<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/kernel, branch linux-5.10.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.10.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.10.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:21Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>kexec: derive purgatory entry from symbol</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Chen</name>
</author>
<published>2026-01-20T12:40:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=027797595a108726f4a0a45d225f603b0ffbd22b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:027797595a108726f4a0a45d225f603b0ffbd22b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 480e1d5c64bb14441f79f2eb9421d5e26f91ea3d ]

kexec_load_purgatory() derives image-&gt;start by locating e_entry inside an
SHF_EXECINSTR section.  If the purgatory object contains multiple
executable sections with overlapping sh_addr, the entrypoint check can
match more than once and trigger a WARN.

Derive the entry section from the purgatory_start symbol when present and
compute image-&gt;start from its final placement.  Keep the existing e_entry
fallback for purgatories that do not expose the symbol.

WARNING: kernel/kexec_file.c:1009 at kexec_load_purgatory+0x395/0x3c0, CPU#10: kexec/1784
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 bzImage64_load+0x133/0xa00
 __do_sys_kexec_file_load+0x2b3/0x5c0
 do_syscall_64+0x81/0x610
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

[me@linux.beauty: move helper to avoid forward declaration, per Baoquan]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260128043511.316860-1-me@linux.beauty
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260120124005.148381-1-me@linux.beauty
Fixes: 8652d44f466a ("kexec: support purgatories with .text.hot sections")
Signed-off-by: Li Chen &lt;me@linux.beauty&gt;
Acked-by: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Graf &lt;graf@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Li Chen &lt;me@linux.beauty&gt;
Cc: Philipp Rudo &lt;prudo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ricardo Ribalda Delgado &lt;ribalda@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sourabh Jain &lt;sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: verifier improvement in 32bit shift sign extension pattern</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:19:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Cupertino Miranda</name>
</author>
<published>2025-12-02T18:02:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=e28ce90f00767d100c908279fdb4fcef355c4a52'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e28ce90f00767d100c908279fdb4fcef355c4a52</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d18dec4b8990048ce75f0ece32bb96b3fbd3f422 ]

This patch improves the verifier to correctly compute bounds for
sign extension compiler pattern composed of left shift by 32bits
followed by a sign right shift by 32bits.  Pattern in the verifier was
limitted to positive value bounds and would reset bound computation for
negative values.  New code allows both positive and negative values for
sign extension without compromising bound computation and verifier to
pass.

This change is required by GCC which generate such pattern, and was
detected in the context of systemd, as described in the following GCC
bugzilla: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=119731

Three new tests were added in verifier_subreg.c.

Signed-off-by: Cupertino Miranda  &lt;cupertino.miranda@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Pinski  &lt;andrew.pinski@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Faust  &lt;david.faust@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Jose Marchesi  &lt;jose.marchesi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Elena Zannoni  &lt;elena.zannoni@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251202180220.11128-2-cupertino.miranda@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Remove duplicate ENABLE_EVENT_STR and DISABLE_EVENT_STR macros</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:19:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
</author>
<published>2026-01-26T18:00:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=545a74a151aa15ba6f994fff51a916c396921aa7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:545a74a151aa15ba6f994fff51a916c396921aa7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9df0e49c5b9b8d051529be9994e4f92f2d20be6f ]

The macros ENABLE_EVENT_STR and DISABLE_EVENT_STR were added to trace.h so
that more than one file can have access to them, but was never removed
from their original location. Remove the duplicates.

Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Zanussi &lt;zanussi@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260126130037.4ba201f9@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: d0bad49bb0a09 ("tracing: Add enable_hist/disable_hist triggers")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ucount: check for CAP_SYS_RESOURCE using ns_capable_noaudit()</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:19:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
</author>
<published>2026-01-22T14:07:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=c74b5519970a77dcbd9ed1c9f2d772c9b189d811'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c74b5519970a77dcbd9ed1c9f2d772c9b189d811</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0895a000e4fff9e950a7894210db45973e485c35 ]

The user.* sysctls implement the ctl_table_root::permissions hook and they
override the file access mode based on the CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability (at
most rwx if capable, at most r-- if not).  The capability is being checked
unconditionally, so if an LSM denies the capability, an audit record may
be logged even when access is in fact granted.

Given the logic in the set_permissions() function in kernel/ucount.c and
the unfortunate way the permission checking is implemented, it doesn't
seem viable to avoid false positive denials by deferring the capability
check.  Thus, do the same as in net_ctl_permissions() (net/sysctl_net.c) -
switch from ns_capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(), so that the check never
logs an audit record.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260122140745.239428-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Fixes: dbec28460a89 ("userns: Add per user namespace sysctls.")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Gladkov &lt;legion@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/rt: Skip currently executing CPU in rto_next_cpu()</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:19:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Chen Jinghuang</name>
</author>
<published>2026-01-22T01:25:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=d57d0746276a88ea43a2cc62b849fd8a95e32e41'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d57d0746276a88ea43a2cc62b849fd8a95e32e41</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 94894c9c477e53bcea052e075c53f89df3d2a33e ]

CPU0 becomes overloaded when hosting a CPU-bound RT task, a non-CPU-bound
RT task, and a CFS task stuck in kernel space. When other CPUs switch from
RT to non-RT tasks, RT load balancing (LB) is triggered; with
HAVE_RT_PUSH_IPI enabled, they send IPIs to CPU0 to drive the execution
of rto_push_irq_work_func. During push_rt_task on CPU0,
if next_task-&gt;prio &lt; rq-&gt;donor-&gt;prio, resched_curr() sets NEED_RESCHED
and after the push operation completes, CPU0 calls rto_next_cpu().
Since only CPU0 is overloaded in this scenario, rto_next_cpu() should
ideally return -1 (no further IPI needed).

However, multiple CPUs invoking tell_cpu_to_push() during LB increments
rd-&gt;rto_loop_next. Even when rd-&gt;rto_cpu is set to -1, the mismatch between
rd-&gt;rto_loop and rd-&gt;rto_loop_next forces rto_next_cpu() to restart its
search from -1. With CPU0 remaining overloaded (satisfying rt_nr_migratory
&amp;&amp; rt_nr_total &gt; 1), it gets reselected, causing CPU0 to queue irq_work to
itself and send self-IPIs repeatedly. As long as CPU0 stays overloaded and
other CPUs run pull_rt_tasks(), it falls into an infinite self-IPI loop,
which triggers a CPU hardlockup due to continuous self-interrupts.

The trigging scenario is as follows:

         cpu0                      cpu1                    cpu2
                                pull_rt_task
                              tell_cpu_to_push
                 &lt;------------irq_work_queue_on
rto_push_irq_work_func
       push_rt_task
    resched_curr(rq)                                   pull_rt_task
    rto_next_cpu                                     tell_cpu_to_push
                      &lt;-------------------------- atomic_inc(rto_loop_next)
rd-&gt;rto_loop != next
     rto_next_cpu
   irq_work_queue_on
rto_push_irq_work_func

Fix redundant self-IPI by filtering the initiating CPU in rto_next_cpu().
This solution has been verified to effectively eliminate spurious self-IPIs
and prevent CPU hardlockup scenarios.

Fixes: 4bdced5c9a29 ("sched/rt: Simplify the IPI based RT balancing logic")
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Suggested-by: K Prateek Nayak &lt;kprateek.nayak@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang &lt;chenjinghuang2@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider &lt;vschneid@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122012533.673768-1-chenjinghuang2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hrtimer: Fix trace oddity</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:19:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
</author>
<published>2026-01-19T10:38:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2b909d846093c3ae4513c568e57be4f151fa7bcc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2b909d846093c3ae4513c568e57be4f151fa7bcc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5d6446f409da00e5a389125ddb5ce09f5bc404c9 ]

It turns out that __run_hrtimer() will trace like:

          &lt;idle&gt;-0     [032] d.h2. 20705.474563: hrtimer_cancel:       hrtimer=0xff2db8f77f8226e8
          &lt;idle&gt;-0     [032] d.h1. 20705.474563: hrtimer_expire_entry: hrtimer=0xff2db8f77f8226e8 now=20699452001850 function=tick_nohz_handler/0x0

Which is a bit nonsensical, the timer doesn't get canceled on
expiration. The cause is the use of the incorrect debug helper.

