<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/fs/kernfs, branch linux-5.4.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.4.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.4.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:25:03Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>fs/kernfs/dir: obey S_ISGID</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:25:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Max Kellermann</name>
</author>
<published>2023-12-08T09:33:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=133bf750d75e73926283cf621be7387c60e14818'/>
<id>urn:sha1:133bf750d75e73926283cf621be7387c60e14818</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5133bee62f0ea5d4c316d503cc0040cac5637601 ]

Handling of S_ISGID is usually done by inode_init_owner() in all other
filesystems, but kernfs doesn't use that function.  In kernfs, struct
kernfs_node is the primary data structure, and struct inode is only
created from it on demand.  Therefore, inode_init_owner() can't be
used and we need to imitate its behavior.

S_ISGID support is useful for the cgroup filesystem; it allows
subtrees managed by an unprivileged process to retain a certain owner
gid, which then enables sharing access to the subtree with another
unprivileged process.

--
v1 -&gt; v2: minor coding style fix (comment)

Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann &lt;max.kellermann@ionos.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231208093310.297233-2-max.kellermann@ionos.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>new helper: lookup_positive_unlocked()</title>
<updated>2023-09-23T08:59:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
</author>
<published>2019-10-31T05:21:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=0c8c20538115af947a34e1bb653deac12e9682ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0c8c20538115af947a34e1bb653deac12e9682ce</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6c2d4798a8d16cf4f3a28c3cd4af4f1dcbbb4d04 ]

Most of the callers of lookup_one_len_unlocked() treat negatives are
ERR_PTR(-ENOENT).  Provide a helper that would do just that.  Note
that a pinned positive dentry remains positive - it's -&gt;d_inode is
stable, etc.; a pinned _negative_ dentry can become positive at any
point as long as you are not holding its parent at least shared.
So using lookup_one_len_unlocked() needs to be careful;
lookup_positive_unlocked() is safer and that's what the callers
end up open-coding anyway.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 0d5a4f8f775f ("fs: Fix error checking for d_hash_and_lookup()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: fix use-after-free in __kernfs_remove</title>
<updated>2022-11-03T14:56:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian A. Ehrhardt</name>
</author>
<published>2022-09-13T12:17:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=c78b0dc6fb7fb389d674e491fd376388cdfb1d53'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c78b0dc6fb7fb389d674e491fd376388cdfb1d53</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4abc99652812a2ddf932f137515d5c5a04723538 upstream.

Syzkaller managed to trigger concurrent calls to
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns() for the same file resulting in
a KASAN detected use-after-free. The race occurs when the root
node is freed during kernfs_drain().

To prevent this acquire an additional reference for the root
of the tree that is removed before calling __kernfs_remove().

Found by syzkaller with the following reproducer (slab_nomerge is
required):

syz_mount_image$ext4(0x0, &amp;(0x7f0000000100)='./file0\x00', 0x100000, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0)
r0 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &amp;(0x7f0000000080)='/proc/self/exe\x00', 0x0, 0x0)
close(r0)
pipe2(&amp;(0x7f0000000140)={0xffffffffffffffff, &lt;r1=&gt;0xffffffffffffffff}, 0x800)
mount$9p_fd(0x0, &amp;(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', &amp;(0x7f00000000c0), 0x408, &amp;(0x7f0000000280)={'trans=fd,', {'rfdno', 0x3d, r0}, 0x2c, {'wfdno', 0x3d, r1}, 0x2c, {[{@cache_loose}, {@mmap}, {@loose}, {@loose}, {@mmap}], [{@mask={'mask', 0x3d, '^MAY_EXEC'}}, {@fsmagic={'fsmagic', 0x3d, 0x10001}}, {@dont_hash}]}})

Sample report:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kernfs_type include/linux/kernfs.h:335 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kernfs_leftmost_descendant fs/kernfs/dir.c:1261 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x843/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1369
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880088807f0 by task syz-executor.2/857

CPU: 0 PID: 857 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3-00363-g7726d4c3e60b #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0x91 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline]
 print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5e5 mm/kasan/report.c:433
 kasan_report+0xa3/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:495
 kernfs_type include/linux/kernfs.h:335 [inline]
 kernfs_leftmost_descendant fs/kernfs/dir.c:1261 [inline]
 __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x843/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1369
 __kernfs_remove fs/kernfs/dir.c:1356 [inline]
 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x108/0x190 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1589
 sysfs_slab_add+0x133/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5943
 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899
 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline]
 kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335
 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993
 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408
 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126
 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610
 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline]
 path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f725f983aed
Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f725f0f7028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f725faa3f80 RCX: 00007f725f983aed
RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007f725f9f419c R08: 0000000020000280 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000408 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 00007f725faa3f80 R15: 00007f725f0d7000
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Allocated by task 855:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
 set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:437 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:470
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:224 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:727 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3243 [inline]
 slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3251 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3258 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0xbf/0x200 mm/slub.c:3268
 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:723 [inline]
 __kernfs_new_node+0xd4/0x680 fs/kernfs/dir.c:593
 kernfs_new_node fs/kernfs/dir.c:655 [inline]
 kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x9c/0x220 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1010
 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x127/0x290 fs/sysfs/dir.c:59
 create_dir lib/kobject.c:63 [inline]
 kobject_add_internal+0x24a/0x8d0 lib/kobject.c:223
 kobject_add_varg lib/kobject.c:358 [inline]
 kobject_init_and_add+0x101/0x160 lib/kobject.c:441
 sysfs_slab_add+0x156/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5954
 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899
 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline]
 kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335
 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993
 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408
 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126
 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610
 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline]
 path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 857:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:370
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:367 [inline]
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:329 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x108/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:375
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:200 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1754 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1780 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3534 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 mm/slub.c:3551
 kernfs_put.part.0+0x2b2/0x520 fs/kernfs/dir.c:547
 kernfs_put+0x42/0x50 fs/kernfs/dir.c:521
 __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x72d/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1407
 __kernfs_remove fs/kernfs/dir.c:1356 [inline]
 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x108/0x190 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1589
 sysfs_slab_add+0x133/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5943
 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899
 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline]
 kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335
 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993
 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408
 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126
 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610
 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline]
 path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888008880780
 which belongs to the cache kernfs_node_cache of size 128
The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of
 128-byte region [ffff888008880780, ffff888008880800)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000732833f8 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8880
flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1)
raw: 0100000000000200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888001147280
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888008880680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888008880700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
&gt;ffff888008880780: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                             ^
 ffff888008880800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888008880880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================

Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt; # -rc3
Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt &lt;lk@c--e.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220913121723.691454-1-lk@c--e.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: Separate kernfs_pr_cont_buf and rename_lock.</title>
<updated>2022-06-14T16:12:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hao Luo</name>
</author>
<published>2022-05-16T19:09:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=6fd031799e7b287bc708e0ea19b66a6b40e935a9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6fd031799e7b287bc708e0ea19b66a6b40e935a9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1a702dc88e150487c9c173a249b3d236498b9183 ]

Previously the protection of kernfs_pr_cont_buf was piggy backed by
rename_lock, which means that pr_cont() needs to be protected under
rename_lock. This can cause potential circular lock dependencies.

If there is an OOM, we have the following call hierarchy:

 -&gt; cpuset_print_current_mems_allowed()
   -&gt; pr_cont_cgroup_name()
     -&gt; pr_cont_kernfs_name()

pr_cont_kernfs_name() will grab rename_lock and call printk. So we have
the following lock dependencies:

 kernfs_rename_lock -&gt; console_sem

Sometimes, printk does a wakeup before releasing console_sem, which has
the dependence chain:

 console_sem -&gt; p-&gt;pi_lock -&gt; rq-&gt;lock

Now, imagine one wants to read cgroup_name under rq-&gt;lock, for example,
printing cgroup_name in a tracepoint in the scheduler code. They will
be holding rq-&gt;lock and take rename_lock:

 rq-&gt;lock -&gt; kernfs_rename_lock

Now they will deadlock.

A prevention to this circular lock dependency is to separate the
protection of pr_cont_buf from rename_lock. In principle, rename_lock
is to protect the integrity of cgroup name when copying to buf. Once
pr_cont_buf has got its content, rename_lock can be dropped. So it's
safe to drop rename_lock after kernfs_name_locked (and
kernfs_path_from_node_locked) and rely on a dedicated pr_cont_lock
to protect pr_cont_buf.

Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hao Luo &lt;haoluo@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220516190951.3144144-1-haoluo@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: do not call fsnotify() with name without a parent</title>
<updated>2020-08-19T06:16:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
</author>
<published>2020-07-08T11:11:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=936e927ece9bddd9153764c3ae9fb12709593536'/>
<id>urn:sha1:936e927ece9bddd9153764c3ae9fb12709593536</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9991bb84b27a2594187898f261866cfc50255454 ]

When creating an FS_MODIFY event on inode itself (not on parent)
the file_name argument should be NULL.

The change to send a non NULL name to inode itself was done on purpuse
as part of another commit, as Tejun writes: "...While at it, supply the
target file name to fsnotify() from kernfs_node-&gt;name.".

But this is wrong practice and inconsistent with inotify behavior when
watching a single file.  When a child is being watched (as opposed to the
parent directory) the inotify event should contain the watch descriptor,
but not the file name.

Fixes: df6a58c5c5aa ("kernfs: don't depend on d_find_any_alias()...")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200708111156.24659-5-amir73il@gmail.com
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: fix ino wrap-around detection</title>
<updated>2019-12-13T07:42:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T23:54:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=01e7ab5b9b0549f249c854e6783a3d0618cd825e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:01e7ab5b9b0549f249c854e6783a3d0618cd825e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e23f568aa63f64cd6b355094224cc9356c0f696b upstream.

When the 32bit ino wraps around, kernfs increments the generation
number to distinguish reused ino instances.  The wrap-around detection
tests whether the allocated ino is lower than what the cursor but the
cursor is pointing to the next ino to allocate so the condition never
triggers.

Fix it by remembering the last ino and comparing against that.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Fixes: 4a3ef68acacf ("kernfs: implement i_generation")
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'y2038-vfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T16:42:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2019-09-19T16:42:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=cfb82e1df8b7c76991ea12958855897c2fb4debc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cfb82e1df8b7c76991ea12958855897c2fb4debc</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull y2038 vfs updates from Arnd Bergmann:
 "Add inode timestamp clamping.

  This series from Deepa Dinamani adds a per-superblock minimum/maximum
  timestamp limit for a file system, and clamps timestamps as they are
  written, to avoid random behavior from integer overflow as well as
  having different time stamps on disk vs in memory.

  At mount time, a warning is now printed for any file system that can
  represent current timestamps but not future timestamps more than 30
  years into the future, similar to the arbitrary 30 year limit that was
  added to settimeofday().

  This was picked as a compromise to warn users to migrate to other file
  systems (e.g. ext4 instead of ext3) when they need the file system to
  survive beyond 2038 (or similar limits in other file systems), but not
  get in the way of normal usage"

* tag 'y2038-vfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground:
  ext4: Reduce ext4 timestamp warnings
  isofs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges
  pstore: fs superblock limits
  fs: omfs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges
  fs: hpfs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges
  fs: ceph: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges
  fs: sysv: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges
  fs: affs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges
  fs: fat: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges
  fs: cifs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges
  fs: nfs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges
  ext4: Initialize timestamps limits
  9p: Fill min and max timestamps in sb
  fs: Fill in max and min timestamps in superblock
  utimes: Clamp the timestamps before update
  mount: Add mount warning for impending timestamp expiry
  timestamp_truncate: Replace users of timespec64_trunc
  vfs: Add timestamp_truncate() api
  vfs: Add file timestamp range support
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>timestamp_truncate: Replace users of timespec64_trunc</title>
<updated>2019-08-30T14:27:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Deepa Dinamani</name>
</author>
<published>2019-06-15T16:00:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=3818c1907a5e4e8fbd57fb14cea77de7c507111a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3818c1907a5e4e8fbd57fb14cea77de7c507111a</id>
<content type='text'>
Update the inode timestamp updates to use timestamp_truncate()
instead of timespec64_trunc().

The change was mostly generated by the following coccinelle
script.

virtual context
virtual patch

@r1 depends on patch forall@
struct inode *inode;
identifier i_xtime =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
expression e;
@@

inode-&gt;i_xtime =
- timespec64_trunc(
+ timestamp_truncate(
...,
- e);
+ inode);

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: adrian.hunter@intel.com
Cc: dedekind1@gmail.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: hch@lst.de
Cc: jaegeuk@kernel.org
Cc: jlbec@evilplan.org
Cc: richard@nod.at
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: yuchao0@huawei.com
Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-ntfs-dev@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: kernfs: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in kernfs_path_from_node_locked()</title>
<updated>2019-07-25T13:32:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jia-Ju Bai</name>
</author>
<published>2019-07-24T02:22:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=bbe70e4e421116db0af3acf84cbce3c3f6cac53e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bbe70e4e421116db0af3acf84cbce3c3f6cac53e</id>
<content type='text'>
In kernfs_path_from_node_locked(), there is an if statement on line 147
to check whether buf is NULL:
    if (buf)

When buf is NULL, it is used on line 151:
    len += strlcpy(buf + len, parent_str, ...)
and line 158:
    len += strlcpy(buf + len, "/", ...)
and line 160:
    len += strlcpy(buf + len, kn-&gt;name, ...)

Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur.

To fix these possible bugs, buf is checked before being used.
If it is NULL, -EINVAL is returned.

These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.

Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai &lt;baijiaju1990@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190724022242.27505-1-baijiaju1990@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: fix potential null pointer dereference</title>
<updated>2019-07-25T13:30:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peng Wang</name>
</author>
<published>2019-07-08T15:16:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2fd60da46da76948b8cc561ae8cc902209686253'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2fd60da46da76948b8cc561ae8cc902209686253</id>
<content type='text'>
Get root safely after kn is ensureed to be not null.

Signed-off-by: Peng Wang &lt;rocking@whu.edu.cn&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190708151611.13242-1-rocking@whu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
