<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/net/mac80211/wep.c, branch linux-3.7.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-3.7.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-3.7.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2012-05-16T16:47:43Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: fix network header location when adding encryption headers</title>
<updated>2012-05-16T16:47:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arik Nemtsov</name>
</author>
<published>2012-05-10T10:21:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=7863157d83763a0f1b9ad96c94a1ed3d0372526a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7863157d83763a0f1b9ad96c94a1ed3d0372526a</id>
<content type='text'>
Update the location of the network header when adding encryption
specific headers to a skb. This allows low-level drivers to use the
(now correct) location of the network header.

Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov &lt;arik@wizery.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: Add IV-room in the skb for TKIP and WEP</title>
<updated>2012-05-16T16:46:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Janusz.Dziedzic@tieto.com</name>
</author>
<published>2012-05-09T05:11:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=ee70108fa2a7688dc67bfedaeb0c8c46a221effb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ee70108fa2a7688dc67bfedaeb0c8c46a221effb</id>
<content type='text'>
Add IV-room in skb also for TKIP and WEP.
Extend patch: "mac80211: support adding IV-room in the skb for CCMP keys"

Signed-off-by: Janusz Dziedzic &lt;janusz.dziedzic@tieto.com&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: linearize SKBs as needed for crypto</title>
<updated>2012-03-13T18:54:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
</author>
<published>2012-03-12T12:49:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a8286911881948c7a2ecc63ee4224c258cce2da3</id>
<content type='text'>
Not linearizing every SKB will help actually pass
non-linear SKBs all the way up when on an encrypted
connection. For now, linearize TKIP completely as
it is lower performance and I don't quite grok all
the details.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: move RX WEP weak IV counting</title>
<updated>2012-03-13T18:54:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
</author>
<published>2012-03-12T12:49:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=617bbde878604adfcd557fc2a8952f77ab4ebd95'/>
<id>urn:sha1:617bbde878604adfcd557fc2a8952f77ab4ebd95</id>
<content type='text'>
This is better done inside the WEP decrypt
function where it doesn't have to check all
the conditions any more since they've been
tested already.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: use skb list for fragments</title>
<updated>2011-11-21T21:20:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
</author>
<published>2011-11-16T14:28:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=252b86c43225d067468dd182e9ae616ad2532bc8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:252b86c43225d067468dd182e9ae616ad2532bc8</id>
<content type='text'>
We are currently linking the skbs by using skb-&gt;next
directly. This works, but the preferred way is to use
a struct sk_buff_head instead. That also prepares for
passing that to drivers directly.

While at it I noticed we calculate the duration for
fragments twice -- remove one of them.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: remove the dependency on crypto_blkcipher</title>
<updated>2011-04-04T20:20:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Felix Fietkau</name>
</author>
<published>2011-03-25T20:39:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=5f9f1812b68a2979bc97399cd4954f1c191986af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5f9f1812b68a2979bc97399cd4954f1c191986af</id>
<content type='text'>
The only thing that using crypto_blkcipher with ecb does over just using
arc4 directly is wrapping the encrypt/decrypt function into a for loop,
looping over each individual character.
To be able to do this, it pulls in around 40 kb worth of unnecessary
kernel modules (at least on a MIPS embedded device).
Using arc4 directly not only eliminates those dependencies, it also makes
the code smaller.

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau &lt;nbd@openwrt.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: don't kmalloc 16 bytes</title>
<updated>2010-10-11T19:04:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
</author>
<published>2010-10-10T16:52:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=730bd83b036e72b0134352ca27e76ea08475fbf1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:730bd83b036e72b0134352ca27e76ea08475fbf1</id>
<content type='text'>
Since this small buffer isn't used for DMA,
we can simply allocate it on the stack, it
just needs to be 16 bytes of which only 8
will be used for WEP40 keys.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: use cipher suite selectors</title>
<updated>2010-08-16T20:45:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
</author>
<published>2010-08-10T07:46:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=97359d1235eaf634fe706c9faa6e40181cc95fb8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97359d1235eaf634fe706c9faa6e40181cc95fb8</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, mac80211 translates the cfg80211
cipher suite selectors into ALG_* values.
That isn't all too useful, and some drivers
benefit from the distinction between WEP40
and WEP104 as well. Therefore, convert it
all to use the cipher suite selectors.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Gertjan van Wingerde &lt;gwingerde@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: improve error checking if WEP fails to init</title>
<updated>2010-07-16T18:03:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John W. Linville</name>
</author>
<published>2010-07-15T20:16:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=088c87262bbc39a01ebcd70817d35616785908b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:088c87262bbc39a01ebcd70817d35616785908b1</id>
<content type='text'>
Do this by poisoning the values of wep_tx_tfm and wep_rx_tfm if either
crypto allocation fails.

Reported-by: Stanislaw Gruszka &lt;sgruszka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: remove wep dependency</title>
<updated>2010-07-08T20:35:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John W. Linville</name>
</author>
<published>2010-07-07T19:07:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=3473187d2459a078e00e5fac8aafc30af69c57fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3473187d2459a078e00e5fac8aafc30af69c57fa</id>
<content type='text'>
The current mac80211 code assumes that WEP is always available.  If WEP
fails to initialize, ieee80211_register_hw will always fail.

In some cases (e.g. FIPS certification), the cryptography used by WEP is
unavailable.  However, in such cases there is no good reason why CCMP
encryption (or even no link level encryption) cannot be used.  So, this
patch removes mac80211's assumption that WEP (and TKIP) will always be
available for use.

Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