Fixes: c6a2a1770245 ("hrtimer: Add tracepoint for hrtimers")
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260121143208.219595606@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix ftrace event field alignments</title>
<updated>2026-02-11T12:34:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
</author>
<published>2026-02-07T19:14:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=6d54efc5bb1c2fce0e310764b1947e28cf4e477c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6d54efc5bb1c2fce0e310764b1947e28cf4e477c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 033c55fe2e326bea022c3cc5178ecf3e0e459b82 ]

The fields of ftrace specific events (events used to save ftrace internal
events like function traces and trace_printk) are generated similarly to
how normal trace event fields are generated. That is, the fields are added
to a trace_events_fields array that saves the name, offset, size,
alignment and signness of the field. It is used to produce the output in
the format file in tracefs so that tooling knows how to parse the binary
data of the trace events.

The issue is that some of the ftrace event structures are packed. The
function graph exit event structures are one of them. The 64 bit calltime
and rettime fields end up 4 byte aligned, but the algorithm to show to
userspace shows them as 8 byte aligned.

The macros that create the ftrace events has one for embedded structure
fields. There's two macros for theses fields:

  __field_desc() and __field_packed()

The difference of the latter macro is that it treats the field as packed.

Rename that field to __field_desc_packed() and create replace the
__field_packed() to be a normal field that is packed and have the calltime
and rettime use those.

This showed up on 32bit architectures for function graph time fields. It
had:

 ~# cat /sys/kernel/tracing/events/ftrace/funcgraph_exit/format
[..]
        field:unsigned long func;       offset:8;       size:4; signed:0;
        field:unsigned int depth;       offset:12;      size:4; signed:0;
        field:unsigned int overrun;     offset:16;      size:4; signed:0;
        field:unsigned long long calltime;      offset:24;      size:8; signed:0;
        field:unsigned long long rettime;       offset:32;      size:8; signed:0;

Notice that overrun is at offset 16 with size 4, where in the structure
calltime is at offset 20 (16 + 4), but it shows the offset at 24. That's
because it used the alignment of unsigned long long when used as a
declaration and not as a member of a structure where it would be aligned
by word size (in this case 4).

By using the proper structure alignment, the format has it at the correct
offset:

 ~# cat /sys/kernel/tracing/events/ftrace/funcgraph_exit/format
[..]
        field:unsigned long func;       offset:8;       size:4; signed:0;
        field:unsigned int depth;       offset:12;      size:4; signed:0;
        field:unsigned int overrun;     offset:16;      size:4; signed:0;
        field:unsigned long long calltime;      offset:20;      size:8; signed:0;
        field:unsigned long long rettime;       offset:28;      size:8; signed:0;

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: "jempty.liang" &lt;imntjempty@163.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260204113628.53faec78@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: 04ae87a52074e ("ftrace: Rework event_create_dir()")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260130015740.212343-1-imntjempty@163.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260202123342.2544795-1-imntjempty@163.com/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
[ Renames + context ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ring-buffer: Avoid softlockup in ring_buffer_resize() during memory free</title>
<updated>2026-02-11T12:34:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wupeng Ma</name>
</author>
<published>2025-12-28T06:50:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=833c8bab02ae2b2f05aac19d11808a3d128bde9a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:833c8bab02ae2b2f05aac19d11808a3d128bde9a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6435ffd6c7fcba330dfa91c58dc30aed2df3d0bf ]

When user resize all trace ring buffer through file 'buffer_size_kb',
then in ring_buffer_resize(), kernel allocates buffer pages for each
cpu in a loop.

If the kernel preemption model is PREEMPT_NONE and there are many cpus
and there are many buffer pages to be freed, it may not give up cpu
for a long time and finally cause a softlockup.

To avoid it, call cond_resched() after each cpu buffer free as Commit
f6bd2c92488c ("ring-buffer: Avoid softlockup in ring_buffer_resize()")
does.

Detailed call trace as follow:

  rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
  rcu: 	24-....: (14837 ticks this GP) idle=521c/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=230597/230597 fqs=5329
  rcu: 	(t=15004 jiffies g=26003221 q=211022 ncpus=96)
  CPU: 24 UID: 0 PID: 11253 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            EL      6.18.2+ #278 NONE
  pc : arch_local_irq_restore+0x8/0x20
   arch_local_irq_restore+0x8/0x20 (P)
   free_frozen_page_commit+0x28c/0x3b0
   __free_frozen_pages+0x1c0/0x678
   ___free_pages+0xc0/0xe0
   free_pages+0x3c/0x50
   ring_buffer_resize.part.0+0x6a8/0x880
   ring_buffer_resize+0x3c/0x58
   __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x34/0xd8
   tracing_resize_ring_buffer+0x8c/0xd0
   tracing_entries_write+0x74/0xd8
   vfs_write+0xcc/0x288
   ksys_write+0x74/0x118
   __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38

Cc: &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251228065008.2396573-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma &lt;mawupeng1@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dma/pool: distinguish between missing and exhausted atomic pools</title>
<updated>2026-02-06T15:40:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sai Sree Kartheek Adivi</name>
</author>
<published>2026-01-28T13:35:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=f0e07491bb10e12d9d154059fe7174cb18405c57'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f0e07491bb10e12d9d154059fe7174cb18405c57</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 56c430c7f06d838fe3b2077dbbc4cc0bf992312b ]

Currently, dma_alloc_from_pool() unconditionally warns and dumps a stack
trace when an allocation fails, with the message "Failed to get suitable
pool".

This conflates two distinct failure modes:
1. Configuration error: No atomic pool is available for the requested
   DMA mask (a fundamental system setup issue)
2. Resource Exhaustion: A suitable pool exists but is currently full (a
   recoverable runtime state)

This lack of distinction prevents drivers from using __GFP_NOWARN to
suppress error messages during temporary pressure spikes, such as when
awaiting synchronous reclaim of descriptors.

Refactor the error handling to distinguish these cases:
- If no suitable pool is found, keep the unconditional WARN regarding
  the missing pool.
- If a pool was found but is exhausted, respect __GFP_NOWARN and update
  the warning message to explicitly state "DMA pool exhausted".

Fixes: 9420139f516d ("dma-pool: fix coherent pool allocations for IOMMU mappings")
Signed-off-by: Sai Sree Kartheek Adivi &lt;s-adivi@ti.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy &lt;robin.murphy@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski &lt;m.szyprowski@samsung.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260128133554.3056582-1-s-adivi@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Reject narrower access to pointer ctx fields</title>
<updated>2026-02-06T15:40:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Chaignon</name>
</author>
<published>2025-07-22T14:32:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=7847c4140e06f6e87229faae22cc38525334c156'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7847c4140e06f6e87229faae22cc38525334c156</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e09299225d5ba3916c91ef70565f7d2187e4cca0 upstream.

The following BPF program, simplified from a syzkaller repro, causes a
kernel warning:

    r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 169);
    exit;

With pointer field sk being at offset 168 in __sk_buff. This access is
detected as a narrower read in bpf_skb_is_valid_access because it
doesn't match offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk). It is therefore allowed
and later proceeds to bpf_convert_ctx_access. Note that for the
"is_narrower_load" case in the convert_ctx_accesses(), the insn-&gt;off
is aligned, so the cnt may not be 0 because it matches the
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk) in the bpf_convert_ctx_access. However,
the target_size stays 0 and the verifier errors with a kernel warning:

    verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion(1)

This patch fixes that to return a proper "invalid bpf_context access
off=X size=Y" error on the load instruction.

The same issue affects multiple other fields in context structures that
allow narrow access. Some other non-affected fields (for sk_msg,
sk_lookup, and sockopt) were also changed to use bpf_ctx_range_ptr for
consistency.

Note this syzkaller crash was reported in the "Closes" link below, which
used to be about a different bug, fixed in
commit fce7bd8e385a ("bpf/verifier: Handle BPF_LOAD_ACQ instructions
in insn_def_regno()"). Because syzbot somehow confused the two bugs,
the new crash and repro didn't get reported to the mailing list.

Fixes: f96da09473b52 ("bpf: simplify narrower ctx access")
Fixes: 0df1a55afa832 ("bpf: Warn on internal verifier errors")
Reported-by: syzbot+0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3b8dcee67ff4296903351a974ddd9c4dca768b64.1753194596.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
[shung-hsi.yu: offset(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_hwtstamp) case was
dropped becasuse it was only added in v6.2 with commit 9bb053490f1a
("bpf: Add hwtstamp field for the sockops prog")]
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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