kernel.git/arch/x86/platform, branch linux-4.19.y

x86/platform/iosf_mbi: Convert PCIBIOS_* return codes to errnos

2024-08-19T03:31:56Z

[ Upstream commit 7821fa101eab529521aa4b724bf708149d70820c ] iosf_mbi_pci_{read,write}_mdr() use pci_{read,write}_config_dword() that return PCIBIOS_* codes but functions also return -ENODEV which are not compatible error codes. As neither of the functions are related to PCI read/write functions, they should return normal errnos. Convert PCIBIOS_* returns code using pcibios_err_to_errno() into normal errno before returning it. Fixes: 46184415368a ("arch: x86: New MailBox support driver for Intel SOC's") Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240527125538.13620-4-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/olpc: fix 'logical not is only applied to the left hand side'

2022-08-25T09:15:27Z

commit 3a2ba42cbd0b669ce3837ba400905f93dd06c79f upstream. The bitops compile-time optimization series revealed one more problem in olpc-xo1-sci.c:send_ebook_state(), resulted in GCC warnings: arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c: In function 'send_ebook_state': arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c:83:63: warning: logical not is only applied to the left hand side of comparison [-Wlogical-not-parentheses] 83 | if (!!test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, ebook_switch_idev->sw) == state) | ^~ arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c:83:13: note: add parentheses around left hand side expression to silence this warning Despite this code working as intended, this redundant double negation of boolean value, together with comparing to `char` with no explicit conversion to bool, makes compilers think the author made some unintentional logical mistakes here. Make it the other way around and negate the char instead to silence the warnings. Fixes: d2aa37411b8e ("x86/olpc/xo1/sci: Produce wakeup events for buttons and switches") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+ Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Reported-by: kernel test robot Reviewed-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin Signed-off-by: Yury Norov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/sme: Explicitly map new EFI memmap table as encrypted

2021-12-22T08:19:01Z

commit 1ff2fc02862d52e18fd3daabcfe840ec27e920a8 upstream. Reserving memory using efi_mem_reserve() calls into the x86 efi_arch_mem_reserve() function. This function will insert a new EFI memory descriptor into the EFI memory map representing the area of memory to be reserved and marking it as EFI runtime memory. As part of adding this new entry, a new EFI memory map is allocated and mapped. The mapping is where a problem can occur. This new memory map is mapped using early_memremap() and generally mapped encrypted, unless the new memory for the mapping happens to come from an area of memory that is marked as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA memory. In this case, the new memory will be mapped unencrypted. However, during replacement of the old memory map, efi_mem_type() is disabled, so the new memory map will now be long-term mapped encrypted (in efi.memmap), resulting in the map containing invalid data and causing the kernel boot to crash. Since it is known that the area will be mapped encrypted going forward, explicitly map the new memory map as encrypted using early_memremap_prot(). Cc: # 4.14.x Fixes: 8f716c9b5feb ("x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ebf1eb2940405438a09d51d121ec0d02c8755558.1634752931.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com/ Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky [ardb: incorporate Kconfig fix by Arnd] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

efi/x86: Free efi_pgd with free_pages()

2020-11-24T12:27:23Z

[ Upstream commit c2fe61d8be491ff8188edaf22e838f819999146b ] Commit d9e9a6418065 ("x86/mm/pti: Allocate a separate user PGD") changed the PGD allocation to allocate PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER pages, so in the error path it should be freed using free_pages() rather than free_page(). Commit 06ace26f4e6f ("x86/efi: Free efi_pgd with free_pages()") fixed one instance of this, but missed another. Move the freeing out-of-line to avoid code duplication and fix this bug. Fixes: d9e9a6418065 ("x86/mm/pti: Allocate a separate user PGD") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110163919.1134431-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

irqdomain/treewide: Keep firmware node unconditionally allocated

2020-07-29T08:16:46Z

[ Upstream commit e3beca48a45b5e0e6e6a4e0124276b8248dcc9bb ] Quite some non OF/ACPI users of irqdomains allocate firmware nodes of type IRQCHIP_FWNODE_NAMED or IRQCHIP_FWNODE_NAMED_ID and free them right after creating the irqdomain. The only purpose of these FW nodes is to convey name information. When this was introduced the core code did not store the pointer to the node in the irqdomain. A recent change stored the firmware node pointer in irqdomain for other reasons and missed to notice that the usage sites which do the alloc_fwnode/create_domain/free_fwnode sequence are broken by this. Storing a dangling pointer is dangerous itself, but in case that the domain is destroyed later on this leads to a double free. Remove the freeing of the firmware node after creating the irqdomain from all affected call sites to cure this. Fixes: 711419e504eb ("irqdomain: Add the missing assignment of domain->fwnode for named fwnode") Reported-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas Acked-by: Marc Zyngier Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/873661qakd.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

