kernel.git/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c, branch linux-4.19.y

sched/x86: Save [ER]FLAGS on context switch

2019-05-22T05:37:36Z

commit 6690e86be83ac75832e461c141055b5d601c0a6d upstream. Effectively reverts commit: 2c7577a75837 ("sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch") Specifically because SMAP uses FLAGS.AC which invalidates the claim that the kernel has clean flags. In particular; while preemption from interrupt return is fine (the IRET frame on the exception stack contains FLAGS) it breaks any code that does synchonous scheduling, including preempt_enable(). This has become a significant issue ever since commit: 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses") provided for means of having 'normal' C code between STAC / CLAC, exposing the FLAGS.AC state. So far this hasn't led to trouble, however fix it before it comes apart. Reported-by: Julien Thierry Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code

2018-12-05T18:32:03Z

commit ff16701a29cba3aafa0bd1656d766813b2d0a811 upstream Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit. Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the per_cpu() indirection. This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch speculation optimization happens only in one place. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.280855518@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/process: Don't mix user/kernel regs in 64bit __show_regs()

2018-09-06T12:33:12Z

When the kernel.print-fatal-signals sysctl has been enabled, a simple userspace crash will cause the kernel to write a crash dump that contains, among other things, the kernel gsbase into dmesg. As suggested by Andy, limit output to pt_regs, FS_BASE and KERNEL_GS_BASE in this case. This also moves the bitness-specific logic from show_regs() into process_{32,64}.c. Fixes: 45807a1df9f5 ("vdso: print fatal signals") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180831194151.123586-1-jannh@google.com

x86/entry: Rename update_sp0 to update_task_stack

2018-07-19T23:11:40Z

The function does not update sp0 anymore but updates makes the task-stack visible for entry code. This is by either writing it to sp1 or by doing a hypercall. Rename the function to get rid of the misleading name. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Pavel Machek Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Boris Ostrovsky Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: David Laight Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Eduardo Valentin Cc: Greg KH Cc: Will Deacon Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Waiman Long Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-15-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org

x86/entry/32: Enter the kernel via trampoline stack

2018-07-19T23:11:37Z

Use the entry-stack as a trampoline to enter the kernel. The entry-stack is already in the cpu_entry_area and will be mapped to userspace when PTI is enabled. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Pavel Machek Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Boris Ostrovsky Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: David Laight Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Eduardo Valentin Cc: Greg KH Cc: Will Deacon Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Waiman Long Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-8-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org

x86/entry/32: Load task stack from x86_tss.sp1 in SYSENTER handler

2018-07-19T23:11:36Z

x86_tss.sp0 will be used to point to the entry stack later to use it as a trampoline stack for other kernel entry points besides SYSENTER. So store the real task stack pointer in x86_tss.sp1, which is otherwise unused by the hardware, as Linux doesn't make use of Ring 1. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Pavel Machek Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Boris Ostrovsky Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: David Laight Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Eduardo Valentin Cc: Greg KH Cc: Will Deacon Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Waiman Long Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-4-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org

x86/dumpstack: Add a show_ip() function

2018-04-26T14:15:27Z

... which shows the Instruction Pointer along with the insn bytes around it. Use it whenever rIP is printed. Drop the rIP < PAGE_OFFSET check since probe_kernel_read() can handle any address properly. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-8-bp@alien8.de

x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only

2017-12-17T13:27:52Z

The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it read-only on x86_64. On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations without double fault handling. [ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for confirmation. ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Boris Ostrovsky Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: David Laight Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Eduardo Valentin Cc: Greg KH Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Will Deacon Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/entry/64: Remove all remaining direct thread_struct::sp0 reads

2017-11-02T10:04:47Z

The only remaining readers in context switch code or vm86(), and they all just want to update TSS.sp0 to match the current task. Replace them all with a new helper update_sp0(). Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2d231687f4ff288c9d9e98d7861b7df374246ac3.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/entry/64: Pass SP0 directly to load_sp0()

2017-11-02T10:04:44Z

load_sp0() had an odd signature: void load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss, struct thread_struct *thread); Simplify it to: void load_sp0(unsigned long sp0); Also simplify a few get_cpu()/put_cpu() sequences to preempt_disable()/preempt_enable(). Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2655d8b42ed940aa384fe18ee1129bbbcf730a08.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar