<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/fs/crypto/fname.c, branch linux-5.12.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.12.y</id>
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<updated>2021-07-14T15:00:30Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: don't ignore minor_hash when hash is 0</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T15:00:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
</author>
<published>2021-05-27T23:52:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=e99d8883bd70bc4d14db0b225a719dc32b77de9a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e99d8883bd70bc4d14db0b225a719dc32b77de9a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 77f30bfcfcf484da7208affd6a9e63406420bf91 upstream.

When initializing a no-key name, fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr() sets the
minor_hash to 0 if the (major) hash is 0.

This doesn't make sense because 0 is a valid hash code, so we shouldn't
ignore the filesystem-provided minor_hash in that case.  Fix this by
removing the special case for 'hash == 0'.

This is an old bug that appears to have originated when the encryption
code in ext4 and f2fs was moved into fs/crypto/.  The original ext4 and
f2fs code passed the hash by pointer instead of by value.  So
'if (hash)' actually made sense then, as it was checking whether a
pointer was NULL.  But now the hashes are passed by value, and
filesystems just pass 0 for any hashes they don't have.  There is no
need to handle this any differently from the hashes actually being 0.

It is difficult to reproduce this bug, as it only made a difference in
the case where a filename's 32-bit major hash happened to be 0.
However, it probably had the largest chance of causing problems on
ubifs, since ubifs uses minor_hash to do lookups of no-key names, in
addition to using it as a readdir cookie.  ext4 only uses minor_hash as
a readdir cookie, and f2fs doesn't use minor_hash at all.

Fixes: 0b81d0779072 ("fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.6+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527235236.2376556-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'f2fs-for-5.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs</title>
<updated>2020-12-17T19:18:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2020-12-17T19:18:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=ff49c86f27e4726a86f5034543e6e684daf41955'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ff49c86f27e4726a86f5034543e6e684daf41955</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim:
 "In this round, we've made more work into per-file compression support.

  For example, F2FS_IOC_GET | SET_COMPRESS_OPTION provides a way to
  change the algorithm or cluster size per file. F2FS_IOC_COMPRESS |
  DECOMPRESS_FILE provides a way to compress and decompress the existing
  normal files manually.

  There is also a new mount option, compress_mode=fs|user, which can
  control who compresses the data.

  Chao also added a checksum feature with a mount option so that
  we are able to detect any corrupted cluster.

  In addition, Daniel contributed casefolding with encryption patch,
  which will be used for Android devices.

  Summary:

  Enhancements:
   - add ioctls and mount option to manage per-file compression feature
   - support casefolding with encryption
   - support checksum for compressed cluster
   - avoid IO starvation by replacing mutex with rwsem
   - add sysfs, max_io_bytes, to control max bio size

  Bug fixes:
   - fix use-after-free issue when compression and fsverity are enabled
   - fix consistency corruption during fault injection test
   - fix data offset for lseek
   - get rid of buffer_head which has 32bits limit in fiemap
   - fix some bugs in multi-partitions support
   - fix nat entry count calculation in shrinker
   - fix some stat information

  And, we've refactored some logics and fix minor bugs as well"

* tag 'f2fs-for-5.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (36 commits)
  f2fs: compress: fix compression chksum
  f2fs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in sanity_check_raw_super()
  f2fs: fix race of pending_pages in decompression
  f2fs: fix to account inline xattr correctly during recovery
  f2fs: inline: fix wrong inline inode stat
  f2fs: inline: correct comment in f2fs_recover_inline_data
  f2fs: don't check PAGE_SIZE again in sanity_check_raw_super()
  f2fs: convert to F2FS_*_INO macro
  f2fs: introduce max_io_bytes, a sysfs entry, to limit bio size
  f2fs: don't allow any writes on readonly mount
  f2fs: avoid race condition for shrinker count
  f2fs: add F2FS_IOC_DECOMPRESS_FILE and F2FS_IOC_COMPRESS_FILE
  f2fs: add compress_mode mount option
  f2fs: Remove unnecessary unlikely()
  f2fs: init dirty_secmap incorrectly
  f2fs: remove buffer_head which has 32bits limit
  f2fs: fix wrong block count instead of bytes
  f2fs: use new conversion functions between blks and bytes
  f2fs: rename logical_to_blk and blk_to_logical
  f2fs: fix kbytes written stat for multi-device case
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6</title>
<updated>2020-12-14T20:18:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2020-12-14T20:18:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=9e4b0d55d84a66dbfede56890501dc96e696059c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9e4b0d55d84a66dbfede56890501dc96e696059c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
 "API:
   - Add speed testing on 1420-byte blocks for networking

