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Volodymyr reports (again!) that under some circumstances (E2H==0,
walking S1 PTs), PAR_EL1 doesn't report the value of the latest
walk in the CPU register, but that instead the value is written to
the backing store.
Further investigation indicates that the root cause of this is
that a group of registers (PAR_EL1, TPIDR*_EL{0,1}, the *32_EL2 dregs)
should always be considered as "on CPU", as they are not remapped
between EL1 and EL2.
We fail to treat them accordingly, and end-up considering that
the register (PAR_EL1 in this example) should be written to memory
instead of in the register.
While it would be possible to quickly work around it, it is obvious
that the way we track these things at the moment is pretty horrible,
and could do with some improvement.
Revamp the whole thing by:
- defining a location for a register (memory, cpu), potentially
depending on the state of the vcpu
- define a transformation for this register (mapped register, potential
translation, special register needing some particular attention)
- convey this information in a structure that can be easily passed
around
As a result, the accessors themselves become much simpler, as the
state is explicit instead of being driven by hard-to-understand
conventions.
We get rid of the "pure EL2 register" notion, which wasn't very
useful, and add sanitisation of the values by applying the RESx
masks as required, something that was missing so far.
And of course, we add the missing registers to the list, with the
indication that they are always loaded.
Reported-by: Volodymyr Babchuk <volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Fixes: fedc612314acf ("KVM: arm64: nv: Handle virtual EL2 registers in vcpu_read/write_sys_reg()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250806141707.3479194-3-volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250817121926.217900-4-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Distinguishing between NV and VHE is slightly pointless, and only
serves as an extra complication, or a way to introduce bugs, such
as the way SPSR_EL1 gets written without checking for the state
being resident.
Get rid if this silly distinction, and fix the bug in one go.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250817121926.217900-3-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Just like c6e35dff58d3 ("KVM: arm64: Check for SYSREGS_ON_CPU before
accessing the CPU state") fixed the 64bit state access, add a check
for the 32bit state actually being on the CPU before writing it.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250817121926.217900-2-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Interrupt support on host wakeup gpio for ste-ux500-samsung bluetooth.
Signed-off-by: Alex Tran <alex.t.tran@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250823212732.356620-1-alex.t.tran@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
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Bindings expect GPIO hog names to end with 'hog' suffix, so correct it
to fix dtbs_check warning:
ste-nomadik-s8815.dtb: mmcsd-gpio: $nodename:0: 'mmcsd-gpio' does not match '^.+-hog(-[0-9]+)?$'
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250115211627.193961-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
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The Secure AVIC feature provides SEV-SNP guests hardware acceleration for
performance sensitive APIC accesses while securely managing the guest-owned
APIC state through the use of a private APIC backing page.
This helps prevent the hypervisor from generating unexpected interrupts for
a vCPU or otherwise violate architectural assumptions around the APIC
behavior.
Add a new x2APIC driver that will serve as the base of the Secure AVIC
support. It is initially the same as the x2APIC physical driver (without IPI
callbacks), but will be modified as features are implemented.
As the new driver does not implement Secure AVIC features yet, if the
hypervisor sets the Secure AVIC bit in SEV_STATUS, maintain the existing
behavior to enforce the guest termination.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Co-developed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828070334.208401-2-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com
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Introduce a common boot_panic() helper macro, and use it to
get rid of three more or less identical implementations.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
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There are two distinct callers of snp_cpuid(): the MSR protocol and the GHCB
page based interface.
The snp_cpuid() logic does not care about the distinction, which only matters
at a lower level. But the fact that it supports both interfaces means that the
GHCB page based logic is pulled into the early startup code where PA to VA
conversions are problematic, given that it runs from the 1:1 mapping of memory.
So keep snp_cpuid() itself in the startup code, but factor out the hypervisor
calls via a callback, so that the GHCB page handling can be moved out.
Code refactoring only - no functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-25-ardb+git@google.com
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Deny all sampling event by the CPUMF counter facility device driver
and return -ENOENT. This return value is used to try other PMUs.
Up to now events for type PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE were not tested for
sampling and returned later on -EOPNOTSUPP. This ends the search
for alternative PMUs. Change that behavior and try other PMUs
instead.
Fixes: 613a41b0d16e ("s390/cpum_cf: Reject request for sampling in event initialization")
Acked-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
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Each PAI PMU device driver returns -EINVAL when an event is out of
its accepted range. This return value aborts the search for an
alternative PMU device driver to handle this event.
Change the return value to -ENOENT. This return value is used to
try other PMUs instead. This makes the PMUs more robust when
the sequence of PMU device driver initialization changes (at boot time)
or by using modules.
Fixes: 39d62336f5c12 ("s390/pai: add support for cryptography counters")
Acked-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
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Update the wake-up pin and associated interupt details for the
Pinebook Pro WiFi module.
Signed-off-by: Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250827143040.1644867-1-pbrobinson@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
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Enable the NPU on FriendlyElec NanoPi R6C/R6S boards.
Signed-off-by: Anton Kirilov <anton.kirilov@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250827142210.2221606-1-anton.kirilov@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
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As documented in the PinephonePro-Schematic-V1.0-20211127.pdf,
page 11, the SPI Flash's VCC pin is connected to VCC_1V8 power
source. This fixes the following warning:
spi-nor spi1.0: supply vcc not found, using dummy regulator
Signed-off-by: Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondřej Jirman <megi@xff.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250827143501.1646163-1-pbrobinson@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
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We have dedictaded bindings for scl/sda nowadays. Switch away from the
deprecated plain 'gpios' property.
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
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We have dedictaded bindings for scl/sda nowadays. Switch away from the
deprecated plain 'gpios' property.
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
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Define ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK and arch_sync_kernel_mappings() to ensure
page tables are properly synchronized when calling p*d_populate_kernel().
For 5-level paging, synchronization is performed via
pgd_populate_kernel(). In 4-level paging, pgd_populate() is a no-op, so
synchronization is instead performed at the P4D level via
p4d_populate_kernel().
This fixes intermittent boot failures on systems using 4-level paging and
a large amount of persistent memory:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe70000000034
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__init_single_page+0x9/0x6d
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__init_zone_device_page+0x17/0x5d
memmap_init_zone_device+0x154/0x1bb
pagemap_range+0x2e0/0x40f
memremap_pages+0x10b/0x2f0
devm_memremap_pages+0x1e/0x60
dev_dax_probe+0xce/0x2ec [device_dax]
dax_bus_probe+0x6d/0xc9
[... snip ...]
</TASK>
It also fixes a crash in vmemmap_set_pmd() caused by accessing vmemmap
before sync_global_pgds() [1]:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb3ff1200000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
Tainted: [W]=WARN
RIP: 0010:vmemmap_set_pmd+0xff/0x230
<TASK>
vmemmap_populate_hugepages+0x176/0x180
vmemmap_populate+0x34/0x80
__populate_section_memmap+0x41/0x90
sparse_add_section+0x121/0x3e0
__add_pages+0xba/0x150
add_pages+0x1d/0x70
memremap_pages+0x3dc/0x810
devm_memremap_pages+0x1c/0x60
xe_devm_add+0x8b/0x100 [xe]
xe_tile_init_noalloc+0x6a/0x70 [xe]
xe_device_probe+0x48c/0x740 [xe]
[... snip ...]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250818020206.4517-4-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Fixes: 8d400913c231 ("x86/vmemmap: handle unpopulated sub-pmd ranges")
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20250311114420.240341-1-gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com [1]
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: bibo mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter (Ampere) <cl@gentwo.org>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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When verifier sees a timed may_goto instruction, it emits a call to
arch_bpf_timed_may_goto() with a stack offset in BPF_REG_AX (arm64 r9)
and expects a count value to be returned in the same register. The
verifier doesn't save or restore any registers before emitting this
call.
arch_bpf_timed_may_goto() should act as a trampoline to call
bpf_check_timed_may_goto() with AAPCS64 calling convention.
