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2025-11-19ovl: refactor ovl_lookup()Christian Brauner
Split the core into a separate helper in preparation of converting the caller to the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-37-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_copyfile() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-36-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_rename() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-35-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: refactor ovl_rename()Christian Brauner
Extract the code that runs under overridden credentials into a separate ovl_rename_upper() helper function and the code that runs before/after to ovl_rename_start/end(). Error handling is simplified. The helpers returns errors directly instead of using goto labels. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-34-b31603935724@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: introduce struct ovl_renamedataChristian Brauner
Add a struct ovl_renamedata to group rename-related state that was previously stored in local variables. Embedd struct renamedata directly aligning with the vfs. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-33-b31603935724@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_listxattr() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-32-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_xattr_get() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-31-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_xattr_set() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-30-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_nlink_end() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-29-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_nlink_start() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-28-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_check_empty_dir() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-27-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_dir_llseek() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-26-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: refactor ovl_iterate() and port to cred guardChristian Brauner
factor out ovl_iterate_merged() and move some code into ovl_iterate_real() for easier use of the scoped ovl cred guard. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-25-b31603935724@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: don't override credentials for ovl_check_whiteouts()Christian Brauner
The function is only called when rdd->dentry is non-NULL: if (!err && rdd->first_maybe_whiteout && rdd->dentry) err = ovl_check_whiteouts(realpath, rdd); | Caller | Sets rdd->dentry? | Can call ovl_check_whiteouts()? | |-------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------| | ovl_dir_read_merged() | ✓ Yes (line 430) | ✓ YES | | ovl_dir_read_impure() | ✗ No | ✗ NO | | ovl_check_d_type_supported() | ✗ No | ✗ NO | | ovl_workdir_cleanup_recurse() | ✗ No | ✗ NO | | ovl_indexdir_cleanup() | ✗ No | ✗ NO | VFS layer (.iterate_shared file operation) → ovl_iterate() [CRED OVERRIDE] → ovl_cache_get() → ovl_dir_read_merged() → ovl_dir_read() → ovl_check_whiteouts() [CRED REVERT] ovl_unlink() → ovl_do_remove() → ovl_check_empty_dir() [CRED OVERRIDE] → ovl_dir_read_merged() → ovl_dir_read() → ovl_check_whiteouts() [CRED REVERT] ovl_rename() → ovl_check_empty_dir() [CRED OVERRIDE] → ovl_dir_read_merged() → ovl_dir_read() → ovl_check_whiteouts() [CRED REVERT] All valid callchains already override credentials so drop the override. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-24-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_maybe_lookup_lowerdata() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-23-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_maybe_validate_verity() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-22-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_fileattr_get() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-21-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_fileattr_set() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-20-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_fiemap() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-19-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_set_or_remove_acl() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-18-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port do_ovl_get_acl() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-17-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_get_link() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-16-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_permission() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-15-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_getattr() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-14-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_setattr() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-13-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_flush() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-12-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_fadvise() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-11-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_fallocate() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-10-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_fsync() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-9-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_llseek() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-8-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_open_realfile() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-7-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_create_tmpfile() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-6-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_do_remove() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-5-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_set_link_redirect() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-4-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_create_or_link() to cred guardChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-3-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: port ovl_copy_up_flags() to cred guardsChristian Brauner
Use the scoped ovl cred guard. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-2-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ovl: add override_creds cleanup guard extension for overlayfsChristian Brauner
Overlayfs plucks the relevant creds from the superblock. Extend the override_creds cleanup class I added to override_creds_ovl which uses the ovl_override_creds() function as initialization helper. Add with_ovl_creds() based on this new class. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117-work-ovl-cred-guard-v4-1-b31603935724@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19Merge branch 'vfs-6.19.directory.locking' into base.vfs-6.19.ovlChristian Brauner
Bring in the directory locking changes as they touch overlayfs in a pretty substantial way and we are about to change the credential override semantics quite substantially as well. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19Merge branch 'kbuild-6.19.fms.extension'Christian Brauner
Bring in the shared branch with the kbuild tree to enable '-fms-extensions' for 6.19. The overlayfs cred guard work depends on this. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19NFS: Initialise verifiers for visible dentries in _nfs4_open_and_get_stateTrond Myklebust
Ensure that the verifiers are initialised before calling d_splice_alias() in _nfs4_open_and_get_state(). Reported-by: Michael Stoler <michael.stoler@vastdata.com> Fixes: cf5b4059ba71 ("NFSv4: Fix races between open and dentry revalidation") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
2025-11-19fs: move mntput_no_expire() slowpath into a dedicated routineMateusz Guzik
In the stock variant the compiler spills several registers on the stack and employs stack smashing protection, adding even more code + a branch on exit.. The actual fast path is small enough that the compiler inlines it for all callers -- the symbol is no longer emitted. Forcing noinline on it just for code-measurement purposes shows the fast path dropping from 111 to 39 bytes. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251114201803.2183505-1-mjguzik@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19NFS: Initialise verifiers for visible dentries in nfs_atomic_open()Trond Myklebust
Ensure that the verifiers are initialised before calling d_splice_alias() in nfs_atomic_open(). Reported-by: Michael Stoler <michael.stoler@vastdata.com> Fixes: 809fd143de88 ("NFSv4: Ensure nfs_atomic_open set the dentry verifier on ENOENT") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
2025-11-19NFS: Initialise verifiers for visible dentries in readdir and lookupTrond Myklebust
Ensure that the verifiers are initialised before calling d_splice_alias() in both nfs_prime_dcache() and nfs_lookup(). Reported-by: Michael Stoler <michael.stoler@vastdata.com> Fixes: a1147b8281bd ("NFS: Fix up directory verifier races") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
2025-11-19fs: remove spurious exports in fs/file_attr.cChristoph Hellwig
Commit 2f952c9e8fe1 ("fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file") added various exports without users despite claiming to be a simple refactor. Drop them again. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119101415.2732320-1-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19autofs: dont trigger mount if it cant succeedIan Kent
If a mount namespace contains autofs mounts, and they are propagation private, and there is no namespace specific automount daemon to handle possible automounting then attempted path resolution will loop until MAXSYMLINKS is reached before failing causing quite a bit of noise in the log. Add a check for this in autofs ->d_automount() so that the VFS can immediately return an error in this case. Since the mount is propagation private an EPERM return seems most appropriate. Suggested by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118024631.10854-2-raven@themaw.net Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-11-19ceph: Switch to use %ptSpAndy Shevchenko
Use %ptSp instead of open coded variants to print content of struct timespec64 in human readable format. Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251113150217.3030010-3-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
2025-11-19fs/ntfs3: check for shutdown in fsyncKonstantin Komarov
Ensure fsync() returns -EIO when the ntfs3 filesystem is in forced shutdown, instead of silently succeeding via generic_file_fsync(). Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
2025-11-18hfsplus: fix volume corruption issue for generic/073Viacheslav Dubeyko
The xfstests' test-case generic/073 leaves HFS+ volume in corrupted state: sudo ./check generic/073 FSTYP -- hfsplus PLATFORM -- Linux/x86_64 hfsplus-testing-0001 6.17.0-rc1+ #4 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Wed Oct 1 15:02:44 PDT 2025 MKFS_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 /mnt/scratch generic/073 _check_generic_filesystem: filesystem on /dev/loop51 is inconsistent (see XFSTESTS-2/xfstests-dev/results//generic/073.full for details) Ran: generic/073 Failures: generic/073 Failed 1 of 1 tests sudo fsck.hfsplus -d /dev/loop51 ** /dev/loop51 Using cacheBlockSize=32K cacheTotalBlock=1024 cacheSize=32768K. Executing fsck_hfs (version 540.1-Linux). ** Checking non-journaled HFS Plus Volume. The volume name is untitled ** Checking extents overflow file. ** Checking catalog file. ** Checking multi-linked files. ** Checking catalog hierarchy. Invalid directory item count (It should be 1 instead of 0) ** Checking extended attributes file. ** Checking volume bitmap. ** Checking volume information. Verify Status: VIStat = 0x0000, ABTStat = 0x0000 EBTStat = 0x0000 CBTStat = 0x0000 CatStat = 0x00004000 ** Repairing volume. ** Rechecking volume. ** Checking non-journaled HFS Plus Volume. The volume name is untitled ** Checking extents overflow file. ** Checking catalog file. ** Checking multi-linked files. ** Checking catalog hierarchy. ** Checking extended attributes file. ** Checking volume bitmap. ** Checking volume information. ** The volume untitled was repaired successfully. The test is doing these steps on final phase: mv $SCRATCH_MNT/testdir_1/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/testdir_2/bar $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/testdir_1 $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo So, we move file bar from testdir_1 into testdir_2 folder. It means that HFS+ logic decrements the number of entries in testdir_1 and increments number of entries in testdir_2. Finally, we do fsync only for testdir_1 and foo but not for testdir_2. As a result, this is the reason why fsck.hfsplus detects the volume corruption afterwards. This patch fixes the issue by means of adding the hfsplus_cat_write_inode() call for old_dir and new_dir in hfsplus_rename() after the successful ending of hfsplus_rename_cat(). This method makes modification of in-core inode objects for old_dir and new_dir but it doesn't save these modifications in Catalog File's entries. It was expected that hfsplus_write_inode() will save these modifications afterwards. However, because generic/073 does fsync only for testdir_1 and foo then testdir_2 modification hasn't beed saved into Catalog File's entry and it was flushed without this modification. And it was detected by fsck.hfsplus. Now, hfsplus_rename() stores in Catalog File all modified entries and correct state of Catalog File will be flushed during hfsplus_file_fsync() call. Finally, it makes fsck.hfsplus happy. sudo ./check generic/073 FSTYP -- hfsplus PLATFORM -- Linux/x86_64 hfsplus-testing-0001 6.18.0-rc3+ #93 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Wed Nov 12 14:37:49 PST 2025 MKFS_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 /mnt/scratch generic/073 32s ... 32s Ran: generic/073 Passed all 1 tests Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de> cc: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com> cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251112232522.814038-1-slava@dubeyko.com Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
2025-11-18hfsplus: Verify inode mode when loading from diskTetsuo Handa
syzbot is reporting that S_IFMT bits of inode->i_mode can become bogus when the S_IFMT bits of the 16bits "mode" field loaded from disk are corrupted. According to [1], the permissions field was treated as reserved in Mac OS 8 and 9. According to [2], the reserved field was explicitly initialized with 0, and that field must remain 0 as long as reserved. Therefore, when the "mode" field is not 0 (i.e. no longer reserved), the file must be S_IFDIR if dir == 1, and the file must be one of S_IFREG/S_IFLNK/S_IFCHR/ S_IFBLK/S_IFIFO/S_IFSOCK if dir == 0. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+895c23f6917da440ed0d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=895c23f6917da440ed0d Link: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn/tn1150.html#HFSPlusPermissions [1] Link: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn/tn1150.html#ReservedAndPadFields [2] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/04ded9f9-73fb-496c-bfa5-89c4f5d1d7bb@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
2025-11-18fs/resctrl: Consider sparse masks when initializing new group's allocationReinette Chatre
A new resource group is intended to be created with sane defaults. For a cache resource this means all cache portions the new group could possibly allocate into. This includes unused cache portions and shareable cache portions used by other groups and hardware. New resource group creation does not take sparse masks into account. After determining the bitmask reflecting the new group's possible allocations the bitmask is forced to be contiguous even if the system supports sparse masks. For example, a new group could by default allocate into a large portion of cache represented by 0xff0f, but it is instead created with a mask of 0xf. Do not force a contiguous allocation range if the system supports sparse masks. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/abbbb008bc09d982d715e79d3b885c10f92c64e0.1763426240.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
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