kernel.git/net/mac80211/key.c, branch linux-5.10.y

wifi: mac80211: don't increment crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt twice

2026-02-11T12:34:23Z

[ Upstream commit 3f3d8ff31496874a69b131866f62474eb24ed20a ] In reconfig, in case the driver asks to disconnect during the reconfig, all the keys of the interface are marked as tainted. Then ieee80211_reenable_keys will loop over all the interface keys, and for each one it will a) increment crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt b) call ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel, which in turn will detect that this key is tainted, so it will mark it as "not in hardware", which is paired with crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt incrementation, so we get two incrementations for each tainted key. Then we get a warning in ieee80211_free_keys. To fix it, don't increment the count in ieee80211_reenable_keys for tainted keys Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260118092821.4ca111fddcda.Id6e554f4b1c83760aa02d5a9e4e3080edb197aa2@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

wifi: mac80211: skip non-uploaded keys in ieee80211_iter_keys

2024-11-08T15:22:01Z

[ Upstream commit 52009b419355195912a628d0a9847922e90c348c ] Sync iterator conditions with ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu. Fixes: 830af02f24fb ("mac80211: allow driver to iterate keys") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241006153630.87885-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

wifi: mac80211: fix potential key use-after-free

2024-10-22T13:39:24Z

commit 31db78a4923ef5e2008f2eed321811ca79e7f71b upstream. When ieee80211_key_link() is called by ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() but returns 0 due to KRACK protection (identical key reinstall), ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() will still return a pointer into the key, in a potential use-after-free. This normally doesn't happen since it's only called by iwlwifi in case of WoWLAN rekey offload which has its own KRACK protection, but still better to fix, do that by returning an error code and converting that to success on the cfg80211 boundary only, leaving the error for bad callers of ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(). Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Fixes: fdf7cb4185b6 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin [ Sherry: bp to fix CVE-2023-52530, resolved minor conflicts in net/mac80211/cfg.c because of context change due to missing commit 23a5f0af6ff4 ("wifi: mac80211: remove cipher scheme support") ccdde7c74ffd ("wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling")] Signed-off-by: Sherry Yang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks

2021-06-03T07:00:29Z

commit 94034c40ab4a3fcf581fbc7f8fdf4e29943c4a24 upstream. Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key. To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects. This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.3f8290e59823.I622a67769ed39257327a362cfc09c812320eb979@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: rework tx encapsulation offload API

2020-09-18T10:02:57Z

The current API (which lets the driver turn on/off per vif directly) has a number of limitations: - it does not deal with AP_VLAN - conditions for enabling (no tkip, no monitor) are only checked at add_interface time - no way to indicate 4-addr support In order to address this, store offload flags in struct ieee80211_vif (easy to extend for decap offload later). mac80211 initially sets the enable flag, but gives the driver a chance to modify it before its settings are applied. In addition to the .add_interface op, a .update_vif_offload op is introduced, which can be used for runtime changes. If a driver can't disable encap offload at runtime, or if it has some extra limitations, it can simply override the flags within those ops. Support for encap offload with 4-address mode interfaces can be enabled by setting a flag from .add_interface or .update_vif_offload. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200908123702.88454-6-nbd@nbd.name [resolved conflict with commit aa2092a9bab3 ("ath11k: add raw mode and software crypto support")] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg

mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()

2020-08-07T18:33:22Z

As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches Signed-off-by: Waiman Long Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Acked-by: David Howells Acked-by: Michal Hocko Acked-by: Johannes Weiner Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Joe Perches Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Dan Carpenter Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mac80211: Use fallthrough pseudo-keyword

2020-07-31T07:24:23Z

Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary fall-through markings when it is the case. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200707204548.GA9320@embeddedor Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net

2020-03-30T04:25:29Z

Minor comment conflict in mac80211. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links

2020-03-26T14:49:24Z

If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore. This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the frames are still on the TXQ. Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption. With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this behaviour on a key being configured. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jouni Malinen Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20200326150855.6865c7f28a14.I9fb1d911b064262d33e33dfba730cdeef83926ca@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg

mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection

2020-02-24T09:35:57Z

Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg