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Designate the RK806 PMIC on the Radxa ROCK 5A as the system power
controller, so the board shuts down properly on poweroff(8).
Fixes: 75fdcbc8f4c1 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add PMIC to rock-5a")
Reviewed-by: Dragan Simic <dsimic@manjaro.org>
Signed-off-by: FUKAUMI Naoki <naoki@radxa.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240612033523.37166-1-naoki@radxa.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
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This reverts commit d859ad305ed19d9a77d8c8ecd22459b73da36ba6.
Inserting and removing microSD card is not detected since above commit.
Reverting it fixes this problem.
This is probably the same thing as 5 years ago on rk3399
https://lore.kernel.org/all/0608599d485117a9d99f5fb274fbb1b55f6ba9f7.1547466003.git.robin.murphy@arm.com/
So we'll go back to cd-gpios for now.
this patch is tested on Radxa ROCK 5A and 5B.
Fixes: d859ad305ed1 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: remove redundant cd-gpios from rk3588 sdmmc nodes")
Signed-off-by: FUKAUMI Naoki <naoki@radxa.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613001757.1350-1-naoki@radxa.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
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'#sound-dai-cells' is required to properly interpret
the list of DAI specified in the 'sound-dai' property,
so add them to the 'hdmi' node for 'rk3066a.dtsi'.
Fixes: fadc78062477 ("ARM: dts: rockchip: add rk3066 hdmi nodes")
Signed-off-by: Johan Jonker <jbx6244@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8b229dcc-94e4-4bbc-9efc-9d5ddd694532@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
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rk3399-gru
According to Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/dialog,da7219.yaml,
the value of `dlg,jack-det-rate` property should be "32_64" instead of
"32ms_64ms".
Fixes: dc0ff0fa3a9b ("ASoC: da7219: Add Jack insertion detection polarity")
Signed-off-by: Hsin-Te Yuan <yuanhsinte@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613-jack-rate-v2-2-ebc5f9f37931@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
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mmap_base by default"
This reverts commit 3afb76a66b5559a7b595155803ce23801558a7a9.
This was a wrongheaded workaround for an issue that had already been
fixed much better by commit 4ef9ad19e176 ("mm: huge_memory: don't force
huge page alignment on 32 bit").
Asking users questions at kernel compile time that they can't make sense
of is not a viable strategy. And the fact that even the kernel VM
maintainers apparently didn't catch that this "fix" is not a fix any
more pretty much proves the point that people can't be expected to
understand the implications of the question.
It may well be the case that we could improve things further, and that
__thp_get_unmapped_area() should take the mapping randomization into
account even for 64-bit kernels. Maybe we should not be so eager to use
THP mappings.
But in no case should this be a kernel config option.
Cc: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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In commit 4e4dc65ab578 ("s390/pci: use phys_to_virt() for AIBVs/DIBVs")
the setting of dibv_addr was missed when adding virt_to_phys(). This
only affects systems with directed interrupt delivery enabled which are
not generally available.
Fixes: 4e4dc65ab578 ("s390/pci: use phys_to_virt() for AIBVs/DIBVs")
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
"Mainly MM singleton fixes. And a couple of ocfs2 regression fixes"
* tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2024-06-17-11-43' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm:
kcov: don't lose track of remote references during softirqs
mm: shmem: fix getting incorrect lruvec when replacing a shmem folio
mm/debug_vm_pgtable: drop RANDOM_ORVALUE trick
mm: fix possible OOB in numa_rebuild_large_mapping()
mm/migrate: fix kernel BUG at mm/compaction.c:2761!
selftests: mm: make map_fixed_noreplace test names stable
mm/memfd: add documentation for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC
mm: mmap: allow for the maximum number of bits for randomizing mmap_base by default
gcov: add support for GCC 14
zap_pid_ns_processes: clear TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL along with TIF_SIGPENDING
mm: huge_memory: fix misused mapping_large_folio_support() for anon folios
lib/alloc_tag: fix RCU imbalance in pgalloc_tag_get()
lib/alloc_tag: do not register sysctl interface when CONFIG_SYSCTL=n
MAINTAINERS: remove Lorenzo as vmalloc reviewer
Revert "mm: init_mlocked_on_free_v3"
mm/page_table_check: fix crash on ZONE_DEVICE
gcc: disable '-Warray-bounds' for gcc-9
ocfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_abort_trigger()
ocfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_journal_dirty()
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To allow execution at a level other than VMPL0, an SVSM must be present.
