kernel.git/net/sctp, branch linux-4.9.y

sctp: read sk->sk_bound_dev_if once in sctp_rcv()

2022-06-14T14:52:32Z

[ Upstream commit a20ea298071f46effa3aaf965bf9bb34c901db3f ] sctp_rcv() reads sk->sk_bound_dev_if twice while the socket is not locked. Another cpu could change this field under us. Fixes: 0fd9a65a76e8 ("[SCTP] Support SO_BINDTODEVICE socket option on incoming packets.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Neil Horman Cc: Vlad Yasevich Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sctp: fix kernel-infoleak for SCTP sockets

2022-03-16T11:49:01Z

[ Upstream commit 633593a808980f82d251d0ca89730d8bb8b0220c ] syzbot reported a kernel infoleak [1] of 4 bytes. After analysis, it turned out r->idiag_expires is not initialized if inet_sctp_diag_fill() calls inet_diag_msg_common_fill() Make sure to clear idiag_timer/idiag_retrans/idiag_expires and let inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() fill them again if needed. [1] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout lib/iov_iter.c:154 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x6ef/0x25a0 lib/iov_iter.c:668 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline] copyout lib/iov_iter.c:154 [inline] _copy_to_iter+0x6ef/0x25a0 lib/iov_iter.c:668 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:162 [inline] simple_copy_to_iter+0xf3/0x140 net/core/datagram.c:519 __skb_datagram_iter+0x2d5/0x11b0 net/core/datagram.c:425 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0xdc/0x270 net/core/datagram.c:533 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3696 [inline] netlink_recvmsg+0x669/0x1c80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1977 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline] __sys_recvfrom+0x795/0xa10 net/socket.c:2097 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2115 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2111 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x19d/0x210 net/socket.c:2111 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:737 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3247 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe0c/0x1510 mm/slub.c:4975 kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:354 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x545/0xf90 net/core/skbuff.c:426 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1158 [inline] netlink_dump+0x3e5/0x16c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2248 __netlink_dump_start+0xcf8/0xe90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2373 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:254 [inline] inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x2e7/0x400 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1341 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x24a/0x620 netlink_rcv_skb+0x40c/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494 sock_diag_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/core/sock_diag.c:277 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x1093/0x1360 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x14d9/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x594/0x690 net/socket.c:1061 do_iter_readv_writev+0xa7f/0xc70 do_iter_write+0x52c/0x1500 fs/read_write.c:851 vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:924 [inline] do_writev+0x645/0xe00 fs/read_write.c:967 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1040 [inline] __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1037 [inline] __x64_sys_writev+0xe5/0x120 fs/read_write.c:1037 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Bytes 68-71 of 2508 are uninitialized Memory access of size 2508 starts at ffff888114f9b000 Data copied to user address 00007f7fe09ff2e0 CPU: 1 PID: 3478 Comm: syz-executor306 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Cc: Vlad Yasevich Cc: Neil Horman Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Reviewed-by: Xin Long Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310001145.297371-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sctp: add vtag check in sctp_sf_violation

2021-11-02T16:39:23Z

[ Upstream commit aa0f697e45286a6b5f0ceca9418acf54b9099d99 ] sctp_sf_violation() is called when processing HEARTBEAT_ACK chunk in cookie_wait state, and some other places are also using it. The vtag in the chunk's sctphdr should be verified, otherwise, as later in chunk length check, it may send abort with the existent asoc's vtag, which can be exploited by one to cook a malicious chunk to terminate a SCTP asoc. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sctp: use init_tag from inithdr for ABORT chunk

2021-11-02T16:39:23Z

[ Upstream commit 4f7019c7eb33967eb87766e0e4602b5576873680 ] Currently Linux SCTP uses the verification tag of the existing SCTP asoc when failing to process and sending the packet with the ABORT chunk. This will result in the peer accepting the ABORT chunk and removing the SCTP asoc. One could exploit this to terminate a SCTP asoc. This patch is to fix it by always using the initiate tag of the received INIT chunk for the ABORT chunk to be sent. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sctp: validate from_addr_param return

2021-09-26T11:36:19Z

commit 0c5dc070ff3d6246d22ddd931f23a6266249e3db upstream. Ilja reported that, simply putting it, nothing was validating that from_addr_param functions were operating on initialized memory. That is, the parameter itself was being validated by sctp_walk_params, but it doesn't check for types and their specific sizes and it could be a 0-length one, causing from_addr_param to potentially work over the next parameter or even uninitialized memory. The fix here is to, in all calls to from_addr_param, check if enough space is there for the wanted IP address type. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sctp: add param size validation for SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY

2021-09-26T11:36:18Z

commit ef6c8d6ccf0c1dccdda092ebe8782777cd7803c9 upstream. When SCTP handles an INIT chunk, it calls for example: sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init sctp_verify_init sctp_verify_param sctp_process_init sctp_process_param handling of SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY sctp_verify_init() wasn't doing proper size validation and neither the later handling, allowing it to work over the chunk itself, possibly being uninitialized memory. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sctp: validate chunk size in __rcv_asconf_lookup

2021-09-26T11:36:18Z

commit b6ffe7671b24689c09faa5675dd58f93758a97ae upstream. In one of the fallbacks that SCTP has for identifying an association for an incoming packet, it looks for AddIp chunk (from ASCONF) and take a peek. Thing is, at this stage nothing was validating that the chunk actually had enough content for that, allowing the peek to happen over uninitialized memory. Similar check already exists in actual asconf handling in sctp_verify_asconf(). Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sctp: move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope

2021-08-04T09:58:02Z

[ Upstream commit 1d11fa231cabeae09a95cb3e4cf1d9dd34e00f08 ] The doc draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 that restricts 198 addresses was never published. These addresses as private addresses should be allowed to use in SCTP. As Michael Tuexen suggested, this patch is to move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope. Reported-by: Sérgio Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sctp: add size validation when walking chunks

2021-07-20T14:21:08Z

[ Upstream commit 50619dbf8db77e98d821d615af4f634d08e22698 ] The first chunk in a packet is ensured to be present at the beginning of sctp_rcv(), as a packet needs to have at least 1 chunk. But the second one, may not be completely available and ch->length can be over uninitialized memory. Fix here is by only trying to walk on the next chunk if there is enough to hold at least the header, and then proceed with the ch->length validation that is already there. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sctp: fix a SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB leak in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b

2021-05-22T08:40:31Z

[ Upstream commit f282df0391267fb2b263da1cc3233aa6fb81defc ] Normally SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB is always incremented once asoc enter into ESTABLISHED from the state < ESTABLISHED and decremented when the asoc is being deleted. However, in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(), the asoc's state can be changed to ESTABLISHED from the state >= ESTABLISHED where it shouldn't increment SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB. Otherwise, one asoc may increment MIB_CURRESTAB multiple times but only decrement once at the end. I was able to reproduce it by using scapy to do the 4-way shakehands, after that I replayed the COOKIE-ECHO chunk with 'peer_vtag' field changed to different values, and SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB was incremented multiple times and never went back to 0 even when the asoc was freed. This patch is to fix it by only incrementing SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB when the state < ESTABLISHED in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin