<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/security/landlock/audit.c, branch linux-rolling-lts</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-rolling-lts</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-rolling-lts'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2026-01-23T10:21:22Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>landlock: Fix wrong type usage</title>
<updated>2026-01-23T10:21:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tingmao Wang</name>
</author>
<published>2025-12-06T17:11:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=f73f911a4cdf04d8a76181d8ce4765cf195c5527'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f73f911a4cdf04d8a76181d8ce4765cf195c5527</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 29fbfa46e4287c596bdc77e2c599e3a1bbf8bb67 ]

I think, based on my best understanding, that this type is likely a typo
(even though in the end both are u16)

Signed-off-by: Tingmao Wang &lt;m@maowtm.org&gt;
Fixes: 2fc80c69df82 ("landlock: Log file-related denials")
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7339ad7b47f998affd84ca629a334a71f913616d.1765040503.git.m@maowtm.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>landlock: Improve bit operations in audit code</title>
<updated>2025-05-12T09:38:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
</author>
<published>2025-05-12T09:37:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=3039ed432745f8fdf5cbb43fdc60b2e1aad624c1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3039ed432745f8fdf5cbb43fdc60b2e1aad624c1</id>
<content type='text'>
Use the BIT() and BIT_ULL() macros in the new audit code instead of
explicit shifts to improve readability.  Use bitmask instead of modulo
operation to simplify code.

Add test_range1_rand15() and test_range2_rand15() KUnit tests to improve
get_id_range() coverage.

Signed-off-by: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack3000@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250512093732.1408485-1-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>landlock: Remove KUnit test that triggers a warning</title>
<updated>2025-05-03T06:55:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
</author>
<published>2025-05-03T06:53:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=b1525d0a8d3ad98487775232c3a861f3f4d894ea'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b1525d0a8d3ad98487775232c3a861f3f4d894ea</id>
<content type='text'>
A KUnit test checking boundaries triggers a canary warning, which may be
disturbing.  Let's remove this test for now.  Hopefully, KUnit will soon
get support for suppressing warning backtraces [1].

Cc: Alessandro Carminati &lt;acarmina@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Tingmao Wang &lt;m@maowtm.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250327213807.12964-1-m@maowtm.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250425193249.78b45d2589575c15f483c3d8@linux-foundation.org [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250503065359.3625407-1-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_*_EXEC_* flags</title>
<updated>2025-03-26T12:59:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
</author>
<published>2025-03-20T19:07:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=12bfcda73ac2cf3083c9d6d05724af92da3a4b4b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:12bfcda73ac2cf3083c9d6d05724af92da3a4b4b</id>
<content type='text'>
Most of the time we want to log denied access because they should not
happen and such information helps diagnose issues.  However, when
sandboxing processes that we know will try to access denied resources
(e.g. unknown, bogus, or malicious binary), we might want to not log
related access requests that might fill up logs.

By default, denied requests are logged until the task call execve(2).

If the LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF flag is set, denied
requests will not be logged for the same executed file.

If the LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON flag is set, denied
requests from after an execve(2) call will be logged.

The rationale is that a program should know its own behavior, but not
necessarily the behavior of other programs.

Because LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF is set for a specific
Landlock domain, it makes it possible to selectively mask some access
requests that would be logged by a parent domain, which might be handy
for unprivileged processes to limit logs.  However, system
administrators should still use the audit filtering mechanism.  There is
intentionally no audit nor sysctl configuration to re-enable these logs.
This is delegated to the user space program.

Increment the Landlock ABI version to reflect this interface change.

Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-18-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Rename variables and fix __maybe_unused]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>landlock: Log scoped denials</title>
<updated>2025-03-26T12:59:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
</author>
<published>2025-03-20T19:07:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=1176a15b5ec02925ea89bae05b5c860ddcce1e2e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1176a15b5ec02925ea89bae05b5c860ddcce1e2e</id>
<content type='text'>
Add audit support for unix_stream_connect, unix_may_send, task_kill, and
file_send_sigiotask hooks.

The related blockers are:
- scope.abstract_unix_socket
- scope.signal

Audit event sample for abstract unix socket:

  type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.268:30): domain=195ba459b blockers=scope.abstract_unix_socket path=00666F6F

Audit event sample for signal:

  type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.291:31): domain=195ba459b blockers=scope.signal opid=1 ocomm="systemd"

Refactor and simplify error handling in LSM hooks.

Extend struct landlock_file_security with fown_layer and use it to log
the blocking domain.  The struct aligned size is still 16 bytes.

Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tahera Fahimi &lt;fahimitahera@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-17-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials</title>
<updated>2025-03-26T12:59:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
</author>
<published>2025-03-20T19:07:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=9f74411a40cecc6faca2a3e3bbb7c1834276d4a2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9f74411a40cecc6faca2a3e3bbb7c1834276d4a2</id>
<content type='text'>
Add audit support to socket_bind and socket_connect hooks.

The related blockers are:
- net.bind_tcp
- net.connect_tcp

Audit event sample:

  type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=net.connect_tcp daddr=127.0.0.1 dest=80

Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze &lt;konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Mikhail Ivanov &lt;ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-16-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>landlock: Log truncate and IOCTL denials</title>
<updated>2025-03-26T12:59:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
</author>
<published>2025-03-20T19:07:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=20fd2954945458c1b04060d1ce6320f897b3a701'/>
<id>urn:sha1:20fd2954945458c1b04060d1ce6320f897b3a701</id>
<content type='text'>
Add audit support to the file_truncate and file_ioctl hooks.

