<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c, branch linux-5.4.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.4.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.4.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:53:21Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>evm: fix writing &lt;securityfs&gt;/evm overflow</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:53:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
</author>
<published>2021-04-26T22:13:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=4020615bd733c491a51e00b1e5292bfea3184877'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4020615bd733c491a51e00b1e5292bfea3184877</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 ]

EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete.  Define and read an unsigned
int.

Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:53:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
</author>
<published>2021-05-14T15:27:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:74e9d920f25ce511f5458ae9d8c5ccd506649367</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9acc89d31f0c94c8e573ed61f3e4340bbd526d0c upstream.

EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to
temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary
to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is
cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is
calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs.

Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized
with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust
xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation.

Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix RCU list related warnings</title>
<updated>2020-06-07T11:18:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Madhuparna Bhowmik</name>
</author>
<published>2020-04-30T16:02:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1610cd913f5aaae23c6e6eab0e807145e4852b3d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 770f60586d2af0590be263f55fd079226313922c ]

This patch fixes the following warning and few other instances of
traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:

[   32.848432] =============================
[   32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[   32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
[   32.849308] -----------------------------
[   32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted, use
list_for_each_entry_lockless() instead of list_for_each_entry_rcu for
traversing the list.  Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to
indicate this fact.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik &lt;madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt; (RCU viewpoint)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441</title>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:37:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
</author>
<published>2019-06-01T08:08:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel &lt;armijn@tjaldur.nl&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event</title>
<updated>2019-03-27T22:11:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
</author>
<published>2019-03-26T18:49:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a1aa08a01f734d48a8f76b12aca9f4e4adae7649</id>
<content type='text'>
In commit fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of
verified xattrs"), the call to audit_log_start() is missing a context to
link it to an audit event. Since this event is in user context, add
the process' syscall context to the record.

In addition, the orphaned keyword "locked" appears in the record.
Normalize this by changing it to logging the locking string "." as any
other user input in the "xattr=" field.

Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/109

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h</title>
<updated>2018-12-12T22:58:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Gortmaker</name>
</author>
<published>2018-12-09T20:36:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=876979c9308b7228cdaf6785909c57eebc85d911'/>
<id>urn:sha1:876979c9308b7228cdaf6785909c57eebc85d911</id>
<content type='text'>
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends.  That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.

The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.

Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.

Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()</title>
<updated>2018-07-22T18:49:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Yongjun</name>
</author>
<published>2018-07-11T13:28:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=3dd0f18c70d94ca2432c78c5735744429f071b0b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3dd0f18c70d94ca2432c78c5735744429f071b0b</id>
<content type='text'>
In case of error, the function audit_log_start() returns NULL pointer
not ERR_PTR(). The IS_ERR() test in the return value check should be
replaced with NULL test.

Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;weiyongjun1@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: unlock on error path in evm_read_xattrs()</title>
<updated>2018-06-01T10:03:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
</author>
<published>2018-06-01T08:00:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=b5c90a7526fe39164c2204f0404ce8f8ff21e522'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b5c90a7526fe39164c2204f0404ce8f8ff21e522</id>
<content type='text'>
We need to unlock before returning on this error path.

Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: prevent array underflow in evm_write_xattrs()</title>
<updated>2018-05-31T14:13:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
</author>
<published>2018-05-29T13:11:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=a41d80acfa2764e9b1ce49aa303a263e609d91f7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a41d80acfa2764e9b1ce49aa303a263e609d91f7</id>
<content type='text'>
If the user sets xattr-&gt;name[0] to NUL then we would read one character
before the start of the array.  This bug seems harmless as far as I can
see but perhaps it would trigger a warning in KASAN.

Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: Fix null dereference on xattr when xattr fails to allocate</title>
<updated>2018-05-31T14:13:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
</author>
<published>2018-05-27T22:55:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=72acd64df4561593d2ec3227b4aca9b0d7ded50e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:72acd64df4561593d2ec3227b4aca9b0d7ded50e</id>
<content type='text'>
In the case where the allocation of xattr fails and xattr is NULL, the
error exit return path via label 'out' will dereference xattr when
kfree'ing xattr-name.  Fix this by only kfree'ing xattr-&gt;name and xattr
when xattr is non-null.

Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1469366 ("Dereference after null check")

Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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