<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/fs/ocfs2, branch linux-3.12.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-3.12.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-3.12.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2017-03-03T10:31:12Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: do not write error flag to user structure we cannot copy from/to</title>
<updated>2017-03-03T10:31:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
</author>
<published>2014-08-29T22:18:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=9095638dfd6b9a45bf414dfcc86b88442c9cd567'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9095638dfd6b9a45bf414dfcc86b88442c9cd567</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2b462638e41ea62230297c21c4da9955937b7a3c upstream.

If we failed to copy from the structure, writing back the flags leaks 31
bits of kernel memory (the rest of the ir_flags field).

In any case, if we cannot copy from/to the structure, why should we
expect putting just the flags to work?

Also make sure ocfs2_info_handle_freeinode() returns the right error
code if the copy_to_user() fails.

Fixes: ddee5cdb70e6 ('Ocfs2: Add new OCFS2_IOC_INFO ioctl for ocfs2 v8.')
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: fix BUG_ON() in ocfs2_ci_checkpointed()</title>
<updated>2017-01-27T16:15:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tariq Saeed</name>
</author>
<published>2015-09-04T22:44:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=ded56d6d88168cb8cb46a50456929fb5f8aae600'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ded56d6d88168cb8cb46a50456929fb5f8aae600</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3d46a44a0c01b15d385ccaae24b56f619613c256 upstream.

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  #6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  #7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  #8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  #9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -&gt; my_chmod
   -&gt; sys_chmod
    -&gt; sys_fchmodat
     -&gt; notify_change
      -&gt; ocfs2_setattr
       -&gt; posix_acl_chmod
        -&gt; ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -&gt; ocfs2_set_acl
          -&gt; ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); &lt;&lt;&lt; WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status &amp;&amp; attr-&gt;ia_valid &amp; ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode-&gt;i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode-&gt;i_op-&gt;set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    &gt;&gt;&gt; BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point &lt;&lt;&lt;
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode-&gt;i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.#1247.  Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point.  Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR.  So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#184.  The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked
(the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the
lock is not EX (it is PR).  If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed
the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -&gt; ocfs2_start_checkpoint before
downconverting (to NULL) for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path.  If it
does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another
cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting
the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo
that is a mix of the two.

Orabug: 20189959
Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed &lt;tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions</title>
<updated>2017-01-27T10:15:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
</author>
<published>2016-10-25T13:44:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=a88a2be387d1d8a5843826e12009c79e32fb46c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a88a2be387d1d8a5843826e12009c79e32fb46c8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef upstream.

When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok().  Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2).  Fix that.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: fix crash caused by stale lvb with fsdlm plugin</title>
<updated>2017-01-26T16:40:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Ren</name>
</author>
<published>2017-01-11T00:57:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=762f213c7c123ace3488d0752dabc2930f92e3a2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:762f213c7c123ace3488d0752dabc2930f92e3a2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e7ee2c089e94067d68475990bdeed211c8852917 upstream.

The crash happens rather often when we reset some cluster nodes while
nodes contend fiercely to do truncate and append.

The crash backtrace is below:

   dlm: C21CBDA5E0774F4BA5A9D4F317717495: dlm_recover_grant 1 locks on 971 resources
   dlm: C21CBDA5E0774F4BA5A9D4F317717495: dlm_recover 9 generation 5 done: 4 ms
   ocfs2: Begin replay journal (node 318952601, slot 2) on device (253,18)
   ocfs2: End replay journal (node 318952601, slot 2) on device (253,18)
   ocfs2: Beginning quota recovery on device (253,18) for slot 2
   ocfs2: Finishing quota recovery on device (253,18) for slot 2
   (truncate,30154,1):ocfs2_truncate_file:470 ERROR: bug expression: le64_to_cpu(fe-&gt;i_size) != i_size_read(inode)
   (truncate,30154,1):ocfs2_truncate_file:470 ERROR: Inode 290321, inode i_size = 732 != di i_size = 937, i_flags = 0x1
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at /usr/src/linux/fs/ocfs2/file.c:470!
   invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: ocfs2_stack_user(OEN) ocfs2(OEN) ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue(OEN) quota_tree dlm(OEN) configfs fuse sd_mod    iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi af_packet iscsi_ibft iscsi_boot_sysfs softdog xfs libcrc32c ppdev parport_pc pcspkr parport      joydev virtio_balloon virtio_net i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq button processor ext4 crc16 jbd2 mbcache ata_generic cirrus virtio_blk ata_piix               drm_kms_helper ahci syscopyarea libahci sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm floppy libata drm virtio_pci virtio_ring uhci_hcd virtio ehci_hcd       usbcore serio_raw usb_common sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua scsi_mod autofs4
   Supported: No, Unsupported modules are loaded
   CPU: 1 PID: 30154 Comm: truncate Tainted: G           OE   N  4.4.21-69-default #1
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.1-0-g4adadbd-20151112_172657-sheep25 04/01/2014
   task: ffff88004ff6d240 ti: ffff880074e68000 task.ti: ffff880074e68000
   RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa05c8c30&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa05c8c30&gt;] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x640/0x6c0 [ocfs2]
   RSP: 0018:ffff880074e6bd50  EFLAGS: 00010282
   RAX: 0000000000000074 RBX: 000000000000029e RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
   RBP: ffff880074e6bda8 R08: 000000003675dc7a R09: ffffffff82013414
   R10: 0000000000034c50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003aab3448
   R13: 00000000000002dc R14: 0000000000046e11 R15: 0000000000000020
   FS:  00007f839f965700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
   CR2: 00007f839f97e000 CR3: 0000000036723000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
   Call Trace:
     ocfs2_setattr+0x698/0xa90 [ocfs2]
     notify_change+0x1ae/0x380
     do_truncate+0x5e/0x90
     do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.11+0x108/0x160
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6d
   Code: 24 28 ba d6 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 30 43 62 a0 8b 41 2c 89 44 24 08 48 8b 41 20 48 c7 c1 78 a3 62 a0 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 a0 97 f9 ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b 3d 00 fe ff ff 0f 84 ab fd ff ff 83 f8 fc 0f 84 a2 fd ff
   RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa05c8c30&gt;] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x640/0x6c0 [ocfs2]

It's because ocfs2_inode_lock() get us stale LVB in which the i_size is
not equal to the disk i_size.  We mistakenly trust the LVB because the
underlaying fsdlm dlm_lock() doesn't set lkb_sbflags with
DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID properly for us.  But, why?

The current code tries to downconvert lock without DLM_LKF_VALBLK flag
to tell o2cb don't update RSB's LVB if it's a PR-&gt;NULL conversion, even
if the lock resource type needs LVB.  This is not the right way for
fsdlm.

The fsdlm plugin behaves different on DLM_LKF_VALBLK, it depends on
DLM_LKF_VALBLK to decide if we care about the LVB in the LKB.  If
DLM_LKF_VALBLK is not set, fsdlm will skip recovering RSB's LVB from
this lkb and set the right DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID appropriately when node
failure happens.

The following diagram briefly illustrates how this crash happens:

RSB1 is inode metadata lock resource with LOCK_TYPE_USES_LVB;

The 1st round:

             Node1                                    Node2
RSB1: PR
                                                  RSB1(master): NULL-&gt;EX
ocfs2_downconvert_lock(PR-&gt;NULL, set_lvb==0)
  ocfs2_dlm_lock(no DLM_LKF_VALBLK)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

dlm_lock(no DLM_LKF_VALBLK)
  convert_lock(overwrite lkb-&gt;lkb_exflags
               with no DLM_LKF_VALBLK)

RSB1: NULL                                        RSB1: EX
                                                  reset Node2
dlm_recover_rsbs()
  recover_lvb()

/* The LVB is not trustable if the node with EX fails and
 * no lock &gt;= PR is left. We should set RSB_VALNOTVALID for RSB1.
 */

 if(!(kb_exflags &amp; DLM_LKF_VALBLK)) /* This means we miss the chance to
           return;                   * to invalid the LVB here.
                                     */

