<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/crypto/Kconfig, branch linux-4.14.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.14.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.14.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2019-02-12T18:45:57Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>crypto: aes_ti - disable interrupts while accessing S-box</title>
<updated>2019-02-12T18:45:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
</author>
<published>2018-10-18T04:37:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=e867d75658251211cba421522c3272c6cd1dabe6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e867d75658251211cba421522c3272c6cd1dabe6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0a6a40c2a8c184a2fb467efacfb1cd338d719e0b ]

In the "aes-fixed-time" AES implementation, disable interrupts while
accessing the S-box, in order to make cache-timing attacks more
difficult.  Previously it was possible for the CPU to be interrupted
while the S-box was loaded into L1 cache, potentially evicting the
cachelines and causing later table lookups to be time-variant.

In tests I did on x86 and ARM, this doesn't affect performance
significantly.  Responsiveness is potentially a concern, but interrupts
are only disabled for a single AES block.

Note that even after this change, the implementation still isn't
necessarily guaranteed to be constant-time; see
https://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf for a discussion
of the many difficulties involved in writing truly constant-time AES
software.  But it's valuable to make such attacks more difficult.

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: x86/salsa20 - remove x86 salsa20 implementations</title>
<updated>2018-07-17T09:39:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
</author>
<published>2018-05-26T07:08:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=19f39eff68b40746703285ee55209041fedca6b3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:19f39eff68b40746703285ee55209041fedca6b3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b7b73cd5d74694ed59abcdb4974dacb4ff8b2a2a upstream.

The x86 assembly implementations of Salsa20 use the frame base pointer
register (%ebp or %rbp), which breaks frame pointer convention and
breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code.
Recent (v4.10+) kernels will warn about this, e.g.

WARNING: kernel stack regs at 00000000a8291e69 in syzkaller047086:4677 has bad 'bp' value 000000001077994c
[...]

But after looking into it, I believe there's very little reason to still
retain the x86 Salsa20 code.  First, these are *not* vectorized
(SSE2/SSSE3/AVX2) implementations, which would be needed to get anywhere
close to the best Salsa20 performance on any remotely modern x86
processor; they're just regular x86 assembly.  Second, it's still
unclear that anyone is actually using the kernel's Salsa20 at all,
especially given that now ChaCha20 is supported too, and with much more
efficient SSSE3 and AVX2 implementations.  Finally, in benchmarks I did
on both Intel and AMD processors with both gcc 8.1.0 and gcc 4.9.4, the
x86_64 salsa20-asm is actually slightly *slower* than salsa20-generic
(~3% slower on Skylake, ~10% slower on Zen), while the i686 salsa20-asm
is only slightly faster than salsa20-generic (~15% faster on Skylake,
~20% faster on Zen).  The gcc version made little difference.

So, the x86_64 salsa20-asm is pretty clearly useless.  That leaves just
the i686 salsa20-asm, which based on my tests provides a 15-20% speed
boost.  But that's without updating the code to not use %ebp.  And given
the maintenance cost, the small speed difference vs. salsa20-generic,
the fact that few people still use i686 kernels, the doubt that anyone
is even using the kernel's Salsa20 at all, and the fact that a SSE2
implementation would almost certainly be much faster on any remotely
modern x86 processor yet no one has cared enough to add one yet, I don't
think it's worthwhile to keep.

Thus, just remove both the x86_64 and i686 salsa20-asm implementations.

Reported-by: syzbot+ffa3a158337bbc01ff09@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecdh - fix typo in KPP dependency of CRYPTO_ECDH</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:38:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hauke Mehrtens</name>
</author>
<published>2017-11-25T23:16:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2992182765762c2d5bfa70ff2da5f1841e7aba89'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2992182765762c2d5bfa70ff2da5f1841e7aba89</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b5b9007730ce1d90deaf25d7f678511550744bdc upstream.

This fixes a typo in the CRYPTO_KPP dependency of CRYPTO_ECDH.

Fixes: 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens &lt;hauke@hauke-m.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:10:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
</author>
<published>2017-11-01T14:07:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst</title>
<updated>2017-08-09T12:17:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Mueller</name>
</author>
<published>2017-07-30T12:32:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=72548b093ee38a6d4f2a19e6ef1948ae05c181f7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:72548b093ee38a6d4f2a19e6ef1948ae05c181f7</id>
<content type='text'>
Use the NULL cipher to copy the AAD and PT/CT from the TX SGL
to the RX SGL. This allows an in-place crypto operation on the
RX SGL for encryption, because the TX data is always smaller or
equal to the RX data (the RX data will hold the tag).

For decryption, a per-request TX SGL is created which will only hold
the tag value. As the RX SGL will have no space for the tag value and
an in-place operation will not write the tag buffer, the TX SGL with the
tag value is chained to the RX SGL. This now allows an in-place
crypto operation.

For example:

* without the patch:
kcapi -x 2 -e -c "gcm(aes)" -p 89154d0d4129d322e4487bafaa4f6b46 -k c0ece3e63198af382b5603331cc23fa8 -i 7e489b83622e7228314d878d -a afcd7202d621e06ca53b70c2bdff7fb2 -l 16 -u -s
00000000000000000000000000000000f4a3eacfbdadd3b1a17117b1d67ffc1f1e21efbbc6d83724a8c296e3bb8cda0c

* with the patch:
kcapi -x 2 -e -c "gcm(aes)" -p 89154d0d4129d322e4487bafaa4f6b46 -k c0ece3e63198af382b5603331cc23fa8 -i 7e489b83622e7228314d878d -a afcd7202d621e06ca53b70c2bdff7fb2 -l 16 -u -s
afcd7202d621e06ca53b70c2bdff7fb2f4a3eacfbdadd3b1a17117b1d67ffc1f1e21efbbc6d83724a8c296e3bb8cda0c

Tests covering this functionality have been added to libkcapi.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecdh - add privkey generation support</title>
<updated>2017-06-10T04:04:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tudor-Dan Ambarus</name>
</author>
<published>2017-05-30T14:52:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=6755fd269d5c100b0eca420db501ae58435efd6e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6755fd269d5c100b0eca420db501ae58435efd6e</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for generating ecc private keys.

Generation of ecc private keys is helpful in a user-space to kernel
ecdh offload because the keys are not revealed to user-space. Private
key generation is also helpful to implement forward secrecy.

If the user provides a NULL ecc private key, the kernel will generate it
and further use it for ecdh.

Move ecdh's object files below drbg's. drbg must be present in the kernel
at the time of calling.

Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus &lt;tudor.ambarus@microchip.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: xts - drop gf128mul dependency</title>
<updated>2017-04-05T13:58:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnáček</name>
</author>
<published>2017-04-02T19:19:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=ad1064cd612e11b807eb764140deb5c1875ca5dc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ad1064cd612e11b807eb764140deb5c1875ca5dc</id>
<content type='text'>
Since the gf128mul_x_ble function used by xts.c is now defined inline
in the header file, the XTS module no longer depends on gf128mul.
Therefore, the 'select CRYPTO_GF128MUL' line can be safely removed.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnacek@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewd-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: powerpc - Stress test for vpmsum implementations</title>
<updated>2017-03-24T14:02:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Axtens</name>
</author>
<published>2017-03-15T12:37:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=146c8688d99c574d9ff0af17eca51bbd6402a57f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:146c8688d99c574d9ff0af17eca51bbd6402a57f</id>
<content type='text'>
vpmsum implementations often don't kick in for short test vectors.
This is a simple test module that does a configurable number of
random tests, each up to 64kB and each with random offsets.

Both CRC-T10DIF and CRC32C are tested.

Cc: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: powerpc - Add CRC-T10DIF acceleration</title>
<updated>2017-03-24T14:02:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Axtens</name>
</author>
<published>2017-03-15T12:37:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=b01df1c16c9a6f7a14f843d3ac6b9eef5a7bb17e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b01df1c16c9a6f7a14f843d3ac6b9eef5a7bb17e</id>
<content type='text'>
T10DIF is a CRC16 used heavily in NVMe.

It turns out we can accelerate it with a CRC32 library and a few
little tricks.

Provide the accelerator based the refactored CRC32 code.

Cc: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Thanks-to: Hong Bo Peng &lt;penghb@cn.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: xts - Add ECB dependency</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T12:11:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Milan Broz</name>
</author>
<published>2017-02-23T07:38:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=12cb3a1c4184f891d965d1f39f8cfcc9ef617647'/>
<id>urn:sha1:12cb3a1c4184f891d965d1f39f8cfcc9ef617647</id>
<content type='text'>
Since the
   commit f1c131b45410a202eb45cc55980a7a9e4e4b4f40
   crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher
the XTS mode is based on ECB, so the mode must select
ECB otherwise it can fail to initialize.

Signed-off-by: Milan Broz &lt;gmazyland@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
