kernel.git/net/sctp/auth.c, branch linux-3.12.y

sctp: translate host order to network order when setting a hmacid

2016-01-05T15:11:08Z

[ Upstream commit ed5a377d87dc4c87fb3e1f7f698cba38cd893103 ] now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs. even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(): if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) return -EOPNOTSUPP; so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility. Fixes: 65b07e5d0d09 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Acked-by: Neil Horman Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management

2014-11-19T11:31:42Z

[ Upstream commit 4184b2a79a7612a9272ce20d639934584a1f3786 ] A very minimal and simple user space application allocating an SCTP socket, setting SCTP_AUTH_KEY setsockopt(2) on it and then closing the socket again will leak the memory containing the authentication key from user space: unreferenced object 0xffff8800837047c0 (size 16): comm "a.out", pid 2789, jiffies 4296954322 (age 192.258s) hex dump (first 16 bytes): 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [] __kmalloc+0xe8/0x270 [] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] [] sctp_auth_set_key+0xa1/0x140 [sctp] [] sctp_setsockopt+0xd03/0x1180 [sctp] [] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 [] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0 [] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 [] 0xffffffffffffffff This is bad because of two things, we can bring down a machine from user space when auth_enable=1, but also we would leave security sensitive keying material in memory without clearing it after use. The issue is that sctp_auth_create_key() already sets the refcount to 1, but after allocation sctp_auth_set_key() does an additional refcount on it, and thus leaving it around when we free the socket. Fixes: 65b07e5d0d0 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Cc: Vlad Yasevich Acked-by: Neil Horman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint

2014-05-29T09:49:17Z

[ Upstream commit b14878ccb7fac0242db82720b784ab62c467c0dc ] Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Neil Horman Tested-by: Joshua Kinard Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

net: sctp: trivial: update bug report in header comment

2013-08-09T18:33:02Z

With the restructuring of the lksctp.org site, we only allow bug reports through the SCTP mailing list linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org, not via SF, as SF is only used for web hosting and nothing more. While at it, also remove the obvious statement that bugs will be fixed and incooperated into the kernel. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net: sctp: trivial: update mailing list address

2013-07-25T00:53:38Z

The SCTP mailing list address to send patches or questions to is linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org and not lksctp-developers@lists.sourceforge.net anymore. Therefore, update all occurences. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Neil Horman Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net

2013-02-08T23:02:14Z

Synchronize with 'net' in order to sort out some l2tp, wireless, and ipv6 GRE fixes that will be built on top of in 'net-next'. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net: sctp: sctp_auth_make_key_vector: use sctp_auth_create_key

2013-02-08T22:55:48Z

In sctp_auth_make_key_vector, we allocate a temporary sctp_auth_bytes structure with kmalloc instead of the sctp_auth_create_key allocator. Change this to sctp_auth_create_key as it is the case everywhere else, so that we also can properly free it via sctp_auth_key_put. This makes it easier for future code changes in the structure and allocator itself, since a single API is consistently used for this purpose. Also, by using sctp_auth_create_key we're doing sanity checks over the arguments. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net: sctp: sctp_auth_make_key_vector: remove duplicate ntohs calls

2013-02-08T04:44:37Z

Instead of calling 3 times ntohs(random->param_hdr.length), 2 times ntohs(hmacs->param_hdr.length), and 3 times ntohs(chunks->param_hdr.length) within the same function, we only call each once and store it in a variable. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Neil Horman Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net: sctp: sctp_auth_key_put: use kzfree instead of kfree

2013-02-08T04:43:42Z

For sensitive data like keying material, it is common practice to zero out keys before returning the memory back to the allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Neil Horman Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

sctp: fix bogus if statement in sctp_auth_recv_cid()

2012-08-16T20:36:29Z

There is an extra semi-colon here, so we always return 0 instead of calling __sctp_auth_cid(). Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: David S. Miller