The 2nd round:

         Node 1                                Node2
RSB1(become master from recovery)

ocfs2_setattr()
  ocfs2_inode_lock(NULL-&gt;EX)
    /* dlm_lock() return the stale lvb without setting DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID */
    ocfs2_meta_lvb_is_trustable() return 1 /* so we don't refresh inode from disk */
  ocfs2_truncate_file()
      mlog_bug_on_msg(disk isize != i_size_read(inode))  /* crash! */

The fix is quite straightforward.  We keep to set DLM_LKF_VALBLK flag
for dlm_lock() if the lock resource type needs LVB and the fsdlm plugin
is uesed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481275846-6604-1-git-send-email-zren@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Ren &lt;zren@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;jiangqi903@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@versity.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: fix start offset to ocfs2_zero_range_for_truncate()</title>
<updated>2016-10-06T06:21:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Samant</name>
</author>
<published>2016-09-19T21:44:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=341ec0a305e2e64d67f346c09445c7328579f120'/>
<id>urn:sha1:341ec0a305e2e64d67f346c09445c7328579f120</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d21c353d5e99c56cdd5b5c1183ffbcaf23b8b960 upstream.

If we punch a hole on a reflink such that following conditions are met:

1. start offset is on a cluster boundary
2. end offset is not on a cluster boundary
3. (end offset is somewhere in another extent) or
   (hole range &gt; MAX_CONTIG_BYTES(1MB)),

we dont COW the first cluster starting at the start offset.  But in this
case, we were wrongly passing this cluster to
ocfs2_zero_range_for_truncate() to zero out.  This will modify the
cluster in place and zero it in the source too.

Fix this by skipping this cluster in such a scenario.

To reproduce:

1. Create a random file of say 10 MB
     xfs_io -c 'pwrite -b 4k 0 10M' -f 10MBfile
2. Reflink  it
     reflink -f 10MBfile reflnktest
3. Punch a hole at starting at cluster boundary  with range greater that
1MB. You can also use a range that will put the end offset in another
extent.
     fallocate -p -o 0 -l 1048615 reflnktest
4. sync
5. Check the  first cluster in the source file. (It will be zeroed out).
    dd if=10MBfile iflag=direct bs=&lt;cluster size&gt; count=1 | hexdump -C

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470957147-14185-1-git-send-email-ashish.samant@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Ashish Samant &lt;ashish.samant@oracle.com&gt;
Reported-by: Saar Maoz &lt;saar.maoz@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srinivas Eeda &lt;srinivas.eeda@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@versity.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Ren &lt;zren@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2/dlm: fix race between convert and migration</title>
<updated>2016-10-06T06:21:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joseph Qi</name>
</author>
<published>2016-09-19T21:43:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=84f0c561eb604f27b6df9ced98a0ad545e44a44b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:84f0c561eb604f27b6df9ced98a0ad545e44a44b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e6f0c6e6170fec175fe676495f29029aecdf486c upstream.

Commit ac7cf246dfdb ("ocfs2/dlm: fix race between convert and recovery")
checks if lockres master has changed to identify whether new master has
finished recovery or not.  This will introduce a race that right after
old master does umount ( means master will change), a new convert
request comes.

In this case, it will reset lockres state to DLM_RECOVERING and then
retry convert, and then fail with lockres-&gt;l_action being set to
OCFS2_AST_INVALID, which will cause inconsistent lock level between
ocfs2 and dlm, and then finally BUG.

Since dlm recovery will clear lock-&gt;convert_pending in
dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list, we can use it to correctly identify
the race case between convert and recovery.  So fix it.

Fixes: ac7cf246dfdb ("ocfs2/dlm: fix race between convert and recovery")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/57CE1569.8010704@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@versity.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2/dlm: fix BUG in dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T14:44:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joseph Qi</name>
</author>
<published>2016-03-25T21:21:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=71e64a840bac24303c9cc564f92517eaa64573b7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:71e64a840bac24303c9cc564f92517eaa64573b7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit be12b299a83fc807bbaccd2bcb8ec50cbb0cb55c upstream.

