kernel.git/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c, branch master

selftests/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC tests

2026-02-06T16:54:39Z

Exercise various scenarios where Landlock domains are enforced across all of a processes' threads. Test coverage for security/landlock is 91.6% of 2130 lines according to LLVM 21. Cc: Andrew G. Morgan Cc: John Johansen Cc: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Günther Noack Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251127115136.3064948-3-gnoack@google.com [mic: Fix subject, use EXPECT_EQ(close()), make helpers static, add test coverage] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün

landlock: Multithreading support for landlock_restrict_self()

2026-02-06T16:54:37Z

Introduce the LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC flag. With this flag, a given Landlock ruleset is applied to all threads of the calling process, instead of only the current one. Without this flag, multithreaded userspace programs currently resort to using the nptl(7)/libpsx hack for multithreaded policy enforcement, which is also used by libcap and for setuid(2). Using this userspace-based scheme, the threads of a process enforce the same Landlock policy, but the resulting Landlock domains are still separate. The domains being separate causes multiple problems: * When using Landlock's "scoped" access rights, the domain identity is used to determine whether an operation is permitted. As a result, when using LANLDOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL, signaling between sibling threads stops working. This is a problem for programming languages and frameworks which are inherently multithreaded (e.g. Go). * In audit logging, the domains of separate threads in a process will get logged with different domain IDs, even when they are based on the same ruleset FD, which might confuse users. Cc: Andrew G. Morgan Cc: John Johansen Cc: Paul Moore Suggested-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Günther Noack Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251127115136.3064948-2-gnoack@google.com [mic: Fix restrict_self_flags test, clean up Makefile, allign comments, reduce local variable scope, add missing includes] Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/2 Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün

selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags

2025-03-26T12:59:45Z

Add the base_test's restrict_self_fd_flags tests to align with previous restrict_self_fd tests but with the new LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF flag. Add the restrict_self_flags tests to check that LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF, LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON, and LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF are valid but not the next bit. Some checks are similar to restrict_self_checks_ordering's ones. Cc: Günther Noack Cc: Paul Moore Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-22-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün

selftests/landlock: Add test for invalid ruleset file descriptor

2025-03-26T12:59:44Z

To align with fs_test's layout1.inval and layout0.proc_nsfs which test EBADFD for landlock_add_rule(2), create a new base_test's restrict_self_fd which test EBADFD for landlock_restrict_self(2). Cc: Günther Noack Cc: Paul Moore Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-21-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün

landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG__EXEC_ flags

2025-03-26T12:59:42Z

Most of the time we want to log denied access because they should not happen and such information helps diagnose issues. However, when sandboxing processes that we know will try to access denied resources (e.g. unknown, bogus, or malicious binary), we might want to not log related access requests that might fill up logs. By default, denied requests are logged until the task call execve(2). If the LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF flag is set, denied requests will not be logged for the same executed file. If the LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON flag is set, denied requests from after an execve(2) call will be logged. The rationale is that a program should know its own behavior, but not necessarily the behavior of other programs. Because LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF is set for a specific Landlock domain, it makes it possible to selectively mask some access requests that would be logged by a parent domain, which might be handy for unprivileged processes to limit logs. However, system administrators should still use the audit filtering mechanism. There is intentionally no audit nor sysctl configuration to re-enable these logs. This is delegated to the user space program. Increment the Landlock ABI version to reflect this interface change. Cc: Günther Noack Cc: Paul Moore Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-18-mic@digikod.net [mic: Rename variables and fix __maybe_unused] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün

landlock: Add the errata interface

2025-03-21T11:12:19Z

Some fixes may require user space to check if they are applied on the running kernel before using a specific feature. For instance, this applies when a restriction was previously too restrictive and is now getting relaxed (e.g. for compatibility reasons). However, non-visible changes for legitimate use (e.g. security fixes) do not require an erratum. Because fixes are backported down to a specific Landlock ABI, we need a way to avoid cherry-pick conflicts. The solution is to only update a file related to the lower ABI impacted by this issue. All the ABI files are then used to create a bitmask of fixes. The new errata interface is similar to the one used to get the supported Landlock ABI version, but it returns a bitmask instead because the order of fixes may not match the order of versions, and not all fixes may apply to all versions. The actual errata will come with dedicated commits. The description is not actually used in the code but serves as documentation. Create the landlock_abi_version symbol and use its value to check errata consistency. Update test_base's create_ruleset_checks_ordering tests and add errata tests. This commit is backportable down to the first version of Landlock. Fixes: 3532b0b4352c ("landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features") Cc: Günther Noack Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-3-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün

landlock: Add abstract UNIX socket scoping

2024-09-16T21:50:45Z

Introduce a new "scoped" member to landlock_ruleset_attr that can specify LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET to restrict connection to abstract UNIX sockets from a process outside of the socket's domain. Two hooks are implemented to enforce these restrictions: unix_stream_connect and unix_may_send. Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/7 Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5f7ad85243b78427242275b93481cfc7c127764b.1725494372.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com [mic: Fix commit message formatting, improve documentation, simplify hook_unix_may_send(), and cosmetic fixes including rename of LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET] Co-developed-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün

selftests/landlock: Add cred_transfer test

2024-07-24T15:34:56Z

Check that keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT) preserves the parent's restrictions. Fixes: e1199815b47b ("selftests/landlock: Add user space tests") Co-developed-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240724.Ood5aige9she@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün

landlock: Add IOCTL access right for character and block devices

2024-05-13T04:58:29Z

Introduces the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right and increments the Landlock ABI version to 5. This access right applies to device-custom IOCTL commands when they are invoked on block or character device files. Like the truncate right, this right is associated with a file descriptor at the time of open(2), and gets respected even when the file descriptor is used outside of the thread which it was originally opened in. Therefore, a newly enabled Landlock policy does not apply to file descriptors which are already open. If the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right is handled, only a small number of safe IOCTL commands will be permitted on newly opened device files. These include FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO and FIOASYNC, as well as other IOCTL commands for regular files which are implemented in fs/ioctl.c. Noteworthy scenarios which require special attention: TTY devices are often passed into a process from the parent process, and so a newly enabled Landlock policy does not retroactively apply to them automatically. In the past, TTY devices have often supported IOCTL commands like TIOCSTI and some TIOCLINUX subcommands, which were letting callers control the TTY input buffer (and simulate keypresses). This should be restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN programs on modern kernels though. Known limitations: The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV access right is a coarse-grained control over IOCTL commands. Landlock users may use path-based restrictions in combination with their knowledge about the file system layout to control what IOCTLs can be done. Cc: Paul Moore Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Günther Noack Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240419161122.2023765-2-gnoack@google.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün

selftests: kselftest_harness: save full exit code in metadata

2024-03-01T10:30:28Z

Instead of tracking passed = 0/1 rename the field to exit_code and invert the values so that they match the KSFT_* exit codes. This will allow us to fold SKIP / XFAIL into the same value. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller