kernel.git/net/core/net_namespace.c, branch linux-3.14.y

rtnetlink: wait for unregistering devices in rtnl_link_unregister()

2014-05-31T20:20:38Z

[ Upstream commit 200b916f3575bdf11609cb447661b8d5957b0bbf ] From: Cong Wang commit 50624c934db18ab90 (net: Delay default_device_exit_batch until no devices are unregistering) introduced rtnl_lock_unregistering() for default_device_exit_batch(). Same race could happen we when rmmod a driver which calls rtnl_link_unregister() as we call dev->destructor without rtnl lock. For long term, I think we should clean up the mess of netdev_run_todo() and net namespce exit code. Cc: Eric W. Biederman Cc: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy

2013-08-31T06:44:11Z

nsown_capable is a special case of ns_capable essentially for just CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID. For the existing users it doesn't noticably simplify things and from the suggested patches I have seen it encourages people to do the wrong thing. So remove nsown_capable. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

proc: Split the namespace stuff out into linux/proc_ns.h

2013-05-01T21:29:39Z

Split the proc namespace stuff out into linux/proc_ns.h. Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: Serge E. Hallyn cc: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Al Viro

new helper: file_inode(file)

2013-02-23T04:31:31Z

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.

2012-12-15T00:12:03Z

Andy Lutomirski found a nasty little bug in the permissions of setns. With unprivileged user namespaces it became possible to create new namespaces without privilege. However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user nameapce of the targed namespace. Which made the following nasty sequence possible. pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS); if (pid == 0) { /* child */ system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd"); } else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */ char path[PATH_MAX]; snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt"); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); setns(fd, 0); system("su -"); } Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.

2012-11-20T12:19:49Z

Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc inode for every namespace in proc. A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test to see if two processes are in the same namespace. This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks impossible. We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors) but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important. I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so their structures can be statically initialized. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns.

2012-11-20T12:17:42Z

- Push the permission check from the core setns syscall into the setns install methods where the user namespace of the target namespace can be determined, and used in a ns_capable call. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

userns: make each net (net_ns) belong to a user_ns

2012-11-19T06:46:23Z

The user namespace which creates a new network namespace owns that namespace and all resources created in it. This way we can target capability checks for privileged operations against network resources to the user_ns which created the network namespace in which the resource lives. Privilege to the user namespace which owns the network namespace, or any parent user namespace thereof, provides the same privilege to the network resource. This patch is reworked from a version originally by Serge E. Hallyn Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

netns: Deduplicate and fix copy_net_ns when !CONFIG_NET_NS

2012-11-19T06:46:19Z

The copy of copy_net_ns used when the network stack is not built is broken as it does not return -EINVAL when attempting to create a new network namespace. We don't even have a previous network namespace. Since we need a copy of copy_net_ns in net/net_namespace.h that is available when the networking stack is not built at all move the correct version of copy_net_ns from net_namespace.c into net_namespace.h Leaving us with just 2 versions of copy_net_ns. One version for when we compile in network namespace suport and another stub for all other occasions. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

net: Statically initialize init_net.dev_base_head

2012-07-18T20:32:27Z

This change eliminates an initialization-order hazard most recently seen when netprio_cgroup is built into the kernel. With thanks to Eric Dumazet for catching a bug. Signed-off-by: Mark Rustad Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller