<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/include/linux/mm.h, branch linux-3.10.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-3.10.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-3.10.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2017-06-21T13:42:43Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas</title>
<updated>2017-06-21T13:42:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
</author>
<published>2017-06-19T11:03:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=1ad9a25dd06fda9bdc27875e1cedb8277accb212'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1ad9a25dd06fda9bdc27875e1cedb8277accb212</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
[wt: backport to 3.18: adjust context ; no FOLL_POPULATE ;
     s390 uses generic arch_get_unmapped_area()]
[wt: backport to 3.16: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 3.10: adjust context ; code logic in PARISC's
     arch_get_unmapped_area() wasn't found ; code inserted into
     expand_upwards() and expand_downwards() runs under anon_vma lock;
     changes for gup.c:faultin_page go to memory.c:__get_user_pages();
     included Hugh Dickins' fixes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()</title>
<updated>2016-10-19T22:46:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2016-10-13T20:07:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=9691eac5593ff1e2f82391ad327f21d90322aec1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9691eac5593ff1e2f82391ad327f21d90322aec1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 19be0eaffa3ac7d8eb6784ad9bdbc7d67ed8e619 upstream.

This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").

In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better).  The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9.  Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.

Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.

To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.

Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester &lt;kernel@linuxace.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Nick Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Thelen &lt;gthelen@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: s/gup.c/memory.c; s/follow_page_pte/follow_page_mask;
     s/faultin_page/__get_user_page]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vm: add VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV handling support</title>
<updated>2015-04-29T08:34:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2015-01-29T18:51:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=0c42d1fbb33f7e3fc97a4854e1f9804951ebdd0d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0c42d1fbb33f7e3fc97a4854e1f9804951ebdd0d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 33692f27597fcab536d7cbbcc8f52905133e4aa7 upstream.

The core VM already knows about VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, but cannot return a
"you should SIGSEGV" error, because the SIGSEGV case was generally
handled by the caller - usually the architecture fault handler.

That results in lots of duplication - all the architecture fault
handlers end up doing very similar "look up vma, check permissions, do
retries etc" - but it generally works.  However, there are cases where
the VM actually wants to SIGSEGV, and applications _expect_ SIGSEGV.

In particular, when accessing the stack guard page, libsigsegv expects a
SIGSEGV.  And it usually got one, because the stack growth is handled by
that duplicated architecture fault handler.

However, when the generic VM layer started propagating the error return
from the stack expansion in commit fee7e49d4514 ("mm: propagate error
from stack expansion even for guard page"), that now exposed the
existing VM_FAULT_SIGBUS result to user space.  And user space really
expected SIGSEGV, not SIGBUS.

To fix that case, we need to add a VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV, and teach all those
duplicate architecture fault handlers about it.  They all already have
the code to handle SIGSEGV, so it's about just tying that new return
value to the existing code, but it's all a bit annoying.

This is the mindless minimal patch to do this.  A more extensive patch
would be to try to gather up the mostly shared fault handling logic into
one generic helper routine, and long-term we really should do that
cleanup.

Just from this patch, you can generally see that most architectures just
copied (directly or indirectly) the old x86 way of doing things, but in
the meantime that original x86 model has been improved to hold the VM
semaphore for shorter times etc and to handle VM_FAULT_RETRY and other
"newer" things, so it would be a good idea to bring all those
improvements to the generic case and teach other architectures about
them too.

Reported-and-tested-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Jan Engelhardt &lt;jengelh@inai.de&gt;
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt; # "s390 still compiles and boots"
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[shengyong: Backport to 3.10
 - adjust context
 - ignore modification for arch nios2, because 3.10 does not support it
 - ignore modification for driver lustre, because 3.10 does not support it
 - ignore VM_FAULT_FALLBACK in VM_FAULT_ERROR, becase 3.10 does not support
   this flag
 - add SIGSEGV handling to powerpc/cell spu_fault.c, because 3.10 does not
   separate it to copro_fault.c
 - add SIGSEGV handling in mm/memory.c, because 3.10 does not separate it
   to gup.c
]
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong &lt;shengyong1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard page</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2015-01-06T21:00:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=88b5d12c6413c7b80c3df4527b09c9d5f65c1c0a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:88b5d12c6413c7b80c3df4527b09c9d5f65c1c0a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fee7e49d45149fba60156f5b59014f764d3e3728 upstream.

Jay Foad reports that the address sanitizer test (asan) sometimes gets
confused by a stack pointer that ends up being outside the stack vma
that is reported by /proc/maps.

This happens due to an interaction between RLIMIT_STACK and the guard
page: when we do the guard page check, we ignore the potential error
from the stack expansion, which effectively results in a missing guard
page, since the expected stack expansion won't have been done.

And since /proc/maps explicitly ignores the guard page (commit
d7824370e263: "mm: fix up some user-visible effects of the stack guard
page"), the stack pointer ends up being outside the reported stack area.

This is the minimal patch: it just propagates the error.  It also
effectively makes the guard page part of the stack limit, which in turn
measn that the actual real stack is one page less than the stack limit.

Let's see if anybody notices.  We could teach acct_stack_growth() to
allow an extra page for a grow-up/grow-down stack in the rlimit test,
but I don't want to add more complexity if it isn't needed.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jay Foad &lt;jay.foad@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arch: mm: pass userspace fault flag to generic fault handler</title>
<updated>2014-11-21T17:22:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Weiner</name>
</author>
<published>2013-09-12T22:13:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=e2ec2c2b96808afa2f57ec7d7949691146fca341'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e2ec2c2b96808afa2f57ec7d7949691146fca341</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 759496ba6407c6994d6a5ce3a5e74937d7816208 upstream.

Unlike global OOM handling, memory cgroup code will invoke the OOM killer
in any OOM situation because it has no way of telling faults occuring in
kernel context - which could be handled more gracefully - from
user-triggered faults.

Pass a flag that identifies faults originating in user space from the
architecture-specific fault handlers to generic code so that memcg OOM
handling can be improved.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki &lt;kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: azurIt &lt;azurit@pobox.sk&gt;
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: fix data corruption when blocksize &lt; pagesize for mmaped data</title>
<updated>2014-11-14T16:47:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
</author>
<published>2014-10-02T01:49:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=6cbdf1151168e44f93866f6af751442b937f8989'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6cbdf1151168e44f93866f6af751442b937f8989</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 90a8020278c1598fafd071736a0846b38510309c upstream.

-&gt;page_mkwrite() is used by filesystems to allocate blocks under a page
which is becoming writeably mmapped in some process' address space. This
allows a filesystem to return a page fault if there is not enough space
available, user exceeds quota or similar problem happens, rather than
silently discarding data later when writepage is called.

However VFS fails to call -&gt;page_mkwrite() in all the cases where
filesystems need it when blocksize &lt; pagesize. For example when
blocksize = 1024, pagesize = 4096 the following is problematic:
  ftruncate(fd, 0);
  pwrite(fd, buf, 1024, 0);
  map = mmap(NULL, 1024, PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
  map[0] = 'a';       ----&gt; page_mkwrite() for index 0 is called
  ftruncate(fd, 10000); /* or even pwrite(fd, buf, 1, 10000) */
  mremap(map, 1024, 10000, 0);
  map[4095] = 'a';    ----&gt; no page_mkwrite() called

At the moment -&gt;page_mkwrite() is called, filesystem can allocate only
one block for the page because i_size == 1024. Otherwise it would create
blocks beyond i_size which is generally undesirable. But later at
-&gt;writepage() time, we also need to store data at offset 4095 but we
don't have block allocated for it.

This patch introduces a helper function filesystems can use to have
-&gt;page_mkwrite() called at all the necessary moments.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: close PageTail race</title>
<updated>2014-04-03T19:01:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Rientjes</name>
</author>
<published>2014-03-03T23:38:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=def52acc90faab583b124f3177d55c15d125e2d1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:def52acc90faab583b124f3177d55c15d125e2d1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 668f9abbd4334e6c29fa8acd71635c4f9101caa7 upstream.

Commit bf6bddf1924e ("mm: introduce compaction and migration for
ballooned pages") introduces page_count(page) into memory compaction
which dereferences page-&gt;first_page if PageTail(page).

This results in a very rare NULL pointer dereference on the
aforementioned page_count(page).  Indeed, anything that does
compound_head(), including page_count() is susceptible to racing with
prep_compound_page() and seeing a NULL or dangling page-&gt;first_page
pointer.

This patch uses Andrea's implementation of compound_trans_head() that
deals with such a race and makes it the default compound_head()
implementation.  This includes a read memory barrier that ensures that
if PageTail(head) is true that we return a head page that is neither
NULL nor dangling.  The patch then adds a store memory barrier to
prep_compound_page() to ensure page-&gt;first_page is set.

This is the safest way to ensure we see the head page that we are
expecting, PageTail(page) is already in the unlikely() path and the
memory barriers are unfortunately required.

Hugetlbfs is the exception, we don't enforce a store memory barrier
during init since no race is possible.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Holger Kiehl &lt;Holger.Kiehl@dwd.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Rafael Aquini &lt;aquini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;



</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: Make {,set}page_address() static inline if WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL</title>
<updated>2014-01-25T16:27:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Geert Uytterhoeven</name>
</author>
<published>2014-01-21T23:48:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2d36355274980e716b832710e8d18b6396594d4e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2d36355274980e716b832710e8d18b6396594d4e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f92f455f67fef27929e6043499414605b0c94872 upstream.

{,set}page_address() are macros if WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL.  If
!WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL, they're plain C functions.

If someone calls them with a void *, this pointer is auto-converted to
struct page * if !WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL, but causes a build failure on
architectures using WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL (arc, m68k and sparc64):

  drivers/md/bcache/bset.c: In function `__btree_sort':
  drivers/md/bcache/bset.c:1190: warning: dereferencing `void *' pointer
  drivers/md/bcache/bset.c:1190: error: request for member `virtual' in something not a structure or union

Convert them to static inline functions to fix this.  There are already
plenty of users of struct page members inside &lt;linux/mm.h&gt;, so there's
no reason to keep them as macros.

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Tested-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>include/linux/mm.h: complete the mm_walk definition</title>
<updated>2013-05-08T01:38:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Morton</name>
</author>
<published>2013-05-07T23:18:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=0f157a5b58d0d2890f0ae20da9fe66aa19a91a4d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0f157a5b58d0d2890f0ae20da9fe66aa19a91a4d</id>
<content type='text'>
That nameless-function-arguments thing drives me batty.  Fix.

Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal</title>
<updated>2013-05-01T14:21:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2013-05-01T14:21:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=08d76760832993050ad8c25e63b56773ef2ca303'/>
<id>urn:sha1:08d76760832993050ad8c25e63b56773ef2ca303</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull compat cleanup from Al Viro:
 "Mostly about syscall wrappers this time; there will be another pile
  with patches in the same general area from various people, but I'd
  rather push those after both that and vfs.git pile are in."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal:
  syscalls.h: slightly reduce the jungles of macros
  get rid of union semop in sys_semctl(2) arguments
  make do_mremap() static
  sparc: no need to sign-extend in sync_file_range() wrapper
  ppc compat wrappers for add_key(2) and request_key(2) are pointless
  x86: trim sys_ia32.h
  x86: sys32_kill and sys32_mprotect are pointless
  get rid of compat_sys_semctl() and friends in case of ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC
  merge compat sys_ipc instances
  consolidate compat lookup_dcookie()
  convert vmsplice to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
  switch getrusage() to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
  switch epoll_pwait to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
  convert sendfile{,64} to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
  switch signalfd{,4}() to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
  make SYSCALL_DEFINE&lt;n&gt;-generated wrappers do asmlinkage_protect
  make HAVE_SYSCALL_WRAPPERS unconditional
  consolidate cond_syscall and SYSCALL_ALIAS declarations
  teach SYSCALL_DEFINE&lt;n&gt; how to deal with long long/unsigned long long
  get rid of duplicate logics in __SC_....[1-6] definitions
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