When master handles convert request, it queues ast first and then
returns status.  This may happen that the ast is sent before the request
status because the above two messages are sent by two threads.  And
right after the ast is sent, if master down, it may trigger BUG in
dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list in the requested node because ast
handler moves it to grant list without clear lock-&gt;convert_pending.  So
remove BUG_ON statement and check if the ast is processed in
dlmconvert_remote.

Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yiwen Jiang &lt;jiangyiwen@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Tariq Saeed &lt;tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2/dlm: fix race between convert and recovery</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T14:44:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joseph Qi</name>
</author>
<published>2016-03-25T21:21:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=69f0a1a3a67b769ec9afb0f0a0b748f4d7b1fd1c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69f0a1a3a67b769ec9afb0f0a0b748f4d7b1fd1c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ac7cf246dfdbec3d8fed296c7bf30e16f5099dac upstream.

There is a race window between dlmconvert_remote and
dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list, which will cause a lock with
OCFS2_LOCK_BUSY in grant list, thus system hangs.

dlmconvert_remote
{
        spin_lock(&amp;res-&gt;spinlock);
        list_move_tail(&amp;lock-&gt;list, &amp;res-&gt;converting);
        lock-&gt;convert_pending = 1;
        spin_unlock(&amp;res-&gt;spinlock);

        status = dlm_send_remote_convert_request();
        &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; race window, master has queued ast and return DLM_NORMAL,
               and then down before sending ast.
               this node detects master down and calls
               dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list, which will revert the
               lock to grant list.
               Then OCFS2_LOCK_BUSY won't be cleared as new master won't
               send ast any more because it thinks already be authorized.

        spin_lock(&amp;res-&gt;spinlock);
        lock-&gt;convert_pending = 0;
        if (status != DLM_NORMAL)
                dlm_revert_pending_convert(res, lock);
        spin_unlock(&amp;res-&gt;spinlock);
}

In this case, check if res-&gt;state has DLM_LOCK_RES_RECOVERING bit set
(res is still in recovering) or res master changed (new master has
finished recovery), reset the status to DLM_RECOVERING, then it will
retry convert.

Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yiwen Jiang &lt;jiangyiwen@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Tariq Saeed &lt;tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2/dlm: clear refmap bit of recovery lock while doing local recovery cleanup</title>
<updated>2016-02-15T16:07:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>xuejiufei</name>
</author>
<published>2016-02-05T23:36:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=4e7094d5b3677a5a832985d2891568c9573bfa28'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4e7094d5b3677a5a832985d2891568c9573bfa28</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c95a51807b730e4681e2ecbdfd669ca52601959e upstream.

When recovery master down, dlm_do_local_recovery_cleanup() only remove
the $RECOVERY lock owned by dead node, but do not clear the refmap bit.
Which will make umount thread falling in dead loop migrating $RECOVERY
to the dead node.

Signed-off-by: xuejiufei &lt;xuejiufei@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2/dlm: ignore cleaning the migration mle that is inuse</title>
<updated>2016-02-15T16:07:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>xuejiufei</name>
</author>
<published>2016-01-14T23:17:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=327f9703c84483c87b0fa3048819939e79f43b37'/>
<id>urn:sha1:327f9703c84483c87b0fa3048819939e79f43b37</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bef5502de074b6f6fa647b94b73155d675694420 upstream.

We have found that migration source will trigger a BUG that the refcount
of mle is already zero before put when the target is down during
migration.  The situation is as follows:

dlm_migrate_lockres
  dlm_add_migration_mle
  dlm_mark_lockres_migrating
  dlm_get_mle_inuse
  &lt;&lt;&lt;&lt;&lt;&lt; Now the refcount of the mle is 2.
  dlm_send_one_lockres and wait for the target to become the
  new master.
  &lt;&lt;&lt;&lt;&lt;&lt; o2hb detect the target down and clean the migration
  mle. Now the refcount is 1.

dlm_migrate_lockres woken, and put the mle twice when found the target
goes down which trigger the BUG with the following message:

  "ERROR: bad mle: ".

Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue &lt;xuejiufei@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