efi/x86: Fix the deletion of variables in mixed mode

2020-04-17T08:48:55Z

[ Upstream commit a4b81ccfd4caba017d2b84720b6de4edd16911a0 ] efi_thunk_set_variable() treated the NULL "data" pointer as an invalid parameter, and this broke the deletion of variables in mixed mode. This commit fixes the check of data so that the userspace program can delete a variable in mixed mode. Fixes: 8319e9d5ad98ffcc ("efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode") Signed-off-by: Gary Lin Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200408081606.1504-1-glin@suse.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200409130434.6736-9-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode

2020-03-11T13:15:12Z

commit 8319e9d5ad98ffccd19f35664382c73cea216193 upstream. The mixed mode runtime wrappers are fragile when it comes to how the memory referred to by its pointer arguments are laid out in memory, due to the fact that it translates these addresses to physical addresses that the runtime services can dereference when running in 1:1 mode. Since vmalloc'ed pages (including the vmap'ed stack) are not contiguous in the physical address space, this scheme only works if the referenced memory objects do not cross page boundaries. Currently, the mixed mode runtime service wrappers require that all by-ref arguments that live in the vmalloc space have a size that is a power of 2, and are aligned to that same value. While this is a sensible way to construct an object that is guaranteed not to cross a page boundary, it is overly strict when it comes to checking whether a given object violates this requirement, as we can simply take the physical address of the first and the last byte, and verify that they point into the same physical page. When this check fails, we emit a WARN(), but then simply proceed with the call, which could cause data corruption if the next physical page belongs to a mapping that is entirely unrelated. Given that with vmap'ed stacks, this condition is much more likely to trigger, let's relax the condition a bit, but fail the runtime service call if it does trigger. Fixes: f6697df36bdf0bf7 ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-4-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

efi/x86: Align GUIDs to their size in the mixed mode runtime wrapper

2020-03-11T13:15:12Z

commit 63056e8b5ebf41d52170e9f5ba1fc83d1855278c upstream. Hans reports that his mixed mode systems running v5.6-rc1 kernels hit the WARN_ON() in virt_to_phys_or_null_size(), caused by the fact that efi_guid_t objects on the vmap'ed stack happen to be misaligned with respect to their sizes. As a quick (i.e., backportable) fix, copy GUID pointer arguments to the local stack into a buffer that is naturally aligned to its size, so that it is guaranteed to cover only one physical page. Note that on x86, we cannot rely on the stack pointer being aligned the way the compiler expects, so we need to allocate an 8-byte aligned buffer of sufficient size, and copy the GUID into that buffer at an offset that is aligned to 16 bytes. Fixes: f6697df36bdf0bf7 ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Reported-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Tested-by: Hans de Goede Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-2-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

efi/x86: Don't panic or BUG() on non-critical error conditions

2020-02-24T07:34:46Z

[ Upstream commit e2d68a955e49d61fd0384f23e92058dc9b79be5e ] The logic in __efi_enter_virtual_mode() does a number of steps in sequence, all of which may fail in one way or the other. In most cases, we simply print an error and disable EFI runtime services support, but in some cases, we BUG() or panic() and bring down the system when encountering conditions that we could easily handle in the same way. While at it, replace a pointless page-to-virt-phys conversion with one that goes straight from struct page to physical. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Arvind Sankar Cc: Matthew Garrett Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103113953.9571-14-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

efi/x86: Map the entire EFI vendor string before copying it

2020-02-24T07:34:37Z

[ Upstream commit ffc2760bcf2dba0dbef74013ed73eea8310cc52c ] Fix a couple of issues with the way we map and copy the vendor string: - we map only 2 bytes, which usually works since you get at least a page, but if the vendor string happens to cross a page boundary, a crash will result - only call early_memunmap() if early_memremap() succeeded, or we will call it with a NULL address which it doesn't like, - while at it, switch to early_memremap_ro(), and array indexing rather than pointer dereferencing to read the CHAR16 characters. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Arvind Sankar Cc: Matthew Garrett Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5b83683f32b1 ("x86: EFI runtime service support") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103113953.9571-5-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin