3d96e643657ad53a49 upstream.
shared_policy_replace() use of sp_alloc() is unsafe. 1) sp_node cannot
be dereferenced if sp->lock is not held and 2) another thread can modify
sp_node between spin_unlock for allocating a new sp node and next
spin_lock. The bug was introduced before 2.6.12-rc2.
Kosaki's original patch for this problem was to allocate an sp node and
policy within shared_policy_replace and initialise it when the lock is
reacquired. I was not keen on this approach because it partially
duplicates sp_alloc(). As the paths were sp->lock is taken are not that
performance critical this patch converts sp->lock to sp->mutex so it can
sleep when calling sp_alloc().
[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: Original patch]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit ad4b3fb7ff9940bcdb1e4cd62bd189d10fa636ba upstream.
Unfortunately with !CONFIG_PAGEFLAGS_EXTENDED, (!PageHead) is false, and
(PageHead) is true, for tail pages. If this is indeed the intended
behavior, which I doubt because it breaks cache cleaning on some ARM
systems, then the nomenclature is highly problematic.
This patch makes sure PageHead is only true for head pages and PageTail
is only true for tail pages, and neither is true for non-compound pages.
[ This buglet seems ancient - seems to have been introduced back in Apr
2008 in commit 6a1e7f777f61: "pageflags: convert to the use of new
macros". And the reason nobody noticed is because the PageHead()
tests are almost all about just sanity-checking, and only used on
pages that are actual page heads. The fact that the old code returned
true for tail pages too was thus not really noticeable. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
Acked-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <Will.Deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Steve Capper <Steve.Capper@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 85f2a2ef1d0ab99523e0b947a2b723f5650ed6aa upstream.
When allocating memory fails, page is NULL. page_to_pfn() will
cause the kernel panicked if we don't use sparsemem vmemmap.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/505AB1FF.8020104@cn.fujitsu.com
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Vaguely based on upstream commit 574c4866e33d 'consolidate kernel-side
struct sigaction declarations'.
flush_signal_handlers() needs to know whether sigaction::sa_restorer
is defined, not whether SA_RESTORER is defined. Define the
__ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER macro to indicate this.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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ptrace: introduce signal_wake_up_state() and ptrace_signal_wake_up()
CVE-2013-0871
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1129192
Cleanup and preparation for the next change.
signal_wake_up(resume => true) is overused. None of ptrace/jctl callers
actually want to wakeup a TASK_WAKEKILL task, but they can't specify the
necessary mask.
Turn signal_wake_up() into signal_wake_up_state(state), reintroduce
signal_wake_up() as a trivial helper, and add ptrace_signal_wake_up()
which adds __TASK_TRACED.
This way ptrace_signal_wake_up() can work "inside" ptrace_request()
even if the tracee doesn't have the TASK_WAKEKILL bit set.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(backported from commit 910ffdb18a6408e14febbb6e4b6840fd2c928c82)
Conflicts:
kernel/ptrace.c
kernel/signal.c
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit d740269867021faf4ce38a449353d2b986c34a67 upstream
To avoid an explosion of request_module calls on a chain of abusive
scripts, fail maximum recursion with -ELOOP instead of -ENOEXEC. As soon
as maximum recursion depth is hit, the error will fail all the way back
up the chain, aborting immediately.
This also has the side-effect of stopping the user's shell from attempting
to reexecute the top-level file as a shell script. As seen in the
dash source:
if (cmd != path_bshell && errno == ENOEXEC) {
*argv-- = cmd;
*argv = cmd = path_bshell;
goto repeat;
}
The above logic was designed for running scripts automatically that lacked
the "#!" header, not to re-try failed recursion. On a legitimate -ENOEXEC,
things continue to behave as the shell expects.
Additionally, when tracking recursion, the binfmt handlers should not be
involved. The recursion being tracked is the depth of calls through
search_binary_handler(), so that function should be exclusively responsible
for tracking the depth.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b66c5984017533316fd1951770302649baf1aa33 upstream
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit d0bd587a80960d7ba7e0c8396e154028c9045c54 upstream
Implement UMH_KILLABLE, should be used along with UMH_WAIT_EXEC/PROC.
The caller must ensure that subprocess_info->path/etc can not go away
until call_usermodehelper_freeinfo().
call_usermodehelper_exec(UMH_KILLABLE) does
wait_for_completion_killable. If it fails, it uses
xchg(&sub_info->complete, NULL) to serialize with umh_complete() which
does the same xhcg() to access sub_info->complete.
If call_usermodehelper_exec wins, it can safely return. umh_complete()
should get NULL and call call_usermodehelper_freeinfo().
Otherwise we know that umh_complete() was already called, in this case
call_usermodehelper_exec() falls back to wait_for_completion() which
should succeed "very soon".
Note: UMH_NO_WAIT == -1 but it obviously should not be used with
UMH_KILLABLE. We delay the neccessary cleanup to simplify the back
porting.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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This reverts commit fb1e75389bd06fd5987e9cda1b4e0305c782f854.
"Benjamin S." <sbenni@gmx.de> reports that the patch in question
causes a big drop in sequential throughput for him, dropping from
200MB/sec down to only 70MB/sec.
Needs to be investigated more fully, for now lets just revert the
offending commit.
Conflicts:
include/linux/blkdev.h
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
(cherry picked from commit 79da0644a8e0838522828f106e4049639eea6baf)
Cc: Thomas Bork <tom@eisfair.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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