Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel. https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.18.y 2022-01-10T18:00:03Z 2022-01-10T18:00:03Z Linus Torvalds 2022-01-10T18:00:03Z urn:sha1:2e97a0c02b94f2ecd5cbf29ded90c5db055e8ad0 Pull misc x86 updates from Borislav Petkov: "The pile which we cannot find the proper topic for so we stick it in x86/misc: - Add support for decoding instructions which do MMIO accesses in order to use it in SEV and TDX guests - An include fix and reorg to allow for removing set_fs in UML later" * tag 'x86_misc_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mtrr: Remove the mtrr_bp_init() stub x86/sev-es: Use insn_decode_mmio() for MMIO implementation x86/insn-eval: Introduce insn_decode_mmio() x86/insn-eval: Introduce insn_get_modrm_reg_ptr() x86/insn-eval: Handle insn_get_opcode() failure 2022-01-10T17:33:40Z Linus Torvalds 2022-01-10T17:33:40Z urn:sha1:01d5e7872c1c2c04f4fd419c9a4968e148efc5a0 Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov: "The accumulated pile of x86/sev generalizations and cleanups: - Share the SEV string unrolling logic with TDX as TDX guests need it too - Cleanups and generalzation of code shared by SEV and TDX" * tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/sev: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll x86/sev: Remove do_early_exception() forward declarations x86/head64: Carve out the guest encryption postprocessing into a helper x86/sev: Get rid of excessive use of defines x86/sev: Shorten GHCB terminate macro names 2021-12-03T17:09:30Z Michael Sterritt 2021-11-19T23:27:57Z urn:sha1:1d5379d0475419085d3575bd9155f2e558e96390 Properly type the operands being passed to __put_user()/__get_user(). Otherwise, these routines truncate data for dependent instructions (e.g., INSW) and only read/write one byte. This has been tested by sending a string with REP OUTSW to a port and then reading it back in with REP INSW on the same port. Previous behavior was to only send and receive the first char of the size. For example, word operations for "abcd" would only read/write "ac". With change, the full string is now written and read back. Fixes: f980f9c31a923 (x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image) Signed-off-by: Michael Sterritt <sterritt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119232757.176201-1-sterritt@google.com 2021-11-30T22:53:30Z Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-11-30T18:49:33Z urn:sha1:c494eb366dbfc5095c0f159bbb5c6d4ec3ed37ec Switch SEV implementation to insn_decode_mmio(). The helper is going to be used by TDX too. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Tested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211130184933.31005-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com 2021-11-15T20:06:33Z Borislav Petkov 2021-11-10T22:06:53Z urn:sha1:75cc9a84c9eb36e436e3fcee5158fe31d1dfd78f There's a perfectly fine prototype in the asm/setup.h header. Use it. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211110220731.2396491-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com 2021-11-15T19:31:16Z Brijesh Singh 2021-11-10T22:06:50Z urn:sha1:18c3933c1983157df9dc06d4f3bfc764f161ed7a Shorten macro names for improved readability. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211110220731.2396491-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com 2021-11-02T14:56:47Z Linus Torvalds 2021-11-02T14:56:47Z urn:sha1:cc0356d6a02e064387c16a83cb96fe43ef33181e Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov: - Do not #GP on userspace use of CLI/STI but pretend it was a NOP to keep old userspace from breaking. Adjust the corresponding iopl selftest to that. - Improve stack overflow warnings to say which stack got overflowed and raise the exception stack sizes to 2 pages since overflowing the single page of exception stack is very easy to do nowadays with all the tracing machinery enabled. With that, rip out the custom mapping of AMD SEV's too. - A bunch of changes in preparation for FGKASLR like supporting more than 64K section headers in the relocs tool, correct ORC lookup table size to cover the whole kernel .text and other adjustments. * tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: selftests/x86/iopl: Adjust to the faked iopl CLI/STI usage vmlinux.lds.h: Have ORC lookup cover entire _etext - _stext x86/boot/compressed: Avoid duplicate malloc() implementations x86/boot: Allow a "silent" kaslr random byte fetch x86/tools/relocs: Support >64K section headers x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storage x86: Increase exception stack sizes x86/mm/64: Improve stack overflow warnings x86/iopl: Fake iopl(3) CLI/STI usage 2021-11-01T22:52:26Z Linus Torvalds 2021-11-01T22:52:26Z urn:sha1:20273d2588c48563e95549e055eeb16ded64dee8 Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov: - Export sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() so that HyperV Isolation VMs can use it too - Non-urgent fixes and cleanups * tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/sev: Expose sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() for use by HyperV x86/sev: Allow #VC exceptions on the VC2 stack x86/sev: Fix stack type check in vc_switch_off_ist() x86/sme: Use #define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 in mem_encrypt_identity.c x86/sev: Carve out HV call's return value verification 2021-11-01T22:16:52Z Linus Torvalds 2021-11-01T22:16:52Z urn:sha1:6e5772c8d9cf0a77ba4d6fd34fd4126fb66c9983 Pull generic confidential computing updates from Borislav Petkov: "Add an interface called cc_platform_has() which is supposed to be used by confidential computing solutions to query different aspects of the system. The intent behind it is to unify testing of such aspects instead of having each confidential computing solution add its own set of tests to code paths in the kernel, leading to an unwieldy mess" * tag 'x86_cc_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with cc_platform_has() x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with cc_platform_has() x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with cc_platform_has() x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with cc_platform_has() powerpc/pseries/svm: Add a powerpc version of cc_platform_has() x86/sev: Add an x86 version of cc_platform_has() arch/cc: Introduce a function to check for confidential computing features x86/ioremap: Selectively build arch override encryption functions 2021-10-25T16:11:42Z Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25T12:21:10Z urn:sha1:007faec014cb5d26983c1f86fd08c6539b41392e Hyper-V needs to issue the GHCB HV call in order to read/write MSRs in Isolation VMs. For that, expose sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(). The Hyper-V Isolation VMs are unenlightened guests and run a paravisor at VMPL0 for communicating. GHCB pages are being allocated and set up by that paravisor. Linux gets the GHCB page's physical address via MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB from the paravisor and should not change it. Add a @set_ghcb_msr parameter to sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() to control whether the function should set the GHCB's address prior to the call or not and export that function for use by HyperV. [ bp: - Massage commit message - add a struct ghcb forward declaration to fix randconfig builds. ] Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211025122116.264793-6-ltykernel@gmail.com