Allow the SEV-SNP guest to continue booting if an SVSM is detected and
the hypervisor supports the SVSM feature as indicated in the GHCB
hypervisor features bitmap.
[ bp: Massage a bit. ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2ce7cf281cce1d0cba88f3f576687ef75dc3c953.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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When an SVSM is present, the guest can also request attestation reports
from it. These SVSM attestation reports can be used to attest the SVSM
and any services running within the SVSM.
Extend the config-fs attestation support to provide such. This involves
creating four new config-fs attributes:
- 'service-provider' (input)
This attribute is used to determine whether the attestation request
should be sent to the specified service provider or to the SEV
firmware. The SVSM service provider is represented by the value
'svsm'.
- 'service_guid' (input)
Used for requesting the attestation of a single service within the
service provider. A null GUID implies that the SVSM_ATTEST_SERVICES
call should be used to request the attestation report. A non-null
GUID implies that the SVSM_ATTEST_SINGLE_SERVICE call should be used.
- 'service_manifest_version' (input)
Used with the SVSM_ATTEST_SINGLE_SERVICE call, the service version
represents a specific service manifest version be used for the
attestation report.
- 'manifestblob' (output)
Used to return the service manifest associated with the attestation
report.
Only display these new attributes when running under an SVSM.
[ bp: Massage.
- s/svsm_attestation_call/svsm_attest_call/g ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/965015dce3c76bb8724839d50c5dea4e4b5d598f.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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Currently, the sev-guest driver uses the vmpck-0 key by default. When an
SVSM is present, the kernel is running at a VMPL other than 0 and the
vmpck-0 key is no longer available. If a specific vmpck key has not be
requested by the user via the vmpck_id module parameter, choose the
vmpck key based on the active VMPL level.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b88081c5d88263176849df8ea93e90a404619cab.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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Requesting an attestation report from userspace involves providing the VMPL
level for the report. Currently any value from 0-3 is valid because Linux
enforces running at VMPL0.
When an SVSM is present, though, Linux will not be running at VMPL0 and only
VMPL values starting at the VMPL level Linux is running at to 3 are valid. In
order to allow userspace to determine the minimum VMPL value that can be
supplied to an attestation report, create a sysfs entry that can be used to
retrieve the current VMPL level of the kernel.
[ bp: Add CONFIG_SYSFS ifdeffery. ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fff846da0d8d561f9fdaf297dcf8cd907545a25b.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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The SVSM specification documents an alternative method of discovery for
the SVSM using a reserved CPUID bit and a reserved MSR. This is intended
for guest components that do not have access to the secrets page in
order to be able to call the SVSM (e.g. UEFI runtime services).
For the MSR support, a new reserved MSR 0xc001f000 has been defined. A #VC
should be generated when accessing this MSR. The #VC handler is expected
to ignore writes to this MSR and return the physical calling area address
(CAA) on reads of this MSR.
While the CPUID leaf is updated, allowing the creation of a CPU feature,
the code will continue to use the VMPL level as an indication of the
presence of an SVSM. This is because the SVSM can be called well before
the CPU feature is in place and a non-zero VMPL requires that an SVSM be
present.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4f93f10a2ff3e9f368fd64a5920d51bf38d0c19e.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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Using the RMPADJUST instruction, the VMSA attribute can only be changed
at VMPL0. An SVSM will be present when running at VMPL1 or a lower
privilege level.
In that case, use the SVSM_CORE_CREATE_VCPU call or the
SVSM_CORE_DESTROY_VCPU call to perform VMSA attribute changes. Use the
VMPL level supplied by the SVSM for the VMSA when starting the AP.
[ bp: Fix typo + touchups. ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bcdd95ecabe9723673b9693c7f1533a2b8f17781.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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The PVALIDATE instruction can only be performed at VMPL0. If an SVSM is
present, it will be running at VMPL0 while the guest itself is then
running at VMPL1 or a lower privilege level.
In that case, use the SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE call to perform memory
validation instead of issuing the PVALIDATE instruction directly.
The validation of a single 4K page is now explicitly identified as such
in the function name, pvalidate_4k_page(). The pvalidate_pages()
function is used for validating 1 or more pages at either 4K or 2M in
size. Each function, however, determines whether it can issue the
PVALIDATE directly or whether the SVSM needs to be invoked.
[ bp: Touchups. ]
[ Tom: fold in a fix for Coconut SVSM:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/234bb23c-d295-76e5-a690-7ea68dc1118b@amd.com ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4c4017d8b94512d565de9ccb555b1a9f8983c69c.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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Unknown uncore PMON types can be found in both SPR and EMR with HBM or
CXL.
$ls /sys/devices/ | grep type
uncore_type_12_16
uncore_type_12_18
uncore_type_12_2
uncore_type_12_4
uncore_type_12_6
uncore_type_12_8
uncore_type_13_17
uncore_type_13_19
uncore_type_13_3
uncore_type_13_5
uncore_type_13_7
uncore_type_13_9
The unknown PMON types are HBM and CXL PMON. Except for the name, the
other information regarding the HBM and CXL PMON counters can be
retrieved via the discovery table. Add them into the uncores tables for
SPR and EMR.
The event config registers for all CXL related units are 8-byte apart.
Add SPR_UNCORE_MMIO_OFFS8_COMMON_FORMAT to specially handle it.
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614134631.1092359-9-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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The unit control and ID information are retrieved from the unit control
RB tree. No one uses the old structure anymore. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614134631.1092359-8-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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The unit control RB tree has the unit control and unit ID information
for all the PCI units. Use them to replace the box_ctls/pci_offsets to
get an accurate unit control address for PCI uncore units.
The UPI/M3UPI units in the discovery table are ignored. Please see the
commit 65248a9a9ee1 ("perf/x86/uncore: Add a quirk for UPI on SPR").
Manually allocate a unit control RB tree for UPI/M3UPI.
Add cleanup_extra_boxes to release such manual allocation.
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614134631.1092359-7-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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The unit control RB tree has the unit control and unit ID information
for all the MSR units. Use them to replace the box_ctl and
uncore_msr_box_ctl() to get an accurate unit control address for MSR
uncore units.
Add intel_generic_uncore_assign_hw_event(), which utilizes the accurate
unit control address from the unit control RB tree to calculate the
config_base and event_base.
The unit id related information should be retrieved from the unit
control RB tree as well.
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614134631.1092359-6-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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The unit control RB tree has the unit control and unit ID information
for all the units. Use it to replace the box_ctls/mmio_offsets to get
an accurate unit control address for MMIO uncore units.
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614134631.1092359-5-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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The box_ids only save the unit ID for the first die. If a unit, e.g., a
CXL unit, doesn't exist in the first die. The unit ID cannot be
retrieved.
The unit control RB tree also stores the unit ID information.
Retrieve the unit ID from the unit control RB tree
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614134631.1092359-4-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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The cpumask of some uncore units, e.g., CXL uncore units, may be wrong
under some configurations. Perf may access an uncore counter of a
non-existent uncore unit.
The uncore driver assumes that all uncore units are symmetric among
dies. A global cpumask is shared among all uncore PMUs. However, some
CXL uncore units may only be available on some dies.
A per PMU cpumask is introduced to track the CPU mask of this PMU.
The driver searches the unit control RB tree to check whether the PMU is
available on a given die, and updates the per PMU cpumask accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614134631.1092359-3-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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The unit control address of some CXL units may be wrongly calculated
under some configuration on a EMR machine.
The current implementation only saves the unit control address of the
units from the first die, and the first unit of the rest of dies. Perf
assumed that the units from the other dies have the same offset as the
first die. So the unit control address of the rest of the units can be
calculated. However, the assumption is wrong, especially for the CXL
units.
Introduce an RB tree for each uncore type to save the unit control
address and three kinds of ID information (unit ID, PMU ID, and die ID)
for all units.
The unit ID is a physical ID of a unit.
The PMU ID is a logical ID assigned to a unit. The logical IDs start
from 0 and must be contiguous. The physical ID and the logical ID are
1:1 mapping. The units with the same physical ID in different dies share
the same PMU.
The die ID indicates which die a unit belongs to.
The RB tree can be searched by two different keys (unit ID or PMU ID +
die ID). During the RB tree setup, the unit ID is used as a key to look
up the RB tree. The perf can create/assign a proper PMU ID to the unit.
Later, after the RB tree is setup, PMU ID + die ID is used as a key to
look up the RB tree to fill the cpumask of a PMU. It's used more
frequently, so PMU ID + die ID is compared in the unit_less().
The uncore_find_unit() has to be O(N). But the RB tree setup only occurs
once during the driver load time. It should be acceptable.
Compared with the current implementation, more space is required to save
the information of all units. The extra size should be acceptable.
For example, on EMR, there are 221 units at most. For a 2-socket machine,
the extra space is ~6KB at most.