  Algorithms:
   - Improve performance of chacha on ARM for network packets
   - Improve performance of aegis128 on ARM for network packets

  Drivers:
   - Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
   - Add support for QAT 4xxx devices
   - Enable crypto-engine retry mechanism in caam
   - Enable support for crypto engine on sdm845 in qce
   - Add HiSilicon PRNG driver support"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (161 commits)
  crypto: qat - add capability detection logic in qat_4xxx
  crypto: qat - add AES-XTS support for QAT GEN4 devices
  crypto: qat - add AES-CTR support for QAT GEN4 devices
  crypto: atmel-i2c - select CONFIG_BITREVERSE
  crypto: hisilicon/trng - replace atomic_add_return()
  crypto: keembay - Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
  dt-bindings: Add Keem Bay OCS AES bindings
  crypto: aegis128 - avoid spurious references crypto_aegis128_update_simd
  crypto: seed - remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
  crypto: x86/poly1305 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
  crypto: x86/sha512 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
  crypto: aesni - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
  crypto: cpt - Fix sparse warnings in cptpf
  hwrng: ks-sa - Add dependency on IOMEM and OF
  crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file
  crypto: arm/aes-ce - work around Cortex-A57/A72 silion errata
  crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()
  crypto: ccree - rework cache parameters handling
  crypto: cavium - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
  crypto: marvell/octeontx - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: Have filesystems handle their d_ops</title>
<updated>2020-12-03T06:00:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Rosenberg</name>
</author>
<published>2020-11-19T06:09:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=bb9cd9106b22b4fc5ff8d78a752be8a4ba2cbba5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bb9cd9106b22b4fc5ff8d78a752be8a4ba2cbba5</id>
<content type='text'>
This shifts the responsibility of setting up dentry operations from
fscrypt to the individual filesystems, allowing them to have their own
operations while still setting fscrypt's d_revalidate as appropriate.

Most filesystems can just use generic_set_encrypted_ci_d_ops, unless
they have their own specific dentry operations as well. That operation
will set the minimal d_ops required under the circumstances.

Since the fscrypt d_ops are set later on, we must set all d_ops there,
since we cannot adjust those later on. This should not result in any
change in behavior.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg &lt;drosen@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: allow deleting files with unsupported encryption policy</title>
<updated>2020-12-03T02:25:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
</author>
<published>2020-12-03T02:20:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=a14d0b6764917b21ee6fdfd2a8a4c2920fbefcce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a14d0b6764917b21ee6fdfd2a8a4c2920fbefcce</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently it's impossible to delete files that use an unsupported
encryption policy, as the kernel will just return an error when
performing any operation on the top-level encrypted directory, even just
a path lookup into the directory or opening the directory for readdir.

More specifically, this occurs in any of the following cases:

- The encryption context has an unrecognized version number.  Current
  kernels know about v1 and v2, but there could be more versions in the
  future.

- The encryption context has unrecognized encryption modes
  (FSCRYPT_MODE_*) or flags (FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_*), an unrecognized
  combination of modes, or reserved bits set.

- The encryption key has been added and the encryption modes are
  recognized but aren't available in the crypto API -- for example, a
  directory is encrypted with FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM but the kernel
  doesn't have CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM enabled.

It's desirable to return errors for most operations on files that use an
unsupported encryption policy, but the current behavior is too strict.
We need to allow enough to delete files, so that people can't be stuck
with undeletable files when downgrading kernel versions.  That includes
allowing directories to be listed and allowing dentries to be looked up.

Fix this by modifying the key setup logic to treat an unsupported
encryption policy in the same way as "key unavailable" in the cases that
are required for a recursive delete to work: preparing for a readdir or
a dentry lookup, revalidating a dentry, or checking whether an inode has
the same encryption policy as its parent directory.

Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201203022041.230976-10-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sha - split sha.h into sha1.h and sha2.h</title>
<updated>2020-11-20T03:45:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
</author>
<published>2020-11-13T05:20:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=a24d22b225ce158651378869a6b88105c4bdb887'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a24d22b225ce158651378869a6b88105c4bdb887</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently &lt;crypto/sha.h&gt; contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and &lt;crypto/sha3.h&gt; contains declarations for SHA-3.

This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure.  So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.

Therefore, split &lt;crypto/sha.h&gt; into two headers &lt;crypto/sha1.h&gt; and
&lt;crypto/sha2.h&gt;, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.

This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1.  It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: export fscrypt_d_revalidate()</title>
<updated>2020-09-28T21:44:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
</author>
<published>2020-09-24T05:47:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=5b2a828b98ec1872799b1b4d82113c76a12d594f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5b2a828b98ec1872799b1b4d82113c76a12d594f</id>
<content type='text'>
Dentries that represent no-key names must have a dentry_operations that
includes fscrypt_d_revalidate().  Currently, this is handled by
fscrypt_prepare_lookup() installing fscrypt_d_ops.

However, ceph support for encryption
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914191707.380444-1-jlayton@kernel.org)
can't use fscrypt_d_ops, since ceph already has its own
dentry_operations.

Similarly, ext4 and f2fs support for directories that are both encrypted
and casefolded
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200923010151.69506-1-drosen@google.com)
can't use fscrypt_d_ops either, since casefolding requires some dentry
operations too.

To satisfy both users, we need to move the responsibility of installing
the dentry_operations to filesystems.

In preparation for this, export fscrypt_d_revalidate() and give it a
!CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION stub.

Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924054721.187797-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: rename DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME to DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME</title>
<updated>2020-09-24T04:29:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
</author>
<published>2020-09-24T04:26:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=501e43fbea468fa93c1dff0ee744e69303ef5a43'/>
<id>urn:sha1:501e43fbea468fa93c1dff0ee744e69303ef5a43</id>
<content type='text'>
Originally we used the term "encrypted name" or "ciphertext name" to
mean the encoded filename that is shown when an encrypted directory is
listed without its key.  But these terms are ambiguous since they also
mean the filename stored on-disk.  "Encrypted name" is especially
ambiguous since it could also be understood to mean "this filename is
encrypted on-disk", similar to "encrypted file".

So we've started calling these encoded names "no-key names" instead.

Therefore, rename DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME to DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME to avoid
confusion about what this flag means.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924042624.98439-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: don't call no-key names "ciphertext names"</title>
<updated>2020-09-24T04:29:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
</author>
<published>2020-09-24T04:26:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=70fb2612aab62d47e03f82eaa7384a8d30ca175d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:70fb2612aab62d47e03f82eaa7384a8d30ca175d</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently we're using the term "ciphertext name" ambiguously because it
can mean either the actual ciphertext filename, or the encoded filename
that is shown when an encrypted directory is listed without its key.
The latter we're now usually calling the "no-key name"; and while it's
derived from the ciphertext name, it's not the same thing.

To avoid this ambiguity, rename fscrypt_name::is_ciphertext_name to
fscrypt_name::is_nokey_name, and update comments that say "ciphertext
name" (or "encrypted name") to say "no-key name" instead when warranted.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924042624.98439-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: use sha256() instead of open coding</title>
<updated>2020-09-22T13:48:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
</author>
<published>2020-09-17T04:53:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=0c6a113b2446e7d4c6b8222fe63518dc2e01e8c1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0c6a113b2446e7d4c6b8222fe63518dc2e01e8c1</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that there's a library function that calculates the SHA-256 digest
of a buffer in one step, use it instead of sha256_init() +
sha256_update() + sha256_final().

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917045341.324996-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