To support this custom calling convention, implement
arch_bpf_timed_may_goto() in assembly and make sure BPF caller saved
registers are saved and restored, call bpf_check_timed_may_goto with
arm64 calling convention where first argument and return value both are
in x0, then put the result back into BPF_REG_AX before returning.
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250827113245.52629-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Attack vector controls for SSB were missed in the initial attack vector series.
The default mitigation for SSB requires user-space opt-in so it is only
relevant for user->user attacks. Check with attack vector controls when
the command is auto - i.e., no explicit user selection has been done.
Fixes: 2d31d2874663 ("x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug")
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250819192200.2003074-5-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Prior to the topology parsing rewrite and the switchover to the new parsing
logic for AMD processors in
c749ce393b8f ("x86/cpu: Use common topology code for AMD"),
the initial_apicid on these platforms was:
- First initialized to the LocalApicId from CPUID leaf 0x1 EBX[31:24].
- Then overwritten by the ExtendedLocalApicId in CPUID leaf 0xb
EDX[31:0] on processors that supported topoext.
With the new parsing flow introduced in
f7fb3b2dd92c ("x86/cpu: Provide an AMD/HYGON specific topology parser"),
parse_8000_001e() now unconditionally overwrites the initial_apicid already
parsed during cpu_parse_topology_ext().
Although this has not been a problem on baremetal platforms, on virtualized AMD
guests that feature more than 255 cores, QEMU zeros out the CPUID leaf
0x8000001e on CPUs with CoreID > 255 to prevent collision of these IDs in
EBX[7:0] which can only represent a maximum of 255 cores [1].
This results in the following FW_BUG being logged when booting a guest
with more than 255 cores:
[Firmware Bug]: CPU 512: APIC ID mismatch. CPUID: 0x0000 APIC: 0x0200
AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming Pub.
24593 Rev. 3.42 [2] Section 16.12 "x2APIC_ID" mentions the Extended
Enumeration leaf 0xb (Fn0000_000B_EDX[31:0])(which was later superseded by the
extended leaf 0x80000026) provides the full x2APIC ID under all circumstances
unlike the one reported by CPUID leaf 0x8000001e EAX which depends on the mode
in which APIC is configured.
Rely on the APIC ID parsed during cpu_parse_topology_ext() from CPUID leaf
0x80000026 or 0xb and only use the APIC ID from leaf 0x8000001e if
cpu_parse_topology_ext() failed (has_topoext is false).
On platforms that support the 0xb leaf (Zen2 or later, AMD guests on
QEMU) or the extended leaf 0x80000026 (Zen4 or later), the
initial_apicid is now set to the value parsed from EDX[31:0].
On older AMD/Hygon platforms that do not support the 0xb leaf but support the
TOPOEXT extension (families 0x15, 0x16, 0x17[Zen1], and Hygon), retain current
behavior where the initial_apicid is set using the 0x8000001e leaf.
Issue debugged by Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org> and Sairaj Kodilkar
<sarunkod@amd.com>.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: c749ce393b8f ("x86/cpu: Use common topology code for AMD")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/35ac5dfbcaa4b [1]
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250825075732.10694-2-kprateek.nayak@amd.com
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Now that the infrastructure is in place, enable guest_memfd for arm64.
* Select CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD in KVM/arm64 Kconfig.
* Enforce KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY for guest_memfd on arm64: Ensure that
guest_memfd-backed memory slots on arm64 are only supported if they
are intended for shared memory use cases (i.e.,
kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only() is true). This design reflects the current
arm64 KVM ecosystem where guest_memfd is primarily being introduced
for VMs that support shared memory.
Reviewed-by: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-21-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Handle faults for memslots backed by guest_memfd in arm64 nested
virtualization triggered by VNCR_EL2.
* Introduce is_gmem output parameter to kvm_translate_vncr(), indicating
whether the faulted memory slot is backed by guest_memfd.
* Dispatch faults backed by guest_memfd to kvm_gmem_get_pfn().
* Update kvm_handle_vncr_abort() to handle potential guest_memfd errors.
Some of the guest_memfd errors need to be handled by userspace instead
of attempting to (implicitly) retry by returning to the guest.
Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-20-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add arm64 architecture support for handling guest page faults on memory
slots backed by guest_memfd.
This change introduces a new function, gmem_abort(), which encapsulates
the fault handling logic specific to guest_memfd-backed memory. The
kvm_handle_guest_abort() entry point is updated to dispatch to
gmem_abort() when a fault occurs on a guest_memfd-backed memory slot (as
determined by kvm_slot_has_gmem()).
Until guest_memfd gains support for huge pages, the fault granule for
these memory regions is restricted to PAGE_SIZE.
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-19-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Refactor user_mem_abort() to improve code clarity and simplify
assumptions within the function.
Key changes include:
* Immediately set force_pte to true at the beginning of the function if
logging_active is true. This simplifies the flow and makes the
condition for forcing a PTE more explicit.
* Remove the misleading comment stating that logging_active is
guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP memslots, as this assertion
is not entirely correct.
* Extract reusable code blocks into new helper functions:
* prepare_mmu_memcache(): Encapsulates the logic for preparing and
topping up the MMU page cache.
* adjust_nested_fault_perms(): Isolates the adjustments to shadow S2
permissions and the encoding of nested translation levels.
* Update min(a, (long)b) to min_t(long, a, b) for better type safety and
consistency.
* Perform other minor tidying up of the code.
These changes primarily aim to simplify user_mem_abort() and make its
logic easier to understand and maintain, setting the stage for future
modifications.
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tao Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-18-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Update the KVM MMU fault handler to service guest page faults
for memory slots backed by guest_memfd with mmap support. For such
slots, the MMU must always fault in pages directly from guest_memfd,
bypassing the host's userspace_addr.
This ensures that guest_memfd-backed memory is always handled through
the guest_memfd specific faulting path, regardless of whether it's for
private or non-private (shared) use cases.
Additionally, rename kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private() to
kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_gmem(), as this function is now used to fault in
pages from guest_memfd for both private and non-private memory,
accommodating the new use cases.
Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
[sean: drop the helper]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-17-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rework kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to consult guest_memfd for all mappings,
not just private mappings, so that hugepage support plays nice with the
upcoming support for backing non-private memory with guest_memfd.
In addition to getting the max order from guest_memfd for gmem-only
memslots, update TDX's hook to effectively ignore shared mappings, as TDX's
restrictions on page size only apply to Secure EPT mappings. Do nothing
for SNP, as RMP restrictions apply to both private and shared memory.
Suggested-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-16-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rework kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to provide the plumbing to consult
guest_memfd (and relevant vendor code) when recovering hugepages, e.g.
after disabling live migration. The flaw has existed since guest_memfd was
originally added, but has gone unnoticed due to lack of guest_memfd support
for hugepages or dirty logging.
Don't actually call into guest_memfd at this time, as it's unclear as to
what the API should be. Ideally, KVM would simply use kvm_gmem_get_pfn(),
but invoking kvm_gmem_get_pfn() would lead to sleeping in atomic context
if guest_memfd needed to allocate memory (mmu_lock is held). Luckily,
the path isn't actually reachable, so just add a TODO and WARN to ensure
the functionality is added alongisde guest_memfd hugepage support, and
punt the guest_memfd API design question to the future.
Note, calling kvm_mem_is_private() in the non-fault path is safe, so long
as mmu_lock is held, as hugepage recovery operates on shadow-present SPTEs,
i.e. calling kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() with @fault=NULL is mutually
exclusive with kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes() changing the PRIVATE attribute
of the gfn.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-15-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move kvm_max_level_for_order() and kvm_max_private_mapping_level() up in
mmu.c so that they can be used by __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level().
Opportunistically drop the "inline" from kvm_max_level_for_order().
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rename kvm_x86_ops.private_max_mapping_level() to .gmem_max_mapping_level()
in anticipation of extending guest_memfd support to non-private memory.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-13-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduce the core infrastructure to enable host userspace to mmap()
guest_memfd-backed memory. This is needed for several evolving KVM use
cases:
* Non-CoCo VM backing: Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests
entirely backed by guest_memfd, even for non-CoCo VMs [1]. This
provides a unified memory management model and simplifies guest memory
handling.
* Direct map removal for enhanced security: This is an important step
for direct map removal of guest memory [2]. By allowing host userspace
to fault in guest_memfd pages directly, we can avoid maintaining host
kernel direct maps of guest memory. This provides additional hardening
against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by removing a
potential attack surface within the kernel.
* Future guest_memfd features: This also lays the groundwork for future
enhancements to guest_memfd, such as supporting huge pages and
enabling in-place sharing of guest memory with the host for CoCo
platforms that permit it [3].
Enable the basic mmap and fault handling logic within guest_memfd, but
hold off on allow userspace to actually do mmap() until the architecture
support is also in place.
[1] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/cc1bb8e9bc3e1ab637700a4d3defeec95b55060a.camel@amazon.com
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/c1c9591d-218a-495c-957b-ba356c8f8e09@redhat.com/T/#u
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-11-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Enable KVM_GUEST_MEMFD for all KVM x86 64-bit builds, i.e. for "default"
VM types when running on 64-bit KVM. This will allow using guest_memfd
to back non-private memory for all VM shapes, by supporting mmap() on
guest_memfd.
Opportunistically clean up various conditionals that become tautologies
once x86 selects KVM_GUEST_MEMFD more broadly. Specifically, because
SW protected VMs, SEV, and TDX are all 64-bit only, private memory no
longer needs to take explicit dependencies on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD, because
it is effectively a prerequisite.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to kvm_slot_has_gmem() to improve
clarity and accurately reflect its purpose.
The function kvm_slot_can_be_private() was previously used to check if a
given kvm_memory_slot is backed by guest_memfd. However, its name
implied that the memory in such a slot was exclusively "private".
As guest_memfd support expands to include non-private memory (e.g.,
shared host mappings), it's important to remove this association. The
new name, kvm_slot_has_gmem(), states that the slot is backed by
guest_memfd without making assumptions about the memory's privacy
attributes.
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig
option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate() function,
which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
The new name, HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the
option: to enable arch-specific guest_memfd population mechanisms. It
also follows the same pattern as the other HAVE_KVM_ARCH_* configuration
options.
This improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately
reflects the functionality it controls, especially as guest_memfd
support expands beyond purely "private" memory scenarios.
Temporarily keep KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM as an x86-only config so as to
minimize churn, and to hopefully make it easier to see what features
require HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE. On that note, omit GMEM_POPULATE
for KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, as regular ol' memset() suffices for
software-protected VMs.
As for KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM, a future change will select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD
for all 64-bit KVM builds, at which point the intermediate config will
become obsolete and can/will be dropped.
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM and KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES directly
from KVM_INTEL_TDX, i.e. if and only if TDX support is fully enabled in
KVM. There is no need to enable KVM's private memory support just because
the core kernel's INTEL_TDX_HOST is enabled.
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Now that KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM doesn't have a hidden dependency on KVM_X86,
select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM from within KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM instead of
conditionally selecting it from KVM_X86.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Make all vendor neutral KVM x86 configs depend on KVM_X86, not just KVM,
i.e. gate them on at least one vendor module being enabled and thus on
kvm.ko actually being built. Depending on just KVM allows the user to
select the configs even though they won't actually take effect, and more
importantly, makes it all too easy to create unmet dependencies. E.g.
KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM can't be selected by KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM, because
the KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER dependency is select by KVM_X86.
Hiding all sub-configs when neither KVM_AMD nor KVM_INTEL is selected also
helps communicate to the user that nothing "interesting" is going on, e.g.
--- Virtualization
<M> Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support
< > KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support
< > KVM for AMD processors support
Fixes: ea4290d77bda ("KVM: x86: leave kvm.ko out of the build if no vendor module is requested")
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Rename the Kconfig option CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to
CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD. The original name implied that the feature only
supported "private" memory. However, CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM enables
guest_memfd in general, which is not exclusively for private memory.
Subsequent patches in this series will add guest_memfd support for
non-CoCo VMs, whose memory is not private.
Renaming the Kconfig option to CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD more accurately
reflects its broader scope as the main Kconfig option for all
guest_memfd-backed memory. This provides clearer semantics for the
option and avoids confusion as new features are introduced.
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
* Use array_index_nospec() to sanitize the target vCPU ID when handling PV
IPIs and yields as the ID is guest-controlled.
* Drop a superfluous cpumask_empty() check when reclaiming SEV memory, as
the common case, by far, is that at least one CPU will have entered the
VM, and wbnoinvd_on_cpus_mask() will naturally handle the rare case where
the set of have_run_cpus is empty.
* Rename the is_signed_type() macro in kselftest_harness.h to is_signed_var()
to fix a collision with linux/overflow.h. The collision generates compiler
warnings due to the two macros having different implementations.
|
|
Machines can be shipped without any microcode in the BIOS. Which means,
the microcode patch revision is 0.
Handle that gracefully.
Fixes: 94838d230a6c ("x86/microcode/AMD: Use the family,model,stepping encoded in the patch ID")
Reported-by: Vítek Vávra <vit.vavra.kh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
|
|
KVM x86 fixes and a selftest fix for 6.17-rcN
- Use array_index_nospec() to sanitize the target vCPU ID when handling PV
IPIs and yields as the ID is guest-controlled.
- Drop a superfluous cpumask_empty() check when reclaiming SEV memory, as
the common case, by far, is that at least one CPU will have entered the
VM, and wbnoinvd_on_cpus_mask() will naturally handle the rare case where
the set of have_run_cpus is empty.
- Rename the is_signed_type() macro in kselftest_harness.h to is_signed_var()
to fix a collision with linux/overflow.h. The collision generates compiler
warnings due to the two macros having different implementations.
|
|
We have only two users of fixed_phy_add(), both use address 0 and
ignore the return value. So simplify fixed_phy_add() accordingly.
Whilst at it, constify the fixed_phy_status configs.
Note:
fixed_phy_add() is a legacy function which shouldn't be used in new
code, as it's use may be problematic:
- No check whether a fixed phy exists already at the given address
- If fixed_phy_register() is called afterwards by any other driver,
then it will also use phy_addr 0, because fixed_phy_add() ignores
the ida which manages address assignment
Drivers using a fixed phy created by fixed_phy_add() in platform code,
should dynamically create a fixed phy with fixed_phy_register()
instead.
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/762700e5-a0b1-41af-aa03-929822a39475@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
The verifier provides an architecture-independent implementation of the
may_goto instruction, which is currently used on s390x, but it has a
downside: there is no way to prevent progs using it from running for a
very long time.
The solution to this problem is an alternative timed implementation,
which requires architecture-specific bits. Its availability is signaled
to the verifier by bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto() returning true.
The verifier then emits a call to arch_bpf_timed_may_goto() using a
non-standard calling convention. This function must act as a trampoline
for bpf_check_timed_may_goto().
Implement bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto(), account for the special
calling convention in the BPF_CALL implementation, and implement
arch_bpf_timed_may_goto().
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250821113339.292434-2-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
RDPID instruction outputs to a word-sized register (64-bit on x86_64 and
32-bit on x86_32). Use an unsigned long variable to store the correct size.
LSL outputs to 32-bit register, use %k operand prefix to always print the
32-bit name of the register.
Use RDPID insn mnemonic while at it as the minimum binutils version of
2.30 supports it.
[ bp: Merge two patches touching the same function into a single one. ]
Fixes: ffebbaedc861 ("x86/vdso: Introduce helper functions for CPU and node number")
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250616095315.230620-1-ubizjak@gmail.com
|
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Instead of exposing the sparc-optimized MD5 code via sparc-specific
crypto_shash algorithms, instead just implement the md5_blocks() library
function. This is much simpler, it makes the MD5 library functions be
sparc-optimized, and it fixes the longstanding issue where the
sparc-optimized MD5 code was disabled by default. MD5 still remains
available through crypto_shash, but individual architectures no longer
need to handle it.
Note: to see the diff from arch/sparc/crypto/md5_glue.c to
lib/crypto/sparc/md5.h, view this commit with 'git show -M10'.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250805222855.10362-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Instead of exposing the powerpc-optimized MD5 code via powerpc-specific
crypto_shash algorithms, instead just implement the md5_blocks() library
function. This is much simpler, it makes the MD5 library functions be
powerpc-optimized, and it fixes the longstanding issue where the
powerpc-optimized MD5 code was disabled by default. MD5 still remains
available through crypto_shash, but individual architectures no longer
need to handle it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250805222855.10362-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Since octeon-crypto.c is the only remaining source file in
arch/mips/cavium-octeon/crypto/, move it into its parent directory
arch/mips/cavium-octeon/. Then remove the directory
arch/mips/cavium-octeon/crypto/, including its Makefile.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250805222855.10362-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Instead of exposing the mips-optimized MD5 code via mips-specific
crypto_shash algorithms, instead just implement the md5_blocks() library
function. This is much simpler, it makes the MD5 library functions be
mips-optimized, and it fixes the longstanding issue where the
mips-optimized MD5 code was disabled by default. MD5 still remains
available through crypto_shash, but individual architectures no longer
need to handle it.
Note: to see the diff from arch/mips/cavium-octeon/crypto/octeon-md5.c
to lib/crypto/mips/md5.h, view this commit with 'git show -M10'.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250805222855.10362-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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The s390 implementation of ptep_modify_prot_start() currently does
preempt_disable(), and the preempt_enable() is done later in
ptep_modify_prot_commit(). This logic is not really required, because the
PTE lock must be held over the complete prot_start/commit transaction,
as described in the comment of the generic implementation of
ptep_modify_prot_start().
That comment also mentions that this interface should be batchable,
and modify_prot_start_ptes() might start a transaction over a batch of
PTEs, implemented as a simple loop over ptep_modify_prot_start().
In this case, the preempt_disable() in ptep_modify_prot_start() would
be called multiple times, before the corresponding preempt_enable()
calls happen, and this can lead to a preempt_count overflow.
To fix this, simply remove the preempt_disable/enable() calls in
ptep_modify_prot_start/commit(), and rely on the PTE lock being held.
Commit cac1db8c3aad ("mm: optimize mprotect() by PTE batching") made use
of this PTE batching for the first time, and triggers warnings like this:
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON((preempt_count() & PREEMPT_MASK) >= PREEMPT_MASK - 10)
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/mprotect.c:576
Hence, add a Fixes tag on that commit. Not because it is broken, but to
make sure that it won't get backported w/o also this fix for s390.
Fixes: cac1db8c3aad ("mm: optimize mprotect() by PTE batching")
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
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There are only two headers using the K_64 custom constant. Moreover,
its usage tangles a code because the constant is defined in the C
file, while users are in the headers. Replace it with well defined
SZ_64K from sizes.h.
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250825163545.39303-3-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Since the commit 3d86739c6343 ("floppy: always use the track buffer")
the CROSS_64KB() is not used by the driver, remove the leftovers.
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> #parisc
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250825163545.39303-2-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Current minimum required version of binutils is 2.30, which supports ENCLS
instruction mnemonic.
Replace the byte-wise specification of ENCLS with this proper mnemonic.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250616085716.158942-1-ubizjak@gmail.com
|