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614134631.1092359-2-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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MADT Multiprocessor Wakeup structure version 1 brings support for CPU offlining:
BIOS provides a reset vector where the CPU has to jump to for offlining itself.
The new TEST mailbox command can be used to test whether the CPU offlined itself
which means the BIOS has control over the CPU and can online it again via the
ACPI MADT wakeup method.
Add CPU offlining support for the ACPI MADT wakeup method by implementing custom
cpu_die(), play_dead() and stop_this_cpu() SMP operations.
CPU offlining makes it possible to hand over secondary CPUs over kexec, not
limiting the second kernel to a single CPU.
The change conforms to the approved ACPI spec change proposal. See the Link.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/13356251.uLZWGnKmhe@kreacher
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-19-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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The helper complements kernel_ident_mapping_init(): it frees the identity
mapping that was previously allocated. It will be used in the error path to free
a partially allocated mapping or if the mapping is no longer needed.
The caller provides a struct x86_mapping_info with the free_pgd_page() callback
hooked up and the pgd_t to free.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-18-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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If the helper is defined, it is called instead of halt() to stop the CPU at the
end of stop_this_cpu() and on crash CPU shutdown.
ACPI MADT will use it to hand over the CPU to BIOS in order to be able to wake
it up again after kexec.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-17-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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ACPI MADT doesn't allow to offline a CPU after it was onlined. This limits
kexec: the second kernel won't be able to use more than one CPU.
To prevent a kexec kernel from onlining secondary CPUs, invalidate the mailbox
address in the ACPI MADT wakeup structure which prevents a kexec kernel to use
it.
This is safe as the booting kernel has the mailbox address cached already and
acpi_wakeup_cpu() uses the cached value to bring up the secondary CPUs.
Note: This is a Linux specific convention and not covered by the ACPI
specification.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-16-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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In order to support MADT wakeup structure version 1, provide more appropriate
names for the fields in the structure.
Rename 'mailbox_version' to 'version'. This field signifies the version of the
structure and the related protocols, rather than the version of the mailbox.
This field has not been utilized in the code thus far.
Rename 'base_address' to 'mailbox_address' to clarify the kind of address it
represents. In version 1, the structure includes the reset vector address. Clear
and distinct naming helps to prevent any confusion.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-15-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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kdump
During crashkernel boot only pre-allocated crash memory is presented as
E820_TYPE_RAM.
This can cause page table entries mapping unaccepted memory table to be zapped
during phys_pte_init(), phys_pmd_init(), phys_pud_init() and phys_p4d_init() as
SNP/TDX guest use E820_TYPE_ACPI to store the unaccepted memory table and pass
it between the kernels on kexec/kdump.
E820_TYPE_ACPI covers not only ACPI data, but also EFI tables and might be
required by kernel to function properly.
The problem was discovered during debugging kdump for SNP guest. The unaccepted
memory table stored with E820_TYPE_ACPI and passed between the kernels on kdump
was getting zapped as the PMD entry mapping this is above the E820_TYPE_RAM
range for the reserved crashkernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-14-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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e820__end_of_ram_pfn() is used to calculate max_pfn which, among other things,
guides where direct mapping ends. Any memory above max_pfn is not going to be
present in the direct mapping.
e820__end_of_ram_pfn() finds the end of the RAM based on the highest
E820_TYPE_RAM range. But it doesn't includes E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges into
calculation.
Despite the name, E820_TYPE_ACPI covers not only ACPI data, but also EFI tables
and might be required by kernel to function properly.
Usually the problem is hidden because there is some E820_TYPE_RAM memory above
E820_TYPE_ACPI. But crashkernel only presents pre-allocated crash memory as
E820_TYPE_RAM on boot. If the pre-allocated range is small, it can fit under the
last E820_TYPE_ACPI range.
Modify e820__end_of_ram_pfn() and e820__end_of_low_ram_pfn() to cover
E820_TYPE_ACPI memory.
The problem was discovered during debugging kexec for TDX guest. TDX guest uses
E820_TYPE_ACPI to store the unaccepted memory bitmap and pass it between the
kernels on kexec.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-13-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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TDX guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by allocating
pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them to shared with
set_memory_decrypted().
The second, kexec-ed kernel has no idea what memory is converted this way. It
only sees E820_TYPE_RAM.
Accessing shared memory via private mapping is fatal. It leads to unrecoverable
TD exit.
On kexec, walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private. It
makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it normally.
