kernel.git/arch/x86/platform, branch linux-5.19.y

x86/olpc: fix 'logical not is only applied to the left hand side'

2022-08-17T13:16:05Z

commit 3a2ba42cbd0b669ce3837ba400905f93dd06c79f upstream. The bitops compile-time optimization series revealed one more problem in olpc-xo1-sci.c:send_ebook_state(), resulted in GCC warnings: arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c: In function 'send_ebook_state': arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c:83:63: warning: logical not is only applied to the left hand side of comparison [-Wlogical-not-parentheses] 83 | if (!!test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, ebook_switch_idev->sw) == state) | ^~ arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c:83:13: note: add parentheses around left hand side expression to silence this warning Despite this code working as intended, this redundant double negation of boolean value, together with comparing to `char` with no explicit conversion to bool, makes compilers think the author made some unintentional logical mistakes here. Make it the other way around and negate the char instead to silence the warnings. Fixes: d2aa37411b8e ("x86/olpc/xo1/sci: Produce wakeup events for buttons and switches") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+ Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Reported-by: kernel test robot Reviewed-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin Signed-off-by: Yury Norov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper

2022-07-16T16:51:24Z

When running with return thunks enabled under 32-bit EFI, the system crashes with: kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000005bc02900 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation PGD 18f7063 P4D 18f7063 PUD 18ff063 PMD 190e063 PTE 800000005bc02063 Oops: 0011 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc6+ #166 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:0x5bc02900 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x5bc028d6. RSP: 0018:ffffffffb3203e10 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000048 RDX: 000000000190dfac RSI: 0000000000001710 RDI: 000000007eae823b RBP: ffffffffb3203e70 R08: 0000000001970000 R09: ffffffffb3203e28 R10: 747563657865206c R11: 6c6977203a696665 R12: 0000000000001710 R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 0000000001970000 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e013ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000005bc02900 CR3: 0000000001930000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x9c/0x175 efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x4a6/0x53e start_kernel+0x67c/0x71e x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x2a x86_64_start_kernel+0xe9/0xf4 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb That's because it cannot jump to the return thunk from the 32-bit code. Using a naked RET and marking it as safe allows the system to proceed booting. Fixes: aa3d480315ba ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

x86: Fix all occurences of the "the the" typo

2022-05-27T10:15:39Z

Rather than waiting for the bots to fix these one-by-one, fix all occurences of "the the" throughout arch/x86. Signed-off-by: Bo Liu Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Paolo Bonzini Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220527061400.5694-1-liubo03@inspur.com

Merge tag 'x86_platform_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2022-05-24T02:11:08Z

Pull x86 platform updates from Borislav Petkov: - A couple of changes enabling SGI UV5 support * tag 'x86_platform_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/platform/uv: Log gap hole end size x86/platform/uv: Update TSC sync state for UV5 x86/platform/uv: Update NMI Handler for UV5

Merge tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2022-05-24T01:17:09Z

Pull x86 cleanups from Borislav Petkov: - Serious sanitization and cleanup of the whole APERF/MPERF and frequency invariance code along with removing the need for unnecessary IPIs - Finally remove a.out support - The usual trivial cleanups and fixes all over x86 * tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits) x86: Remove empty files x86/speculation: Add missing srbds=off to the mitigations= help text x86/prctl: Remove pointless task argument x86/aperfperf: Make it correct on 32bit and UP kernels x86/aperfmperf: Integrate the fallback code from show_cpuinfo() x86/aperfmperf: Replace arch_freq_get_on_cpu() x86/aperfmperf: Replace aperfmperf_get_khz() x86/aperfmperf: Store aperf/mperf data for cpu frequency reads x86/aperfmperf: Make parts of the frequency invariance code unconditional x86/aperfmperf: Restructure arch_scale_freq_tick() x86/aperfmperf: Put frequency invariance aperf/mperf data into a struct x86/aperfmperf: Untangle Intel and AMD frequency invariance init x86/aperfmperf: Separate AP/BP frequency invariance init x86/smp: Move APERF/MPERF code where it belongs x86/aperfmperf: Dont wake idle CPUs in arch_freq_get_on_cpu() x86/process: Fix kernel-doc warning due to a changed function name x86: Remove a.out support x86/mm: Replace nodes_weight() with nodes_empty() where appropriate x86: Replace cpumask_weight() with cpumask_empty() where appropriate x86/pkeys: Remove __arch_set_user_pkey_access() declaration ...

Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi

2022-05-23T18:27:24Z

Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel: - Allow runtime services to be re-enabled at boot on RT kernels. - Provide access to secrets injected into the boot image by CoCo hypervisors (COnfidential COmputing) - Use DXE services on x86 to make the boot image executable after relocation, if needed. - Prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations. - Only randomize the placement of the kernel image on arm64 if the loader has not already done so. - Add support for obtaining the boot hartid from EFI on RISC-V. * tag 'efi-next-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi: riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL efi: stub: prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations efi/arm64: libstub: run image in place if randomized by the loader efi: libstub: pass image handle to handle_kernel_image() efi: x86: Set the NX-compatibility flag in the PE header efi: libstub: ensure allocated memory to be executable efi: libstub: declare DXE services table efi: Add missing prototype for efi_capsule_setup_info docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT

x86,xen,objtool: Add UNWIND hint

2022-04-19T19:58:47Z

SYM_CODE_START*() doesn't get auto-validated and needs an UNWIND hint to get checked, add one. vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pvh_start_xen()+0x0: unreachable Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner Reported-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408094718.321246297@infradead.org

efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area

2022-04-13T17:11:18Z

Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID. If EFI exposes such a table entry, uefi_init() will keep a pointer to the EFI config table entry in efi.coco_secret, so it can be used later by the kernel (specifically drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret). It will also appear in the kernel log as "CocoSecret=ADDRESS"; for example: [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f22e680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea0c018 The new functionality can be enabled with CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET=y. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412212127.154182-2-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel

x86: Replace cpumask_weight() with cpumask_empty() where appropriate

2022-04-10T20:35:38Z

In some cases, x86 code calls cpumask_weight() to check if any bit of a given cpumask is set. This can be done more efficiently with cpumask_empty() because cpumask_empty() stops traversing the cpumask as soon as it finds first set bit, while cpumask_weight() counts all bits unconditionally. Signed-off-by: Yury Norov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Steve Wahl Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220210224933.379149-17-yury.norov@gmail.com

x86/platform/uv: Update NMI Handler for UV5

2022-04-07T15:23:20Z

Update NMI handler for UV5 hardware. A platform register changed, and UV5 only uses one of the two NMI methods used on previous hardware. Signed-off-by: Mike Travis Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Dimitri Sivanich Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220406195149.228164-2-steve.wahl@hpe.com