<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c, branch linux-6.5.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-6.5.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-6.5.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2023-11-28T17:14:40Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: abort transaction on generation mismatch when marking eb as dirty</title>
<updated>2023-11-28T17:14:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
</author>
<published>2023-09-12T12:04:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=96612b6f99d5783bdbe96443fca455290bac17b3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:96612b6f99d5783bdbe96443fca455290bac17b3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 50564b651d01c19ce732819c5b3c3fd60707188e ]

When marking an extent buffer as dirty, at btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(),
we check if its generation matches the running transaction and if not we
just print a warning. Such mismatch is an indicator that something really
went wrong and only printing a warning message (and stack trace) is not
enough to prevent a corruption. Allowing a transaction to commit with such
an extent buffer will trigger an error if we ever try to read it from disk
due to a generation mismatch with its parent generation.

So abort the current transaction with -EUCLEAN if we notice a generation
mismatch. For this we need to pass a transaction handle to
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty() which is always available except in test code,
in which case we can pass NULL since it operates on dummy extent buffers
and all test roots have a single node/leaf (root node at level 0).

Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: use u64 for buffer sizes in the tree search ioctls</title>
<updated>2023-11-20T10:57:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
</author>
<published>2023-10-13T09:05:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=3dccc81f9ea91632503a96df1f667626e01eb3ec'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3dccc81f9ea91632503a96df1f667626e01eb3ec</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dec96fc2dcb59723e041416b8dc53e011b4bfc2e ]

In the tree search v2 ioctl we use the type size_t, which is an unsigned
long, to track the buffer size in the local variable 'buf_size'. An
unsigned long is 32 bits wide on a 32 bits architecture. The buffer size
defined in struct btrfs_ioctl_search_args_v2 is a u64, so when we later
try to copy the local variable 'buf_size' to the argument struct, when
the search returns -EOVERFLOW, we copy only 32 bits which will be a
problem on big endian systems.

Fix this by using a u64 type for the buffer sizes, not only at
btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2(), but also everywhere down the call chain
so that we can use the u64 at btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2().

Fixes: cc68a8a5a433 ("btrfs: new ioctl TREE_SEARCH_V2")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/ce6f4bd6-9453-4ffe-ba00-cee35495e10f@moroto.mountain/
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix some -Wmaybe-uninitialized warnings in ioctl.c</title>
<updated>2023-10-25T10:16:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
</author>
<published>2023-09-26T19:47:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=1472a1d9c2947eb9f02a03747274aadf99cf80aa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1472a1d9c2947eb9f02a03747274aadf99cf80aa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9147b9ded499d9853bdf0e9804b7eaa99c4429ed ]

Jens reported the following warnings from -Wmaybe-uninitialized recent
Linus' branch.

  In file included from ./include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:26,
		   from ./arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h:71,
		   from ./include/linux/compiler.h:246,
		   from ./include/linux/export.h:5,
		   from ./include/linux/linkage.h:7,
		   from ./include/linux/kernel.h:17,
		   from fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:6:
  In function ‘instrument_copy_from_user_before’,
      inlined from ‘_copy_from_user’ at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:148:3,
      inlined from ‘copy_from_user’ at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:183:7,
      inlined from ‘btrfs_ioctl_space_info’ at fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2999:6,
      inlined from ‘btrfs_ioctl’ at fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4616:10:
  ./include/linux/kasan-checks.h:38:27: warning: ‘space_args’ may be used
  uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
     38 | #define kasan_check_write __kasan_check_write
  ./include/linux/instrumented.h:129:9: note: in expansion of macro
  ‘kasan_check_write’
    129 |         kasan_check_write(to, n);
	|         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  ./include/linux/kasan-checks.h: In function ‘btrfs_ioctl’:
  ./include/linux/kasan-checks.h:20:6: note: by argument 1 of type ‘const
  volatile void *’ to ‘__kasan_check_write’ declared here
     20 | bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int
	size);
	|      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2981:39: note: ‘space_args’ declared here
   2981 |         struct btrfs_ioctl_space_args space_args;
	|                                       ^~~~~~~~~~
  In function ‘instrument_copy_from_user_before’,
      inlined from ‘_copy_from_user’ at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:148:3,
      inlined from ‘copy_from_user’ at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:183:7,
      inlined from ‘_btrfs_ioctl_send’ at fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4343:9,
      inlined from ‘btrfs_ioctl’ at fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4658:10:
  ./include/linux/kasan-checks.h:38:27: warning: ‘args32’ may be used
  uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
     38 | #define kasan_check_write __kasan_check_write
  ./include/linux/instrumented.h:129:9: note: in expansion of macro
  ‘kasan_check_write’
    129 |         kasan_check_write(to, n);
	|         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  ./include/linux/kasan-checks.h: In function ‘btrfs_ioctl’:
  ./include/linux/kasan-checks.h:20:6: note: by argument 1 of type ‘const
  volatile void *’ to ‘__kasan_check_write’ declared here
     20 | bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int
	size);
	|      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4341:49: note: ‘args32’ declared here
   4341 |                 struct btrfs_ioctl_send_args_32 args32;
	|                                                 ^~~~~~

This was due to his config options and having KASAN turned on,
which adds some extra checks around copy_from_user(), which then
triggered the -Wmaybe-uninitialized checker for these cases.

Fix the warnings by initializing the different structs we're copying
into.

Reported-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: release path before inode lookup during the ino lookup ioctl</title>
<updated>2023-09-23T09:14:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
</author>
<published>2023-08-26T10:28:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=6fdce81e425be112f1ca129776f4041afeaad413'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6fdce81e425be112f1ca129776f4041afeaad413</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ee34a82e890a7babb5585daf1a6dd7d4d1cf142a upstream.

During the ino lookup ioctl we can end up calling btrfs_iget() to get an
inode reference while we are holding on a root's btree. If btrfs_iget()
needs to lookup the inode from the root's btree, because it's not
currently loaded in memory, then it will need to lock another or the
same path in the same root btree. This may result in a deadlock and
trigger the following lockdep splat:

  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00004-gf7757129e3de #0 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  syz-executor277/5012 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff88802df41710 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88802df418e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -&gt; #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:
         down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645
         __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
         btrfs_search_slot+0x13a4/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2302
         btrfs_init_root_free_objectid+0x148/0x320 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4955
         btrfs_init_fs_root fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1128 [inline]
         btrfs_get_root_ref+0x5ae/0xae0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1338
         btrfs_get_fs_root fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1390 [inline]
         open_ctree+0x29c8/0x3030 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3494
         btrfs_fill_super+0x1c7/0x2f0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1154
         btrfs_mount_root+0x7e0/0x910 fs/btrfs/super.c:1519
         legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611
         vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519
         fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1112 [inline]
         vfs_kern_mount+0xbc/0x150 fs/namespace.c:1142
         btrfs_mount+0x39f/0xb50 fs/btrfs/super.c:1579
         legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611
         vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519
         do_new_mount+0x28f/0xae0 fs/namespace.c:3335
         do_mount fs/namespace.c:3675 [inline]
         __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3884 [inline]
         __se_sys_mount+0x2d9/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3861
         do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
         do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

  -&gt; #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}:
         check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
         check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
         validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
         __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
         lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
         down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645
         __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
         btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:142 [inline]
         btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x292/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:281
         btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline]
         btrfs_search_slot+0x4ff/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2154
         btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:412
         btrfs_read_locked_inode fs/btrfs/inode.c:3892 [inline]
         btrfs_iget_path+0x2d9/0x1520 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5716
         btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1961 [inline]
         btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user+0x77a/0xf50 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2105
         btrfs_ioctl+0xb0b/0xd40 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4683
         vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
         __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856
         do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
         do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

  other info that might help us debug this:

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    rlock(btrfs-tree-00);
                                 lock(btrfs-tree-01);
                                 lock(btrfs-tree-00);
    rlock(btrfs-tree-01);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  1 lock held by syz-executor277/5012:
   #0: ffff88802df418e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 1 PID: 5012 Comm: syz-executor277 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00004-gf7757129e3de #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
   dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
   check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195
   check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
   check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
   validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
   __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
   lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
   down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645
   __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
   btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:142 [inline]
   btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x292/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:281
   btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline]
   btrfs_search_slot+0x4ff/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2154
   btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:412
   btrfs_read_locked_inode fs/btrfs/inode.c:3892 [inline]
   btrfs_iget_path+0x2d9/0x1520 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5716
   btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1961 [inline]
   btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user+0x77a/0xf50 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2105
   btrfs_ioctl+0xb0b/0xd40 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4683
   vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  RIP: 0033:0x7f0bec94ea39

Fix this simply by releasing the path before calling btrfs_iget() as at
point we don't need the path anymore.

Reported-by: syzbot+bf66ad948981797d2f1d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000045fa140603c4a969@google.com/
Fixes: 23d0b79dfaed ("btrfs: Add unprivileged version of ino_lookup ioctl")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-6.5/block-2023-06-23' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux</title>
<updated>2023-06-26T19:47:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2023-06-26T19:47:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=a0433f8cae3ac51f59b4b1863032822aaa2d8164'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a0433f8cae3ac51f59b4b1863032822aaa2d8164</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull block updates from Jens Axboe:

 - NVMe pull request via Keith:
      - Various cleanups all around (Irvin, Chaitanya, Christophe)
      - Better struct packing (Christophe JAILLET)
      - Reduce controller error logs for optional commands (Keith)
      - Support for &gt;=64KiB block sizes (Daniel Gomez)
      - Fabrics fixes and code organization (Max, Chaitanya, Daniel
        Wagner)

 - bcache updates via Coly:
      - Fix a race at init time (Mingzhe Zou)
      - Misc fixes and cleanups (Andrea, Thomas, Zheng, Ye)

 - use page pinning in the block layer for dio (David)

 - convert old block dio code to page pinning (David, Christoph)

 - cleanups for pktcdvd (Andy)

 - cleanups for rnbd (Guoqing)

 - use the unchecked __bio_add_page() for the initial single page
   additions (Johannes)

 - fix overflows in the Amiga partition handling code (Michael)

 - improve mq-deadline zoned device support (Bart)

 - keep passthrough requests out of the IO schedulers (Christoph, Ming)

 - improve support for flush requests, making them less special to deal
   with (Christoph)

 - add bdev holder ops and shutdown methods (Christoph)

 - fix the name_to_dev_t() situation and use cases (Christoph)

 - decouple the block open flags from fmode_t (Christoph)

 - ublk updates and cleanups, including adding user copy support (Ming)

 - BFQ sanity checking (Bart)

 - convert brd from radix to xarray (Pankaj)

 - constify various structures (Thomas, Ivan)

 - more fine grained persistent reservation ioctl capability checks
   (Jingbo)

 - misc fixes and cleanups (Arnd, Azeem, Demi, Ed, Hengqi, Hou, Jan,
   Jordy, Li, Min, Yu, Zhong, Waiman)

* tag 'for-6.5/block-2023-06-23' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux: (266 commits)
  scsi/sg: don't grab scsi host module reference
  ext4: Fix warning in blkdev_put()
  block: don't return -EINVAL for not found names in devt_from_devname
  cdrom: Fix spectre-v1 gadget
  block: Improve kernel-doc headers
  blk-mq: don't insert passthrough request into sw queue
  bsg: make bsg_class a static const structure
  ublk: make ublk_chr_class a static const structure
  aoe: make aoe_class a static const structure
  block/rnbd: make all 'class' structures const
  block: fix the exclusive open mask in disk_scan_partitions
  block: add overflow checks for Amiga partition support
  block: change all __u32 annotations to __be32 in affs_hardblocks.h
  block: fix signed int overflow in Amiga partition support
  block: add capacity validation in bdev_add_partition()
  block: fine-granular CAP_SYS_ADMIN for Persistent Reservation
  block: disallow Persistent Reservation on partitions
  reiserfs: fix blkdev_put() warning from release_journal_dev()
  block: fix wrong mode for blkdev_get_by_dev() from disk_scan_partitions()
  block: document the holder argument to blkdev_get_by_path
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: trigger orphan inode cleanup during START_SYNC ioctl</title>
<updated>2023-06-19T11:59:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
</author>
<published>2023-05-11T23:42:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=edc728814f9a73cec501e4e5dd677dc9d65841cb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:edc728814f9a73cec501e4e5dd677dc9d65841cb</id>
<content type='text'>
There is an internal error report that scrub found an error in an orphan
inode's data.

However there are very limited ways to cleanup such orphan inodes:

- btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount()
  This happens at either mount, or RO-&gt;RW switch.
  This is not a viable solution for root fs which may not be unmounted
  or RO mounted.

  Furthermore this doesn't cover every subvolume, it only covers the
  currently cached subvolumes.

- btrfs_lookup_dentry()
  This happens when we first lookup the subvolume dentry.
  But dentry can be cached thus it's not ensured to be triggered every
  time.

- create_snapshot()
  This only happens for the created snapshot, not the source one.

This means if we didn't trigger orphan items cleanup, there is really no
other way to manually trigger it. Add this step to the START_SYNC ioctl.
This is a slight change in the semantics of the ioctl but as sync can be
potentially slow and is usually paired with WAIT_SYNC ioctl.

The errors are not handled because the main point of the ioctl is the
async commit, orphan cleanup is a side effect.

Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: simplify transid initialization in btrfs_ioctl_wait_sync</title>
<updated>2023-06-19T11:59:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Rix</name>
</author>
<published>2023-05-02T14:51:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=12df6a622ed8f0cd14470c6d76fe1b85f621f230'/>
<id>urn:sha1:12df6a622ed8f0cd14470c6d76fe1b85f621f230</id>
<content type='text'>
A small code simplification, move the default value of transid to its
initialization and remove the else-statement.

Signed-off-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: don't commit transaction for every subvol create</title>
<updated>2023-06-19T11:59:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sweet Tea Dorminy</name>
</author>
<published>2023-04-11T19:10:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=1b53e51a4a8f870da194bcdaec9eb8865ee89386'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1b53e51a4a8f870da194bcdaec9eb8865ee89386</id>
<content type='text'>
Recently a Meta-internal workload encountered subvolume creation taking
up to 2s each, significantly slower than directory creation. As they
were hoping to be able to use subvolumes instead of directories, and
were looking to create hundreds, this was a significant issue. After
Josef investigated, it turned out to be due to the transaction commit
currently performed at the end of subvolume creation.

This change improves the workload by not doing transaction commit for every
subvolume creation, and merely requiring a transaction commit on fsync.
In the worst case, of doing a subvolume create and fsync in a loop, this
should require an equal amount of time to the current scheme; and in the
best case, the internal workload creating hundreds of subvolumes before
fsyncing is greatly improved.

While it would be nice to be able to use the log tree and use the normal
fsync path, log tree replay can't deal with new subvolume inodes
presently.

It's possible that there's some reason that the transaction commit is
necessary for correctness during subvolume creation; however,
git logs indicate that the commit dates back to the beginning of
subvolume creation, and there are no notes on why it would be necessary.

Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa &lt;neal@gompa.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy &lt;sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: use the holder as indication for exclusive opens</title>
<updated>2023-06-12T14:04:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
</author>
<published>2023-06-08T11:02:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2736e8eeb0ccdc71d1f4256c9c9a28f58cc43307'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2736e8eeb0ccdc71d1f4256c9c9a28f58cc43307</id>
<content type='text'>
The current interface for exclusive opens is rather confusing as it
requires both the FMODE_EXCL flag and a holder.  Remove the need to pass
FMODE_EXCL and just key off the exclusive open off a non-NULL holder.

For blkdev_put this requires adding the holder argument, which provides
better debug checking that only the holder actually releases the hold,
but at the same time allows removing the now superfluous mode argument.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;		[btrfs]
Acked-by: Jack Wang &lt;jinpu.wang@ionos.com&gt;		[rnbd]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230608110258.189493-16-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix assertion of exclop condition when starting balance</title>
<updated>2023-04-28T14:36:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>xiaoshoukui</name>
</author>
<published>2023-04-13T09:55:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=ac868bc9d136cde6e3eb5de77019a63d57a540ff'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ac868bc9d136cde6e3eb5de77019a63d57a540ff</id>
<content type='text'>
Balance as exclusive state is compatible with paused balance and device
add, which makes some things more complicated. The assertion of valid
states when starting from paused balance needs to take into account two
more states, the combinations can be hit when there are several threads
racing to start balance and device add. This won't typically happen when
the commands are started from command line.

Scenario 1: With exclusive_operation state == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE.

Concurrently adding multiple devices to the same mount point and
btrfs_exclop_finish executed finishes before assertion in
btrfs_exclop_balance, exclusive_operation will changed to
BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE state which lead to assertion failed:

  fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE ||
  fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD,
  in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:456
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   btrfs_exclop_balance+0x13c/0x310
   ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0
   ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20
   btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320
   btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0
   ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210
   do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Scenario 2: With exclusive_operation state == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED.

Concurrently adding multiple devices to the same mount point and
btrfs_exclop_balance executed finish before the latter thread execute
assertion in btrfs_exclop_balance, exclusive_operation will changed to
BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED state which lead to assertion failed:

  fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE ||
  fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD ||
  fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE,
  fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:458
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   btrfs_exclop_balance+0x240/0x410
   ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0
   ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20
   btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320
   btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0
   ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210
   do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

An example of the failed assertion is below, which shows that the
paused balance is also needed to be checked.

  root@syzkaller:/home/xsk# ./repro
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.611428][ T7970] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 0
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.613973][ T7971] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.615456][ T7972] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.617528][ T7973] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.618359][ T7974] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.622589][ T7975] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.624034][ T7976] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.626420][ T7977] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.627643][ T7978] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.629006][ T7979] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  [  416.630298][ T7980] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.632787][ T7981] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.634282][ T7982] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.636202][ T7983] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  [  416.637012][ T7984] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 1
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.637759][ T7984] assertion failed: fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation ==
  BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE || fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation ==
  BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD || fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation ==
  BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE, in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:458
  [  416.639845][ T7984] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
  [  416.640485][ T7984] CPU: 0 PID: 7984 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.2.0 #7
  [  416.641172][ T7984] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
  [  416.642090][ T7984] RIP: 0010:btrfs_assertfail+0x2c/0x2e
  [  416.644423][ T7984] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ea7e28 EFLAGS: 00010282
  [  416.645018][ T7984] RAX: 00000000000000cc RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  [  416.645763][ T7984] RDX: ffff88801d030000 RSI: ffffffff81637e7c RDI: fffff520007d4fb7
  [  416.646554][ T7984] RBP: ffffffff8a533de0 R08: 00000000000000cc R09: 0000000000000000
  [  416.647299][ T7984] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8a533da0
  [  416.648041][ T7984] R13: 00000000000001ca R14: 000000005000940a R15: 0000000000000000
  [  416.648785][ T7984] FS:  00007fa2985d4640(0000) GS:ffff88802cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [  416.649616][ T7984] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [  416.650238][ T7984] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000018e5e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
  [  416.650980][ T7984] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [  416.651725][ T7984] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [  416.652502][ T7984] PKRU: 55555554
  [  416.652888][ T7984] Call Trace:
  [  416.653241][ T7984]  &lt;TASK&gt;
  [  416.653527][ T7984]  btrfs_exclop_balance+0x240/0x410
  [  416.654036][ T7984]  ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0
  [  416.654465][ T7984]  ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20
  [  416.654874][ T7984]  btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320
  [  416.655380][ T7984]  btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0
  [  416.655822][ T7984]  ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80
  [  416.656400][ T7984]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210
  [  416.656874][ T7984]  do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0
  [  416.657346][ T7984]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  [  416.657922][ T7984] RIP: 0033:0x4546af
  [  416.660170][ T7984] RSP: 002b:00007fa2985d4150 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  [  416.660972][ T7984] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa2985d4640 RCX: 00000000004546af
  [  416.661714][ T7984] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000005000940a RDI: 0000000000000003
  [  416.662449][ T7984] RBP: 00007fa2985d41d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffee37a4c4f
  [  416.663195][ T7984] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fa2985d4640
  [  416.663951][ T7984] R13: 0000000000000009 R14: 000000000041b320 R15: 00007fa297dd4000
  [  416.664703][ T7984]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
  [  416.665040][ T7984] Modules linked in:
  [  416.665590][ T7984] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  [  416.666176][ T7984] RIP: 0010:btrfs_assertfail+0x2c/0x2e
  [  416.668775][ T7984] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ea7e28 EFLAGS: 00010282
  [  416.669425][ T7984] RAX: 00000000000000cc RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  [  416.670235][ T7984] RDX: ffff88801d030000 RSI: ffffffff81637e7c RDI: fffff520007d4fb7
  [  416.671050][ T7984] RBP: ffffffff8a533de0 R08: 00000000000000cc R09: 0000000000000000
  [  416.671867][ T7984] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8a533da0
  [  416.672685][ T7984] R13: 00000000000001ca R14: 000000005000940a R15: 0000000000000000
  [  416.673501][ T7984] FS:  00007fa2985d4640(0000) GS:ffff88802cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [  416.674425][ T7984] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [  416.675114][ T7984] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000018e5e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
  [  416.675933][ T7984] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [  416.676760][ T7984] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20230324031611.98986-1-xiaoshoukui@gmail.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Signed-off-by: xiaoshoukui &lt;xiaoshoukui@ruijie.com.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
