<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/net/core/sock.c, branch linux-5.16.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.16.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.16.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2022-03-02T10:51:10Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>net-timestamp: convert sk-&gt;sk_tskey to atomic_t</title>
<updated>2022-03-02T10:51:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
</author>
<published>2022-02-17T17:05:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=caf122caad0374f79dcf821b5cb46ad320d49848'/>
<id>urn:sha1:caf122caad0374f79dcf821b5cb46ad320d49848</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a1cdec57e03a1352e92fbbe7974039dda4efcec0 ]

UDP sendmsg() can be lockless, this is causing all kinds
of data races.

This patch converts sk-&gt;sk_tskey to remove one of these races.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip_append_data / __ip_append_data

read to 0xffff8881035d4b6c of 4 bytes by task 8877 on cpu 1:
 __ip_append_data+0x1c1/0x1de0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:994
 ip_make_skb+0x13f/0x2d0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1636
 udp_sendmsg+0x12bd/0x14c0 net/ipv4/udp.c:1249
 inet_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:819
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2413
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2467 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2553
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2579
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

write to 0xffff8881035d4b6c of 4 bytes by task 8880 on cpu 0:
 __ip_append_data+0x1d8/0x1de0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:994
 ip_make_skb+0x13f/0x2d0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1636
 udp_sendmsg+0x12bd/0x14c0 net/ipv4/udp.c:1249
 inet_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:819
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2413
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2467 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2553
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2579
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000054d -&gt; 0x0000054e

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 8880 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00167-gdcb85f85fa6f-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 09c2d251b707 ("net-timestamp: add key to disambiguate concurrent datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: use sk_is_tcp() in more places</title>
<updated>2022-03-02T10:51:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
</author>
<published>2021-11-15T19:02:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=7446bba2ec3b4a2f70076990b09866e1b185e13a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7446bba2ec3b4a2f70076990b09866e1b185e13a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 42f67eea3ba36cef2dce2e853de6ddcb2e89eb39 ]

Move sk_is_tcp() to include/net/sock.h and use it where we can.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix sock_timestamping_bind_phc() to release device</title>
<updated>2022-01-27T11:03:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miroslav Lichvar</name>
</author>
<published>2022-01-11T15:10:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=bd0f4a3eea2c856507fdd9003bcbe826affe3007'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd0f4a3eea2c856507fdd9003bcbe826affe3007</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2a4d75bfe41232608f5596a6d1369f92ccb20817 upstream.

Don't forget to release the device in sock_timestamping_bind_phc() after
it was used to get the vclock indices.

Fixes: d463126e23f1 ("net: sock: extend SO_TIMESTAMPING for PHC binding")
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Lichvar &lt;mlichvar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Yangbo Lu &lt;yangbo.lu@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sock: fix /proc/net/sockstat underflow in sk_clone_lock()</title>
<updated>2021-11-15T14:27:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
</author>
<published>2021-11-15T10:16:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=938cca9e4109b30ee1d476904538225a825e54eb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:938cca9e4109b30ee1d476904538225a825e54eb</id>
<content type='text'>
sk_clone_lock() needs to call sock_inuse_add(1) before entering the
sk_free_unlock_clone() error path, for __sk_free() from sk_free() from
sk_free_unlock_clone() calls sock_inuse_add(-1).

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Fixes: 648845ab7e200993 ("sock: Move the socket inuse to namespace.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix possible NULL deref in sock_reserve_memory</title>
<updated>2021-11-04T11:28:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
</author>
<published>2021-11-03T23:49:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=d00c8ee31729248ba40b4ab25cd3b3b580c6f87c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d00c8ee31729248ba40b4ab25cd3b3b580c6f87c</id>
<content type='text'>
Sanity check in sock_reserve_memory() was not enough to prevent malicious
user to trigger a NULL deref.

In this case, the isse is that sk_prot-&gt;memory_allocated is NULL.

Use standard sk_has_account() helper to deal with this.

BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:101 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in atomic_long_add_return include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1218 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sk_memory_allocated_add include/net/sock.h:1371 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sock_reserve_memory net/core/sock.c:994 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sock_setsockopt+0x22ab/0x2b30 net/core/sock.c:1443
Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/11270

CPU: 1 PID: 11270 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.15.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:446 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x66/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:101 [inline]
 atomic_long_add_return include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1218 [inline]
 sk_memory_allocated_add include/net/sock.h:1371 [inline]
 sock_reserve_memory net/core/sock.c:994 [inline]
 sock_setsockopt+0x22ab/0x2b30 net/core/sock.c:1443
 __sys_setsockopt+0x4f8/0x610 net/socket.c:2172
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2187 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2184 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2184
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f56076d5ae9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f5604c4b188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f56077e8f60 RCX: 00007f56076d5ae9
RDX: 0000000000000049 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f560772ff25 R08: 000000000000fec7 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fffb61a100f R14: 00007f5604c4b300 R15: 0000000000022000
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: 2bb2f5fb21b0 ("net: add new socket option SO_RESERVE_MEM")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Acked-by: Wei Wang &lt;weiwan@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vsock: Enable y2038 safe timeval for timeout</title>
<updated>2021-10-08T15:21:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Palethorpe</name>
</author>
<published>2021-10-08T10:00:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=4c1e34c0dbffb17accdfe16ac97ab432df9024ff'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4c1e34c0dbffb17accdfe16ac97ab432df9024ff</id>
<content type='text'>
Reuse the timeval compat code from core/sock to handle 32-bit and
64-bit timeval structures. Also introduce a new socket option define
to allow using y2038 safe timeval under 32-bit.

The existing behavior of sock_set_timeout and vsock's timeout setter
differ when the time value is out of bounds. vsocks current behavior
is retained at the expense of not being able to share the full
implementation.

This allows the LTP test vsock01 to pass under 32-bit compat mode.

Fixes: fe0c72f3db11 ("socket: move compat timeout handling into sock.c")
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe &lt;rpalethorpe@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Palethorpe &lt;rpalethorpe@richiejp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net</title>
<updated>2021-09-30T21:49:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
</author>
<published>2021-09-30T21:49:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=dd9a887b35b01d7027f974f5e7936f1410ab51ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dd9a887b35b01d7027f974f5e7936f1410ab51ca</id>
<content type='text'>
drivers/net/phy/bcm7xxx.c
  d88fd1b546ff ("net: phy: bcm7xxx: Fixed indirect MMD operations")
  f68d08c437f9 ("net: phy: bcm7xxx: Add EPHY entry for 72165")

net/sched/sch_api.c
  b193e15ac69d ("net: prevent user from passing illegal stab size")
  69508d43334e ("net_sched: Use struct_size() and flex_array_size() helpers")

Both cases trivial - adjacent code additions.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>af_unix: fix races in sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred accesses</title>
<updated>2021-09-30T13:18:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
</author>
<published>2021-09-29T22:57:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=35306eb23814444bd4021f8a1c3047d3cb0c8b2b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:35306eb23814444bd4021f8a1c3047d3cb0c8b2b</id>
<content type='text'>
Jann Horn reported that SO_PEERCRED and SO_PEERGROUPS implementations
are racy, as af_unix can concurrently change sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred.

In order to fix this issue, this patch adds a new spinlock that needs
to be used whenever these fields are read or written.

Jann also pointed out that l2cap_sock_get_peer_pid_cb() is currently
reading sk-&gt;sk_peer_pid which makes no sense, as this field
is only possibly set by AF_UNIX sockets.
We will have to clean this in a separate patch.
This could be done by reverting b48596d1dc25 "Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add get_peer_pid callback"
or implementing what was truly expected.

Fixes: 109f6e39fa07 ("af_unix: Allow SO_PEERCRED to work across namespaces.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add new socket option SO_RESERVE_MEM</title>
<updated>2021-09-30T12:36:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Wang</name>
</author>
<published>2021-09-29T17:25:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2bb2f5fb21b0486ff69b7b4a1fe03a760527d133'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2bb2f5fb21b0486ff69b7b4a1fe03a760527d133</id>
<content type='text'>
This socket option provides a mechanism for users to reserve a certain
amount of memory for the socket to use. When this option is set, kernel
charges the user specified amount of memory to memcg, as well as
sk_forward_alloc. This amount of memory is not reclaimable and is
available in sk_forward_alloc for this socket.
With this socket option set, the networking stack spends less cycles
doing forward alloc and reclaim, which should lead to better system
performance, with the cost of an amount of pre-allocated and
unreclaimable memory, even under memory pressure.

Note:
This socket option is only available when memory cgroup is enabled and we
require this reserved memory to be charged to the user's memcg. We hope
this could avoid mis-behaving users to abused this feature to reserve a
large amount on certain sockets and cause unfairness for others.

Signed-off-by: Wei Wang &lt;weiwan@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: introduce and use lock_sock_fast_nested()</title>
<updated>2021-09-30T12:06:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Abeni</name>
</author>
<published>2021-09-29T09:59:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=49054556289e8787501630b7c7a9d407da02e296'/>
<id>urn:sha1:49054556289e8787501630b7c7a9d407da02e296</id>
<content type='text'>
Syzkaller reported a false positive deadlock involving
the nl socket lock and the subflow socket lock:

MPTCP: kernel_bind error, err=-98
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.15.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz-executor998/6520 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880795718a0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close+0x267/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2738

but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1612 [inline]
ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close+0x23/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2720

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(k-sk_lock-AF_INET);
  lock(k-sk_lock-AF_INET);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by syz-executor998/6520:
 #0: ffffffff8d176c50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:802
 #1: ffffffff8d176d08 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline]
 #1: ffffffff8d176d08 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv_msg+0x3e0/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:790
 #2: ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1612 [inline]
 #2: ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close+0x23/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2720

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 6520 Comm: syz-executor998 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2944 [inline]
 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2987 [inline]
 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3776 [inline]
 __lock_acquire.cold+0x149/0x3ab kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5015
 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625 [inline]
 lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5590
 lock_sock_fast+0x36/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3229
 mptcp_close+0x267/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2738
 inet_release+0x12e/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:431
 __sock_release net/socket.c:649 [inline]
 sock_release+0x87/0x1b0 net/socket.c:677
 mptcp_pm_nl_create_listen_socket+0x238/0x2c0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:900
 mptcp_nl_cmd_add_addr+0x359/0x930 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1170
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x228/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:731
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x328/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:792
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:803
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724
 sock_no_sendpage+0x101/0x150 net/core/sock.c:2980
 kernel_sendpage.part.0+0x1a0/0x340 net/socket.c:3504
 kernel_sendpage net/socket.c:3501 [inline]
 sock_sendpage+0xe5/0x140 net/socket.c:1003
 pipe_to_sendpage+0x2ad/0x380 fs/splice.c:364
 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:418 [inline]
 __splice_from_pipe+0x43e/0x8a0 fs/splice.c:562
 splice_from_pipe fs/splice.c:597 [inline]
 generic_splice_sendpage+0xd4/0x140 fs/splice.c:746
 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:767 [inline]
 direct_splice_actor+0x110/0x180 fs/splice.c:936
 splice_direct_to_actor+0x34b/0x8c0 fs/splice.c:891
 do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:979
 do_sendfile+0xae9/0x1240 fs/read_write.c:1249
 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1314 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1300 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1300
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f215cb69969
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc96bb3868 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f215cbad072 RCX: 00007f215cb69969
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007ffc96bb3a08 R09: 00007ffc96bb3a08
R10: 0000000100000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc96bb387c
R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

the problem originates from uncorrect lock annotation in the mptcp
code and is only visible since commit 2dcb96bacce3 ("net: core: Correct
the sock::sk_lock.owned lockdep annotations"), but is present since
the port-based endpoint support initial implementation.

This patch addresses the issue introducing a nested variant of
lock_sock_fast() and using it in the relevant code path.

Fixes: 1729cf186d8a ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port")
Fixes: 2dcb96bacce3 ("net: core: Correct the sock::sk_lock.owned lockdep annotations")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1dd53f7a89b299d59eaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
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