The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and unsharing all
memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of conversions takes place
while scheduling is still functioning. This allows for waiting until any ongoing
conversions are finished. The second step is carried out when all CPUs except one
are inactive and interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code
that may access shared memory.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-12-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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AMD SEV and Intel TDX guests allocate shared buffers for performing I/O.
This is done by allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and
then converting them to shared using set_memory_decrypted().
On kexec, the second kernel is unaware of which memory has been
converted in this manner. It only sees E820_TYPE_RAM. Accessing shared
memory as private is fatal.
Therefore, the memory state must be reset to its original state before
starting the new kernel with kexec.
The process of converting shared memory back to private occurs in two
steps:
- enc_kexec_begin() stops new conversions.
- enc_kexec_finish() unshares all existing shared memory, reverting it
back to private.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-11-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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The kernel will convert all shared memory back to private during kexec.
The direct mapping page tables will provide information on which memory
is shared.
It is extremely important to convert all shared memory. If a page is
missed, it will cause the second kernel to crash when it accesses it.
Keep track of the number of shared pages. This will allow for
cross-checking against the shared information in the direct mapping and
reporting if the shared bit is lost.
Memory conversion is slow and does not happen often. Global atomic is
not going to be a bottleneck.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-10-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Currently, lookup_address() returns two things:
1. A "pte_t" (which might be a p[g4um]d_t)
2. The 'level' of the page tables where the "pte_t" was found
(returned via a pointer)
If no pte_t is found, 'level' is essentially garbage.
Always fill out the level. For NULL "pte_t"s, fill in the level where
the p*d_none() entry was found mirroring the "found" behavior.
Always filling out the level allows using lookup_address() to precisely skip
over holes when walking kernel page tables.
Add one more entry into enum pg_level to indicate the size of the VA
covered by one PGD entry in 5-level paging mode.
Update comments for lookup_address() and lookup_address_in_pgd() to
reflect changes in the interface.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-9-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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TDX is going to have more than one reason to fail enc_status_change_prepare().
Change the callback to return errno instead of assuming -EIO. Change
enc_status_change_finish() too to keep the interface symmetric.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-8-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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TDX guests run with MCA enabled (CR4.MCE=1b) from the very start. If
that bit is cleared during CR4 register reprogramming during boot or kexec
flows, a #VE exception will be raised which the guest kernel cannot handle.
Therefore, make sure the CR4.MCE setting is preserved over kexec too and avoid
raising any #VEs.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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That identity_mapped() function was loving that "1" label to the point of
completely confusing its readers.
Use named labels in each place for clarity.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-6-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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ACPI MADT doesn't allow to offline a CPU after it has been woken up.
Currently, CPU hotplug is prevented based on the confidential computing
attribute which is set for Intel TDX. But TDX is not the only possible user of
the wake up method. Any platform that uses ACPI MADT wakeup method cannot
offline CPU.
Disable CPU offlining on ACPI MADT wakeup enumeration.
This has no visible effects for users: currently, TDX guest is the only platform
that uses the ACPI MADT wakeup method.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr and acpi_mp_wake_mailbox are initialized once during
ACPI MADT init and never changed.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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In order to prepare for the expansion of support for the ACPI MADT
wakeup method, move the relevant code into a separate file.
Introduce a new configuration option to clearly indicate dependencies
without the use of ifdefs.
There have been no functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614095904.1345461-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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This seemingly straightforward JMP was introduced in the initial version
of the the 64bit kexec code without any explanation.
It turns out (check accompanying Link) it's likely a copy/paste artefact
from 32-bit code, where such a JMP could be used as a serializing
instruction for the 486's prefetch queue. On x86_64 that's not needed
because there's already a preceding write to cr4 which itself is
a serializing operation.
[ bp: Typos. Let's try this and see what cries out. If it does,
reverting it is trivial. ]
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/55bc0649-c017-49ab-905d-212f140a403f@citrix.com/
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um_pci_init() uses __irq_domain_add(). With the introduction of
irq_domain_instantiate(), __irq_domain_add() becomes obsolete.
In order to fully remove __irq_domain_add(), use directly
irq_domain_instantiate().
[ tglx: Fixup struct initializer ]
Signed-off-by: Herve Codina <herve.codina@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614173232.1184015-20-herve.codina@bootlin.com
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While updating the cpus node, commit 40c753993e3a ("powerpc/kexec_file:
Use current CPU info while setting up FDT") first deletes all subnodes
under the /cpus node. However, while adding sub-nodes back, it missed
adding cpus subnodes whose device_type != "cpu", such as l2-cache*,
l3-cache*, ibm,powerpc-cpu-features.
Fix this by only deleting cpus sub-nodes of device_type == "cpus" and
then adding all available nodes with device_type == "cpu".
Fixes: 40c753993e3a ("powerpc/kexec_file: Use current CPU info while setting up FDT")
Signed-off-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240510102235.2269496-3-sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com
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While setting up the FDT for kexec, CPU nodes that are added after the
system boots and reserved memory ranges are incorporated into the
initial_boot_params (base FDT).
However, they are not taken into account when determining the additional
size needed for the kexec FDT. As a result, kexec fails to load,
generating the following error:
[1116.774451] Error updating memory reserve map: FDT_ERR_NOSPACE
kexec_file_load failed: No such process
Therefore, consider the extra size for CPU nodes added post-system boot
and reserved memory ranges while preparing the kexec FDT.
While adding a new parameter to the setup_new_fdt_ppc64 function, it was
noticed that there were a couple of unused parameters, so they were
removed.
Signed-off-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240510102235.2269496-2-sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com
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Currently in some cases, when the sampled instruction address register
latches to a specific address during sampling, the privilege bits
captured in the sampled event register are incorrect.
For example, a snippet from the perf report on a power10 system is:
Overhead Address Command Shared Object Symbol
........ .................. ............ ................. .......................
2.41% 0x7fff9f94a02c null_syscall [unknown] [k] 0x00007fff9f94a02c
2.20% 0x7fff9f94a02c null_syscall libc.so.6 [.] syscall
perf_get_misc_flags() function looks at the privilege bits to return
the corresponding flags to be used for the address symbol and these
privilege bit details are read from the sampled event register. In the
above snippet, address "0x00007fff9f94a02c" is shown as "k" (kernel) due
to the incorrect privilege bits captured in the sampled event register.
To address this case check whether the sampled address is in the kernel
area. Since this is specific to the latest platform, a new pmu flag
is added called "PPMU_P10" and is used to contain the proposed fix.
PPMU_P10_DD1 marked events are also included under PPMU_P10, hence
remove the code specific to PPMU_P10_DD1 marked events.
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com <mailto:atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240528040356.2722275-1-anjalik@linux.ibm.com
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Add pwm-fan node to control fan through hwmon and change
pwm-cells property to 3 to allow fancontrol utility to
function correctly.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Patel <vishal.patel@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ff6b4dbfc9bb1b53769ffbf7d0e932c7a8be7c08.1716802450.git.michal.simek@amd.com
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Revision 2 is SW compatible with revision 1 but it is necessary to reflect
it in model and compatible properties which are parsed by user space.
Rev 2 has improved a power on boot reset and MIO34 shutdown glich
improvement done via an additional filter in the GreenPak chip.
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/458698666fdfcaaac70967d9f755422a480bed99.1716802450.git.michal.simek@amd.com
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Add a device tree node to describe the DisplayPort connector, and
connect it to the DPSUB output.
The patch was tested on kv260-revB/rev2.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Sagar <vishal.sagar@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4f69489c005719d280b8df97f3e82a5ce0cd9660.1716802450.git.michal.simek@amd.com
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The commit f7ab2d180e6a ("dt-bindings: hwmon: ina2xx: Describe ina260
chip"), commit f29996d0295e ("dt-bindings: hwmon: ina2xx:
Describe #io-channel-cells property") and commit eea32fafadd3
("dt-bindings: hwmon: ina2xx: Add label property") added description for
ina260 that's why describe them on kv260
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/944cba76ef5df932f1bebde6c5e64ec9d201356d.1716802450.git.michal.simek@amd.com
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The commit dbcd27526e6a ("dt-bindings: soc: xilinx: Add support for KV260
CC") added description for kv260 kit and it should be also reflected in
DTs.
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1e436f82182a92187f3892401664db2507482870.1716802450.git.michal.simek@amd.com
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Since the zynqmp pinctrl driver now includes support for the
tri-state registers, ensure that the pins needing output-enable
are correctly configured for SOMs.
Currently, there is an issue with the detection of the MMC for
the SOM kv260, resulting in the following error:
ZynqMP> mmc dev 1
Card did not respond to voltage select! : -110
To address this problem, configure the SDIO pins for output-enable
to enable MMC detection.
Signed-off-by: Tejas Bhumkar <tejas.arvind.bhumkar@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/540f83f7d88b80441c9fa3d771dd7b000b0710a4.1716802450.git.michal.simek@amd.com
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