Add a deny_masks_t type and related helpers to store the domain's layer
level per optional access rights (i.e. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE and
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV) when opening a file, which cannot be
inferred later.  In practice, the landlock_file_security aligned blob size is
still 16 bytes because this new one-byte deny_masks field follows the
existing two-bytes allowed_access field and precede the packed
fown_subject.

Implementing deny_masks_t with a bitfield instead of a struct enables a
generic implementation to store and extract layer levels.

Add KUnit tests to check the identification of a layer level from a
deny_masks_t, and the computation of a deny_masks_t from an access right
with its layer level or a layer_mask_t array.

Audit event sample:

  type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=fs.ioctl_dev path="/dev/tty" dev="devtmpfs" ino=9 ioctlcmd=0x5401

Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-15-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>landlock: Log file-related denials</title>
<updated>2025-03-26T12:59:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
</author>
<published>2025-03-20T19:07:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2fc80c69df823628f1f0f2aace99e393c57112fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2fc80c69df823628f1f0f2aace99e393c57112fa</id>
<content type='text'>
Add audit support for path_mkdir, path_mknod, path_symlink, path_unlink,
path_rmdir, path_truncate, path_link, path_rename, and file_open hooks.

The dedicated blockers are:
- fs.execute
- fs.write_file
- fs.read_file
- fs.read_dir
- fs.remove_dir
- fs.remove_file
- fs.make_char
- fs.make_dir
- fs.make_reg
- fs.make_sock
- fs.make_fifo
- fs.make_block
- fs.make_sym
- fs.refer
- fs.truncate
- fs.ioctl_dev

Audit event sample for a denied link action:

  type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=fs.refer path="/usr/bin" dev="vda2" ino=351
  type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=fs.make_reg,fs.refer path="/usr/local" dev="vda2" ino=365

We could pack blocker names (e.g. "fs:make_reg,refer") but that would
increase complexity for the kernel and log parsers.  Moreover, this
could not handle blockers of different classes (e.g. fs and net).  Make
it simple and flexible instead.

Add KUnit tests to check the identification from a layer_mask_t array of
the first layer level denying such request.

Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Depends-on: 058518c20920 ("landlock: Align partial refer access checks with final ones")
Depends-on: d617f0d72d80 ("landlock: Optimize file path walks and prepare for audit support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-13-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>landlock: Log mount-related denials</title>
<updated>2025-03-26T12:59:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
</author>
<published>2025-03-20T19:07:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=c56f649646ecec3dd1a2e400e6e5ec83439d940f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c56f649646ecec3dd1a2e400e6e5ec83439d940f</id>
<content type='text'>
Add audit support for sb_mount, move_mount, sb_umount, sb_remount, and
sb_pivot_root hooks.

The new related blocker is "fs.change_topology".

Audit event sample:

  type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=fs.change_topology name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=1

Remove landlock_get_applicable_domain() and get_current_fs_domain()
which are now fully replaced with landlock_get_applicable_subject().

Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-12-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN and log domain status</title>
<updated>2025-03-26T12:59:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
</author>
<published>2025-03-20T19:06:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=1d636984e088b17e8587eb5ed9d9d7a80b656c4c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1d636984e088b17e8587eb5ed9d9d7a80b656c4c</id>
<content type='text'>
Asynchronously log domain information when it first denies an access.
This minimize the amount of generated logs, which makes it possible to
always log denials for the current execution since they should not
happen.  These records are identified with the new AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN
type.

The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN message contains:
- the "domain" ID which is described;
- the "status" which can either be "allocated" or "deallocated";
- the "mode" which is for now only "enforcing";
- for the "allocated" status, a minimal set of properties to easily
  identify the task that loaded the domain's policy with
  landlock_restrict_self(2): "pid", "uid", executable path ("exe"), and
  command line ("comm");
- for the "deallocated" state, the number of "denials" accounted to this
  domain, which is at least 1.

This requires each domain to save these task properties at creation
time in the new struct landlock_details.  A reference to the PID is kept
for the lifetime of the domain to avoid race conditions when
investigating the related task.  The executable path is resolved and
stored to not keep a reference to the filesystem and block related
actions.  All these metadata are stored for the lifetime of the related
domain and should then be minimal.  The required memory is not accounted
to the task calling landlock_restrict_self(2) contrary to most other
Landlock allocations (see related comment).

The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN record follows the first AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS
record for the same domain, which is always followed by AUDIT_SYSCALL
and AUDIT_PROCTITLE.  This is in line with the audit logic to first
record the cause of an event, and then add context with other types of
record.

Audit event sample for a first denial:

  type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
  type=LANDLOCK_DOMAIN msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): domain=195ba459b status=allocated mode=enforcing pid=300 uid=0 exe="/root/sandboxer" comm="sandboxer"
  type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0

Audit event sample for a following denial:

  type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1732186800.372:45): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
  type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1732186800.372:45): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0

Log domain deletion with the "deallocated" state when a domain was
previously logged.  This makes it possible for log parsers to free
potential resources when a domain ID will never show again.

The number of denied access requests is useful to easily check how many
access requests a domain blocked and potentially if some of them are
missing in logs because of audit rate limiting, audit rules, or Landlock
log configuration flags (see following commit).

Audit event sample for a deletion of a domain that denied something:

  type=LANDLOCK_DOMAIN msg=audit(1732186800.393:46): domain=195ba459b status=deallocated denials=2

Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-11-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Update comment and GFP flag for landlock_log_drop_domain()]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
