<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c, branch linux-6.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-6.3.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-6.3.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2023-05-17T12:01:52Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix assertion of exclop condition when starting balance</title>
<updated>2023-05-17T12:01:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>xiaoshoukui</name>
</author>
<published>2023-04-13T09:55:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=6062e9e335a3bf409b5118bfe4cc10aff4b6adb1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6062e9e335a3bf409b5118bfe4cc10aff4b6adb1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ac868bc9d136cde6e3eb5de77019a63d57a540ff upstream.

Balance as exclusive state is compatible with paused balance and device
add, which makes some things more complicated. The assertion of valid
states when starting from paused balance needs to take into account two
more states, the combinations can be hit when there are several threads
racing to start balance and device add. This won't typically happen when
the commands are started from command line.

Scenario 1: With exclusive_operation state == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE.

Concurrently adding multiple devices to the same mount point and
btrfs_exclop_finish executed finishes before assertion in
btrfs_exclop_balance, exclusive_operation will changed to
BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE state which lead to assertion failed:

  fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE ||
  fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD,
  in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:456
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   btrfs_exclop_balance+0x13c/0x310
   ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0
   ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20
   btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320
   btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0
   ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210
   do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Scenario 2: With exclusive_operation state == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED.

Concurrently adding multiple devices to the same mount point and
btrfs_exclop_balance executed finish before the latter thread execute
assertion in btrfs_exclop_balance, exclusive_operation will changed to
BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED state which lead to assertion failed:

  fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE ||
  fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD ||
  fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE,
  fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:458
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   btrfs_exclop_balance+0x240/0x410
   ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0
   ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20
   btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320
   btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0
   ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210
   do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

An example of the failed assertion is below, which shows that the
paused balance is also needed to be checked.

  root@syzkaller:/home/xsk# ./repro
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.611428][ T7970] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 0
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.613973][ T7971] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.615456][ T7972] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.617528][ T7973] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.618359][ T7974] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.622589][ T7975] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.624034][ T7976] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.626420][ T7977] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.627643][ T7978] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.629006][ T7979] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  [  416.630298][ T7980] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.632787][ T7981] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.634282][ T7982] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.636202][ T7983] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
  [  416.637012][ T7984] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 1
  Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
  [  416.637759][ T7984] assertion failed: fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation ==
  BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE || fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation ==
  BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD || fs_info-&gt;exclusive_operation ==
  BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE, in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:458
  [  416.639845][ T7984] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
  [  416.640485][ T7984] CPU: 0 PID: 7984 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.2.0 #7
  [  416.641172][ T7984] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
  [  416.642090][ T7984] RIP: 0010:btrfs_assertfail+0x2c/0x2e
  [  416.644423][ T7984] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ea7e28 EFLAGS: 00010282
  [  416.645018][ T7984] RAX: 00000000000000cc RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  [  416.645763][ T7984] RDX: ffff88801d030000 RSI: ffffffff81637e7c RDI: fffff520007d4fb7
  [  416.646554][ T7984] RBP: ffffffff8a533de0 R08: 00000000000000cc R09: 0000000000000000
  [  416.647299][ T7984] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8a533da0
  [  416.648041][ T7984] R13: 00000000000001ca R14: 000000005000940a R15: 0000000000000000
  [  416.648785][ T7984] FS:  00007fa2985d4640(0000) GS:ffff88802cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [  416.649616][ T7984] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [  416.650238][ T7984] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000018e5e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
  [  416.650980][ T7984] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [  416.651725][ T7984] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [  416.652502][ T7984] PKRU: 55555554
  [  416.652888][ T7984] Call Trace:
  [  416.653241][ T7984]  &lt;TASK&gt;
  [  416.653527][ T7984]  btrfs_exclop_balance+0x240/0x410
  [  416.654036][ T7984]  ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0
  [  416.654465][ T7984]  ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20
  [  416.654874][ T7984]  btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320
  [  416.655380][ T7984]  btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0
  [  416.655822][ T7984]  ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80
  [  416.656400][ T7984]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210
  [  416.656874][ T7984]  do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0
  [  416.657346][ T7984]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  [  416.657922][ T7984] RIP: 0033:0x4546af
  [  416.660170][ T7984] RSP: 002b:00007fa2985d4150 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  [  416.660972][ T7984] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa2985d4640 RCX: 00000000004546af
  [  416.661714][ T7984] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000005000940a RDI: 0000000000000003
  [  416.662449][ T7984] RBP: 00007fa2985d41d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffee37a4c4f
  [  416.663195][ T7984] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fa2985d4640
  [  416.663951][ T7984] R13: 0000000000000009 R14: 000000000041b320 R15: 00007fa297dd4000
  [  416.664703][ T7984]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
  [  416.665040][ T7984] Modules linked in:
  [  416.665590][ T7984] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  [  416.666176][ T7984] RIP: 0010:btrfs_assertfail+0x2c/0x2e
  [  416.668775][ T7984] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ea7e28 EFLAGS: 00010282
  [  416.669425][ T7984] RAX: 00000000000000cc RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  [  416.670235][ T7984] RDX: ffff88801d030000 RSI: ffffffff81637e7c RDI: fffff520007d4fb7
  [  416.671050][ T7984] RBP: ffffffff8a533de0 R08: 00000000000000cc R09: 0000000000000000
  [  416.671867][ T7984] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8a533da0
  [  416.672685][ T7984] R13: 00000000000001ca R14: 000000005000940a R15: 0000000000000000
  [  416.673501][ T7984] FS:  00007fa2985d4640(0000) GS:ffff88802cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [  416.674425][ T7984] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [  416.675114][ T7984] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000018e5e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
  [  416.675933][ T7984] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [  416.676760][ T7984] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20230324031611.98986-1-xiaoshoukui@gmail.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Signed-off-by: xiaoshoukui &lt;xiaoshoukui@ruijie.com.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: scrub: reject unsupported scrub flags</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:17:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
</author>
<published>2023-04-06T05:00:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=3f466c7bc5d7ee1bb57ff0ced2bf00a4e5d55c13'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f466c7bc5d7ee1bb57ff0ced2bf00a4e5d55c13</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 604e6681e114d05a2e384c4d1e8ef81918037ef5 upstream.

Since the introduction of scrub interface, the only flag that we support
is BTRFS_SCRUB_READONLY.  Thus there is no sanity checks, if there are
some undefined flags passed in, we just ignore them.

This is problematic if we want to introduce new scrub flags, as we have
no way to determine if such flags are supported.

Address the problem by introducing a check for the flags, and if
unsupported flags are set, return -EOPNOTSUPP to inform the user space.

This check should be backported for all supported kernels before any new
scrub flags are introduced.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-6.3-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux</title>
<updated>2023-04-02T17:57:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2023-04-02T17:57:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=6ab608fe852b50fe809b22cdf7db6cbe006d7cb3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6ab608fe852b50fe809b22cdf7db6cbe006d7cb3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:

 - scan block devices in non-exclusive mode to avoid temporary mkfs
   failures

 - fix race between quota disable and quota assign ioctls

 - fix deadlock when aborting transaction during relocation with scrub

 - ignore fiemap path cache when there are multiple paths for a node

* tag 'for-6.3-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: ignore fiemap path cache when there are multiple paths for a node
  btrfs: fix deadlock when aborting transaction during relocation with scrub
  btrfs: scan device in non-exclusive mode
  btrfs: fix race between quota disable and quota assign ioctls
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix race between quota disable and quota assign ioctls</title>
<updated>2023-03-27T22:46:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
</author>
<published>2023-03-22T10:33:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2f1a6be12ab6c8470d5776e68644726c94257c54'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2f1a6be12ab6c8470d5776e68644726c94257c54</id>
<content type='text'>
The quota assign ioctl can currently run in parallel with a quota disable
ioctl call. The assign ioctl uses the quota root, while the disable ioctl
frees that root, and therefore we can have a use-after-free triggered in
the assign ioctl, leading to a trace like the following when KASAN is
enabled:

  [672.723][T736] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0
  [672.723][T736] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888022ec0208 by task btrfs_search_sl/27736
  [672.724][T736]
  [672.725][T736] CPU: 1 PID: 27736 Comm: btrfs_search_sl Not tainted 6.3.0-rc3 #37
  [672.723][T736] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  [672.727][T736] Call Trace:
  [672.728][T736]  &lt;TASK&gt;
  [672.728][T736]  dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150
  [672.725][T736]  print_report+0xc1/0x5e0
  [672.720][T736]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x61/0x2e0
  [672.727][T736]  ? __phys_addr+0xc9/0x150
  [672.725][T736]  ? btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0
  [672.722][T736]  kasan_report+0xc0/0xf0
  [672.729][T736]  ? btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0
  [672.724][T736]  btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0
  [672.723][T736]  ? fs_reclaim_acquire+0xba/0x160
  [672.722][T736]  ? split_leaf+0x13d0/0x13d0
  [672.726][T736]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
  [672.723][T736]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x338/0x3c0
  [672.722][T736]  update_qgroup_status_item+0xf7/0x320
  [672.724][T736]  ? add_qgroup_rb+0x3d0/0x3d0
  [672.739][T736]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x2b0
  [672.730][T736]  ? spin_bug+0x1d0/0x1d0
  [672.737][T736]  btrfs_run_qgroups+0x5de/0x840
  [672.730][T736]  ? btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xa70/0xa70
  [672.738][T736]  ? __del_qgroup_relation+0x4ba/0xe00
  [672.738][T736]  btrfs_ioctl+0x3d58/0x5d80
  [672.735][T736]  ? tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x16a/0x550
  [672.737][T736]  ? tomoyo_execute_permission+0x4a0/0x4a0
  [672.731][T736]  ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x50/0x50
  [672.737][T736]  ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x54/0x90
  [672.734][T736]  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x132/0x1660
  [672.730][T736]  ? vfs_fileattr_set+0xc40/0xc40
  [672.730][T736]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2e/0x50
  [672.732][T736]  ? sigprocmask+0xf2/0x340
  [672.737][T736]  ? __fget_files+0x26a/0x480
  [672.732][T736]  ? bpf_lsm_file_ioctl+0x9/0x10
  [672.738][T736]  ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x50/0x50
  [672.736][T736]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210
  [672.736][T736]  do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
  [672.731][T736]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  [672.739][T736] RIP: 0033:0x4556ad
  [672.742][T736]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
  [672.743][T736]
  [672.748][T736] Allocated by task 27677:
  [672.743][T736]  kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
  [672.741][T736]  kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
  [672.741][T736]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xa4/0xb0
  [672.749][T736]  btrfs_alloc_root+0x48/0x90
  [672.746][T736]  btrfs_create_tree+0x146/0xa20
  [672.744][T736]  btrfs_quota_enable+0x461/0x1d20
  [672.743][T736]  btrfs_ioctl+0x4a1c/0x5d80
  [672.747][T736]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210
  [672.749][T736]  do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
  [672.744][T736]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  [672.756][T736]
  [672.757][T736] Freed by task 27677:
  [672.759][T736]  kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
  [672.759][T736]  kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
  [672.756][T736]  kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50
  [672.751][T736]  ____kasan_slab_free+0x162/0x1c0
  [672.758][T736]  slab_free_freelist_hook+0x89/0x1c0
  [672.752][T736]  __kmem_cache_free+0xaf/0x2e0
  [672.752][T736]  btrfs_put_root+0x1ff/0x2b0
  [672.759][T736]  btrfs_quota_disable+0x80a/0xbc0
  [672.752][T736]  btrfs_ioctl+0x3e5f/0x5d80
  [672.756][T736]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210
  [672.753][T736]  do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
  [672.765][T736]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  [672.769][T736]
  [672.768][T736] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888022ec0000
  [672.768][T736]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
  [672.769][T736] The buggy address is located 520 bytes inside of
  [672.769][T736]  freed 4096-byte region [ffff888022ec0000, ffff888022ec1000)
  [672.760][T736]
  [672.764][T736] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  [672.761][T736] page:ffffea00008bb000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x22ec0
  [672.766][T736] head:ffffea00008bb000 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
  [672.779][T736] flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
  [672.770][T736] raw: 00fff00000010200 ffff888012842140 ffffea000054ba00 dead000000000002
  [672.770][T736] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
  [672.771][T736] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
  [672.778][T736] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
  [672.777][T736] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2040(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 88
  [672.779][T736]  get_page_from_freelist+0x119c/0x2d50
  [672.779][T736]  __alloc_pages+0x1cb/0x4a0
  [672.776][T736]  alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x270
  [672.773][T736]  allocate_slab+0x260/0x390
  [672.771][T736]  ___slab_alloc+0xa9a/0x13e0
  [672.778][T736]  __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xb0
  [672.771][T736]  __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x136/0x320
  [672.789][T736]  __kmalloc+0x4e/0x1a0
  [672.783][T736]  tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0xc3/0x600
  [672.781][T736]  tomoyo_path_perm+0x22f/0x420
  [672.782][T736]  tomoyo_path_unlink+0x92/0xd0
  [672.780][T736]  security_path_unlink+0xdb/0x150
  [672.788][T736]  do_unlinkat+0x377/0x680
  [672.788][T736]  __x64_sys_unlink+0xca/0x110
  [672.789][T736]  do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
  [672.783][T736]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  [672.784][T736] page last free stack trace:
  [672.787][T736]  free_pcp_prepare+0x4e5/0x920
  [672.787][T736]  free_unref_page+0x1d/0x4e0
  [672.784][T736]  __unfreeze_partials+0x17c/0x1a0
  [672.797][T736]  qlist_free_all+0x6a/0x180
  [672.796][T736]  kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x189/0x1d0
  [672.797][T736]  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x64/0x90
  [672.793][T736]  kmem_cache_alloc+0x17c/0x3c0
  [672.799][T736]  getname_flags.part.0+0x50/0x4e0
  [672.799][T736]  getname_flags+0x9e/0xe0
  [672.792][T736]  vfs_fstatat+0x77/0xb0
  [672.791][T736]  __do_sys_newlstat+0x84/0x100
  [672.798][T736]  do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
  [672.796][T736]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  [672.790][T736]
  [672.791][T736] Memory state around the buggy address:
  [672.799][T736]  ffff888022ec0100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  [672.805][T736]  ffff888022ec0180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  [672.802][T736] &gt;ffff888022ec0200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  [672.809][T736]                       ^
  [672.809][T736]  ffff888022ec0280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  [672.809][T736]  ffff888022ec0300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fix this by having the qgroup assign ioctl take the qgroup ioctl mutex
before calling btrfs_run_qgroups(), which is what all qgroup ioctls should
call.

Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck &lt;butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAFcO6XN3VD8ogmHwqRk4kbiwtpUSNySu2VAxN8waEPciCHJvMA@mail.gmail.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-6.3-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux</title>
<updated>2023-03-10T16:39:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2023-03-10T16:39:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=ae195ca1a8a4af75073e82c485148897c923f88f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae195ca1a8a4af75073e82c485148897c923f88f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
 "First batch of fixes. Among them there are two updates to sysfs and
  ioctl which are not strictly fixes but are used for testing so there's
  no reason to delay them.

   - fix block group item corruption after inserting new block group

   - fix extent map logging bit not cleared for split maps after
     dropping range

   - fix calculation of unusable block group space reporting bogus
     values due to 32/64b division

   - fix unnecessary increment of read error stat on write error

   - improve error handling in inode update

   - export per-device fsid in DEV_INFO ioctl to distinguish seeding
     devices, needed for testing

   - allocator size classes:
      - fix potential dead lock in size class loading logic
      - print sysfs stats for the allocation classes"

* tag 'for-6.3-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: fix block group item corruption after inserting new block group
  btrfs: fix extent map logging bit not cleared for split maps after dropping range
  btrfs: fix percent calculation for bg reclaim message
  btrfs: fix unnecessary increment of read error stat on write error
  btrfs: handle btrfs_del_item errors in __btrfs_update_delayed_inode
  btrfs: ioctl: return device fsid from DEV_INFO ioctl
  btrfs: fix potential dead lock in size class loading logic
  btrfs: sysfs: add size class stats
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: ioctl: return device fsid from DEV_INFO ioctl</title>
<updated>2023-03-06T18:28:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
</author>
<published>2023-02-11T11:53:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2943868a909f1d526da363dc077fd7b578643f4b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2943868a909f1d526da363dc077fd7b578643f4b</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently user space utilizes dev info ioctl to grab the info of a
certain devid, this includes its device uuid.  But the returned info is
not enough to determine if a device is a seed.

Commit a26d60dedf9a ("btrfs: sysfs: add devinfo/fsid to retrieve actual
fsid from the device") exports the same value in sysfs so this is for
parity with ioctl.  Add a new member, fsid, into
btrfs_ioctl_dev_info_args, and populate the member with fsid value.

This should not cause any compatibility problem, following the
combinations:

- Old user space, old kernel
- Old user space, new kernel
  User space tool won't even check the new member.

- New user space, old kernel
  The kernel won't touch the new member, and user space tool should
  zero out its argument, thus the new member is all zero.

  User space tool can then know the kernel doesn't support this fsid
  reporting, and falls back to whatever they can.

- New user space, new kernel
  Go as planned.

  Would find the fsid member is no longer zero, and trust its value.

Reviewed-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-6.3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux</title>
<updated>2023-02-20T20:54:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2023-02-20T20:54:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=885ce48739189fac6645ff42d736ee0de0b5917d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:885ce48739189fac6645ff42d736ee0de0b5917d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull btrfs updates from David Sterba:
 "The usual mix of performance improvements and new features.

  The core change is reworking how checksums are processed, with
  followup cleanups and simplifications. There are two minor changes in
  block layer and iomap code.

  Features:

   - block group allocation class heuristics:
      - pack files by size (up to 128k, up to 8M, more) to avoid
        fragmentation in block groups, assuming that file size and life
        time is correlated, in particular this may help during balance
      - with tracepoints and extensible in the future

  Performance:

   - send: cache directory utimes and only emit the command when
     necessary
      - speedup up to 10x
      - smaller final stream produced (no redundant utimes commands
        issued)
      - compatibility not affected

   - fiemap: skip backref checks for shared leaves
      - speedup 3x on sample filesystem with all leaves shared (e.g. on
        snapshots)

   - micro optimized b-tree key lookup, speedup in metadata operations
     (sample benchmark: fs_mark +10% of files/sec)

  Core changes:

   - change where checksumming is done in the io path:
      - checksum and read repair does verification at lower layer
      - cascaded cleanups and simplifications

   - raid56 refactoring and cleanups

  Fixes:

   - sysfs: make sure that a run-time change of a feature is correctly
     tracked by the feature files

   - scrub: better reporting of tree block errors

  Other:

   - locally enable -Wmaybe-uninitialized after fixing all warnings

   - misc cleanups, spelling fixes

  Other code:

   - block: export bio_split_rw

   - iomap: remove IOMAP_F_ZONE_APPEND"

* tag 'for-6.3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: (109 commits)
  btrfs: make kobj_type structures constant
  btrfs: remove the bdev argument to btrfs_rmap_block
  btrfs: don't rely on unchanging -&gt;bi_bdev for zone append remaps
  btrfs: never return true for reads in btrfs_use_zone_append
  btrfs: pass a btrfs_bio to btrfs_use_append
  btrfs: set bbio-&gt;file_offset in alloc_new_bio
  btrfs: use file_offset to limit bios size in calc_bio_boundaries
  btrfs: do unsigned integer division in the extent buffer binary search loop
  btrfs: eliminate extra call when doing binary search on extent buffer
  btrfs: raid56: handle endio in scrub_rbio
  btrfs: raid56: handle endio in recover_rbio
  btrfs: raid56: handle endio in rmw_rbio
  btrfs: raid56: submit the read bios from scrub_assemble_read_bios
  btrfs: raid56: fold rmw_read_wait_recover into rmw_read_bios
  btrfs: raid56: fold recover_assemble_read_bios into recover_rbio
  btrfs: raid56: add a bio_list_put helper
  btrfs: raid56: wait for I/O completion in submit_read_bios
  btrfs: raid56: simplify code flow in rmw_rbio
  btrfs: raid56: simplify error handling and code flow in raid56_parity_write
  btrfs: replace btrfs_wait_tree_block_writeback by wait_on_extent_buffer_writeback
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: rename btrfs_clean_tree_block to btrfs_clear_buffer_dirty</title>
<updated>2023-02-15T18:38:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
</author>
<published>2023-01-26T21:00:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=190a83391bc40862538572d1313c207c348d356d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:190a83391bc40862538572d1313c207c348d356d</id>
<content type='text'>
btrfs_clean_tree_block is a misnomer, it's just
clear_extent_buffer_dirty with some extra accounting around it.  Rename
this to btrfs_clear_buffer_dirty to make it more clear it belongs with
it's setter, btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: add trans argument to btrfs_clean_tree_block</title>
<updated>2023-02-15T18:38:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
</author>
<published>2023-01-26T21:00:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=ed25dab3a0d1b14b59a3ad74b9d6bb4f4dca03b8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ed25dab3a0d1b14b59a3ad74b9d6bb4f4dca03b8</id>
<content type='text'>
We check the header generation in the extent buffer against the current
running transaction id to see if it's safe to clear DIRTY on this
buffer.  Generally speaking if we're clearing the buffer dirty we're
holding the transaction open, but in the case of cleaning up an aborted
transaction we don't, so we have extra checks in that path to check the
transid.  To allow for a future cleanup go ahead and pass in the trans
handle so we don't have to rely on -&gt;running_transaction being set.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: port privilege checking helpers to mnt_idmap</title>
<updated>2023-01-19T08:24:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
</author>
<published>2023-01-13T11:49:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=9452e93e6dae862d7aeff2b11236d79bde6f9b66'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9452e93e6dae862d7aeff2b11236d79bde6f9b66</id>
<content type='text'>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.

Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.

Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.

Acked-by: Dave Chinner &lt;dchinner@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
