<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h, branch linux-4.14.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.14.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.14.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2023-08-08T17:48:24Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation</title>
<updated>2023-08-08T17:48:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Sneddon</name>
</author>
<published>2023-07-13T02:43:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=cdc2724c9d060a8fa9652a9aa6347d8324f6cd82'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cdc2724c9d060a8fa9652a9aa6347d8324f6cd82</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8974eb588283b7d44a7c91fa09fcbaf380339f3a upstream

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.

Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.

This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.

Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.

The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:

    /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()</title>
<updated>2023-08-08T17:48:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
</author>
<published>2023-06-13T23:39:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=e74430fb9bd9ababfaeef0f453befd4083388598'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e74430fb9bd9ababfaeef0f453befd4083388598</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c7077a72674402654f3291354720cd73cdf649e upstream

check_bugs() is a dumping ground for finalizing the CPU bringup. Only parts of
it has to do with actual CPU bugs.

Split it apart into arch_cpu_finalize_init() and cpu_select_mitigations().

Fixup the bogus 32bit comments while at it.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.019583869@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:23:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Gross</name>
</author>
<published>2020-04-16T15:54:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=9ecf57e4aaca7197ab0f196e8a7b74d57e974ad9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9ecf57e4aaca7197ab0f196e8a7b74d57e974ad9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan &lt;neelima.krishnan@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:18:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T09:01:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=4b708ea4e5e772747b89619489ab96e9d1a1a44d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4b708ea4e5e772747b89619489ab96e9d1a1a44d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 95c5824f75f3ba4c9e8e5a4b1a623c95390ac266 upstream.

Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX
control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this
option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors
TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack.

Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation
unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control
machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c.

 [ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer.
       - Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh.
       - Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr()</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:18:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T08:52:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=52bd862adee5c3ab7125bb7309f23bccf0ffd691'/>
<id>urn:sha1:52bd862adee5c3ab7125bb7309f23bccf0ffd691</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 286836a70433fb64131d2590f4bf512097c255e1 upstream.

Add a helper function to read the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan &lt;neelima.krishnan@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early()</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T16:12:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
</author>
<published>2018-06-05T22:55:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=9552b7df0eb1a8846890c05d375fb3b89f9c2fe6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9552b7df0eb1a8846890c05d375fb3b89f9c2fe6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 95f3d39ccf7aaea79d1ffdac1c887c2e100ec1b6 upstream

To support force disabling of SMT it's required to know the number of
thread siblings early. detect_extended_topology() cannot be called before
the APIC driver is selected, so split out the part which initializes
smp_num_siblings.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early()</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T16:12:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
</author>
<published>2018-06-05T22:53:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=bfa4f8aeb0f38c68b3060b9c27ee533c89404ad1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bfa4f8aeb0f38c68b3060b9c27ee533c89404ad1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 545401f4448a807b963ff17b575e0a393e68b523 upstream

To support force disabling of SMT it's required to know the number of
thread siblings early. detect_ht() cannot be called before the APIC driver
is selected, so split out the part which initializes smp_num_siblings.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS</title>
<updated>2018-05-22T16:54:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
</author>
<published>2018-04-26T02:04:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=128e69909f7c245765f75d7f350dd67eb8fe8a7b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:128e69909f7c245765f75d7f350dd67eb8fe8a7b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 772439717dbf703b39990be58d8d4e3e4ad0598a upstream

Intel CPUs expose methods to:

 - Detect whether RDS capability is available via CPUID.7.0.EDX[31],

 - The SPEC_CTRL MSR(0x48), bit 2 set to enable RDS.

 - MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, Bit(4) no need to enable RRS.

With that in mind if spec_store_bypass_disable=[auto,on] is selected set at
boot-time the SPEC_CTRL MSR to enable RDS if the platform requires it.

Note that this does not fix the KVM case where the SPEC_CTRL is exposed to
guests which can muck with it, see patch titled :
 KVM/SVM/VMX/x86/spectre_v2: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS.

And for the firmware (IBRS to be set), see patch titled:
 x86/spectre_v2: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits

[ tglx: Distangled it from the intel implementation and kept the call order ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86 / CPU: Always show current CPU frequency in /proc/cpuinfo</title>
<updated>2018-01-10T08:31:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rafael J. Wysocki</name>
</author>
<published>2017-11-15T01:13:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=22af48be826c4193bba2f11112330aabb2568594'/>
<id>urn:sha1:22af48be826c4193bba2f11112330aabb2568594</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7d5905dc14a87805a59f3c5bf70173aac2bb18f8 upstream.

After commit 890da9cf0983 (Revert "x86: do not use cpufreq_quick_get()
for /proc/cpuinfo "cpu MHz"") the "cpu MHz" number in /proc/cpuinfo
on x86 can be either the nominal CPU frequency (which is constant)
or the frequency most recently requested by a scaling governor in
cpufreq, depending on the cpufreq configuration.  That is somewhat
inconsistent and is different from what it was before 4.13, so in
order to restore the previous behavior, make it report the current
CPU frequency like the scaling_cur_freq sysfs file in cpufreq.

To that end, modify the /proc/cpuinfo implementation on x86 to use
aperfmperf_snapshot_khz() to snapshot the APERF and MPERF feedback
registers, if available, and use their values to compute the CPU
frequency to be reported as "cpu MHz".

However, do that carefully enough to avoid accumulating delays that
lead to unacceptable access times for /proc/cpuinfo on systems with
many CPUs.  Run aperfmperf_snapshot_khz() once on all CPUs
asynchronously at the /proc/cpuinfo open time, add a single delay
upfront (if necessary) at that point and simply compute the current
frequency while running show_cpuinfo() for each individual CPU.

Also, to avoid slowing down /proc/cpuinfo accesses too much, reduce
the default delay between consecutive APERF and MPERF reads to 10 ms,
which should be sufficient to get large enough numbers for the
frequency computation in all cases.

Fixes: 890da9cf0983 (Revert "x86: do not use cpufreq_quick_get() for /proc/cpuinfo "cpu MHz"")
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:10:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
</author>
<published>2017-11-01T14:07:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
