kernel.git/tools/arch/x86, branch linux-5.18.y

x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections

2022-08-11T11:20:44Z

commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream. tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE. == Background == Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e. Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires the MSR to be written on every privilege level change. To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change. When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests. == Problem == Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM: void run_kvm_guest(void) { // Prepare to run guest VMRESUME(); // Clean up after guest runs } The execution flow for that would look something like this to the processor: 1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest() 2. Host-side: VMRESUME 3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function" 4. VM exit, host runs again 5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls 6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest() Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code: * on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing. * on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff the last RSB entry "by hand". IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL instruction. However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem since the (untrusted) guest controls this address. Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected. == Solution == The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e., eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly. However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT and most of them need a new mitigation. Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT. The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline -- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET. Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an LFENCE. In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window with the LFENCE. There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB. Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB. Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO. [ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ] Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources

2022-07-23T10:56:59Z

commit f098addbdb44c8a565367f5162f3ab170ed9404a upstream. To pick the changes from: f43b9876e857c739 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs") a149180fbcf336e9 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk") 15e67227c49a5783 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage") 369ae6ffc41a3c11 ("x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery") 4ad3278df6fe2b08 x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior 26aae8ccbc197223 x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO 9756bba28470722d x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS 3ebc170068885b6f x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb 2dbb887e875b1de3 x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation 6b80b59b35557065 x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability a149180fbcf336e9 x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk 15e67227c49a5783 x86: Undo return-thunk damage a883d624aed463c8 x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 51802186158c74a0 x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt: CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o And addresses this perf build warning: Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h Cc: Adrian Hunter Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Ian Rogers Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources

2022-07-23T10:56:59Z

commit 91d248c3b903b46a58cbc7e8d38d684d3e4007c2 upstream. To pick up the changes from these csets: 4ad3278df6fe2b08 ("x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior") d7caac991feeef1b ("x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken") That cause no changes to tooling: $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before $ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after $ diff -u before after $ Just silences this perf build warning: Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h Cc: Adrian Hunter Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Ian Rogers Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Pawan Gupta Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQTm9wsB3hxQWvy@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior

2022-07-23T10:56:57Z

commit 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e upstream. Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI. Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines, eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target may get influenced by branch history. A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2). For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests

2022-06-16T11:32:05Z

commit 027bbb884be006b05d9c577d6401686053aa789e upstream The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill buffers. Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS. Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug

2022-06-16T11:32:03Z

commit 51802186158c74a0304f51ab963e7c2b3a2b046f upstream Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/tsx: Disable TSX development mode at boot

2022-04-11T07:58:40Z

A microcode update on some Intel processors causes all TSX transactions to always abort by default[*]. Microcode also added functionality to re-enable TSX for development purposes. With this microcode loaded, if tsx=on was passed on the cmdline, and TSX development mode was already enabled before the kernel boot, it may make the system vulnerable to TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA). To be on safer side, unconditionally disable TSX development mode during boot. If a viable use case appears, this can be revisited later. [*]: Intel TSX Disable Update for Selected Processors, doc ID: 643557 [ bp: Drop unstable web link, massage heavily. ] Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/347bd844da3a333a9793c6687d4e4eb3b2419a3e.1646943780.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com

tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources

2022-04-01T19:19:35Z

To pick the changes from: 991625f3dd2cbc4b ("x86/ibt: Add IBT feature, MSR and #CP handling") This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt: CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o And addresses this perf build warning: Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YkSCx2kr4ambH+Qe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources

2022-04-01T19:19:35Z

To pick up the changes in: 991625f3dd2cbc4b ("x86/ibt: Add IBT feature, MSR and #CP handling") Addressing these tools/perf build warnings: diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' That makes the beautification scripts to pick some new entries: $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before $ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after $ diff -u before after --- before 2022-03-29 16:23:07.678740040 -0300 +++ after 2022-03-29 16:23:16.960978524 -0300 @@ -220,6 +220,13 @@ [0x00000669] = "MC6_DEMOTION_POLICY_CONFIG", [0x00000680] = "LBR_NHM_FROM", [0x00000690] = "CORE_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS", + [0x000006a0] = "IA32_U_CET", + [0x000006a2] = "IA32_S_CET", + [0x000006a4] = "IA32_PL0_SSP", + [0x000006a5] = "IA32_PL1_SSP", + [0x000006a6] = "IA32_PL2_SSP", + [0x000006a7] = "IA32_PL3_SSP", + [0x000006a8] = "IA32_INT_SSP_TAB", [0x000006B0] = "GFX_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS", [0x000006B1] = "RING_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS", [0x000006c0] = "LBR_NHM_TO", $ And this gets rebuilt: CC /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.o LD /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/perf-in.o LD /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/perf-in.o CC /tmp/build/perf/util/amd-sample-raw.o LD /tmp/build/perf/util/perf-in.o LD /tmp/build/perf/perf-in.o LINK /tmp/build/perf/perf Now one can trace systemwide asking to see backtraces to where those MSRs are being read/written with: # perf trace -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=IA32_U_CET && msr<=IA32_INT_SSP_TAB" ^C# If we use -v (verbose mode) we can see what it does behind the scenes: # perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=IA32_U_CET && msr<=IA32_INT_SSP_TAB" Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0 0x6a0 0x6a8 New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr>=0x6a0 && msr<=0x6a8) && (common_pid != 597499 && common_pid != 3313) 0x6a0 0x6a8 New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr>=0x6a0 && msr<=0x6a8) && (common_pid != 597499 && common_pid != 3313) mmap size 528384B ^C# Example with a frequent msr: # perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr==IA32_SPEC_CTRL" --max-events 2 Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0 0x48 New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841) 0x48 New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841) mmap size 528384B Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long) symsrc__init: build id mismatch for vmlinux. Using /proc/kcore for kernel data Using /proc/kallsyms for symbols 0.000 Timer/2525383 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 6) do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms]) do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms]) __switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms]) __switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms]) __schedule ([kernel.kallsyms]) schedule ([kernel.kallsyms]) futex_wait_queue_me ([kernel.kallsyms]) futex_wait ([kernel.kallsyms]) do_futex ([kernel.kallsyms]) __x64_sys_futex ([kernel.kallsyms]) do_syscall_64 ([kernel.kallsyms]) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe ([kernel.kallsyms]) __futex_abstimed_wait_common64 (/usr/lib64/libpthread-2.33.so) 0.030 :0/0 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 2) do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms]) do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms]) __switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms]) __switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms]) __schedule ([kernel.kallsyms]) schedule_idle ([kernel.kallsyms]) do_idle ([kernel.kallsyms]) cpu_startup_entry ([kernel.kallsyms]) secondary_startup_64_no_verify ([kernel.kallsyms]) # Cc: Adrian Hunter Cc: Ian Rogers Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YkNd7Ky+vi7H2Zl2@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

Merge tag 'perf-tools-for-v5.18-2022-03-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux

2022-03-27T20:42:32Z

Pull perf tools updates from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo: "New features: perf ftrace: - Add -n/--use-nsec option to the 'latency' subcommand. Default: usecs: $ sudo perf ftrace latency -T dput -a sleep 1 # DURATION | COUNT | GRAPH | 0 - 1 us | 2098375 | ############################# | 1 - 2 us | 61 | | 2 - 4 us | 33 | | 4 - 8 us | 13 | | 8 - 16 us | 124 | | 16 - 32 us | 123 | | 32 - 64 us | 1 | | 64 - 128 us | 0 | | 128 - 256 us | 1 | | 256 - 512 us | 0 | | Better granularity with nsec: $ sudo perf ftrace latency -T dput -a -n sleep 1 # DURATION | COUNT | GRAPH | 0 - 1 us | 0 | | 1 - 2 ns | 0 | | 2 - 4 ns | 0 | | 4 - 8 ns | 0 | | 8 - 16 ns | 0 | | 16 - 32 ns | 0 | | 32 - 64 ns | 0 | | 64 - 128 ns | 1163434 | ############## | 128 - 256 ns | 914102 | ############# | 256 - 512 ns | 884 | | 512 - 1024 ns | 613 | | 1 - 2 us | 31 | | 2 - 4 us | 17 | | 4 - 8 us | 7 | | 8 - 16 us | 123 | | 16 - 32 us | 83 | | perf lock: - Add -c/--combine-locks option to merge lock instances in the same class into a single entry. # perf lock report -c Name acquired contended avg wait(ns) total wait(ns) max wait(ns) min wait(ns) rcu_read_lock 251225 0 0 0 0 0 hrtimer_bases.lock 39450 0 0 0 0 0 &sb->s_type->i_l... 10301 1 662 662 662 662 ptlock_ptr(page) 10173 2 701 1402 760 642 &(ei->i_block_re... 8732 0 0 0 0 0 &xa->xa_lock 8088 0 0 0 0 0 &base->lock 6705 0 0 0 0 0 &p->pi_lock 5549 0 0 0 0 0 &dentry->d_lockr... 5010 4 1274 5097 1844 789 &ep->lock 3958 0 0 0 0 0 - Add -F/--field option to customize the list of fields to output: $ perf lock report -F contended,wait_max -k avg_wait Name contended max wait(ns) avg wait(ns) slock-AF_INET6 1 23543 23543 &lruvec->lru_lock 5 18317 11254 slock-AF_INET6 1 10379 10379 rcu_node_1 1 2104 2104 &dentry->d_lockr... 1 1844 1844 &dentry->d_lockr... 1 1672 1672 &newf->file_lock 15 2279 1025 &dentry->d_lockr... 1 792 792 - Add --synth=no option for record, as there is no need to symbolize, lock names comes from the tracepoints. perf record: - Threaded recording, opt-in, via the new --threads command line option. - Improve AMD IBS (Instruction-Based Sampling) error handling messages. perf script: - Add 'brstackinsnlen' field (use it with -F) for branch stacks. - Output branch sample type in 'perf script'. perf report: - Add "addr_from" and "addr_to" sort dimensions. - Print branch stack entry type in 'perf report --dump-raw-trace' - Fix symbolization for chrooted workloads. Hardware tracing: Intel PT: - Add CFE (Control Flow Event) and EVD (Event Data) packets support. - Add MODE.Exec IFLAG bit support. Explanation about these features from the "Intel® 64 and IA-32 architectures software developer’s manual combined volumes: 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, and 4" PDF at: https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671200 At page 3951: "32.2.4 Event Trace is a capability that exposes details about the asynchronous events, when they are generated, and when their corresponding software event handler completes execution. These include: o Interrupts, including NMI and SMI, including the interrupt vector when defined. o Faults, exceptions including the fault vector. - Page faults additionally include the page fault address, when in context. o Event handler returns, including IRET and RSM. o VM exits and VM entries.¹ - VM exits include the values written to the “exit reason” and “exit qualification” VMCS fields. INIT and SIPI events. o TSX aborts, including the abort status returned for the RTM instructions. o Shutdown. Additionally, it provides indication of the status of the Interrupt Flag (IF), to indicate when interrupts are masked" ARM CoreSight: - Use advertised caps/min_interval as default sample_period on ARM spe. - Update deduction of TRCCONFIGR register for branch broadcast on ARM's CoreSight ETM. Vendor Events (JSON): Intel: - Update events and metrics for: Alderlake, Broadwell, Broadwell DE, BroadwellX, CascadelakeX, Elkhartlake, Bonnell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus, Westmere EP-DP, Haswell, HaswellX, Icelake, IcelakeX, Ivybridge, Ivytown, Jaketown, Knights Landing, Nehalem EP, Sandybridge, Silvermont, Skylake, Skylake Server, SkylakeX, Tigerlake, TremontX, Westmere EP-SP, and Westmere EX. ARM: - Add support for HiSilicon CPA PMU aliasing. perf stat: - Fix forked applications enablement of counters. - The 'slots' should only be printed on a different order than the one specified on the command line when 'topdown' events are present, fix it. Miscellaneous: - Sync msr-index, cpufeatures header files with the kernel sources. - Stop using some deprecated libbpf APIs in 'perf trace'. - Fix some spelling mistakes. - Refactor the maps pointers usage to pave the way for using refcount debugging. - Only offer the --tui option on perf top, report and annotate when perf was built with libslang. - Don't mention --to-ctf in 'perf data --help' when not linking with the required library, libbabeltrace. - Use ARRAY_SIZE() instead of ad hoc equivalent, spotted by array_size.cocci. - Enhance the matching of sub-commands abbreviations: 'perf c2c rec' -> 'perf c2c record' 'perf c2c recport -> error - Set build-id using build-id header on new mmap records. - Fix generation of 'perf --version' string. perf test: - Add test for the arm_spe event. - Add test to check unwinding using fame-pointer (fp) mode on arm64. - Make metric testing more robust in 'perf test'. - Add error message for unsupported branch stack cases. libperf: - Add API for allocating new thread map array. - Fix typo in perf_evlist__open() failure error messages in libperf tests. perf c2c: - Replace bitmap_weight() with bitmap_empty() where appropriate" * tag 'perf-tools-for-v5.18-2022-03-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux: (143 commits) perf evsel: Improve AMD IBS (Instruction-Based Sampling) error handling messages perf python: Add perf_env stubs that will be needed in evsel__open_strerror() perf tools: Enhance the matching of sub-commands abbreviations libperf tests: Fix typo in perf_evlist__open() failure error messages tools arm64: Import cputype.h perf lock: Add -F/--field option to control output perf lock: Extend struct lock_key to have print function perf lock: Add --synth=no option for record tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources perf stat: Fix forked applications enablement of counters tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources perf evsel: Make evsel__env() always return a valid env perf build-id: Fix spelling mistake "Cant" -> "Can't" perf header: Fix spelling mistake "could't" -> "couldn't" perf script: Add 'brstackinsnlen' for branch stacks perf parse-events: Move slots only with topdown perf ftrace latency: Update documentation perf ftrace latency: Add -n/--use-nsec option perf tools: Fix version kernel tag ...