kernel.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c, branch linux-6.10.y

x86/bugs: Fix handling when SRSO mitigation is disabled

2024-10-10T10:00:21Z

[ Upstream commit 1dbb6b1495d472806fef1f4c94f5b3e4c89a3c1d ] When the SRSO mitigation is disabled, either via mitigations=off or spec_rstack_overflow=off, the warning about the lack of IBPB-enhancing microcode is printed anyway. This is unnecessary since the user has turned off the mitigation. [ bp: Massage, drop SBPB rationale as it doesn't matter because when mitigations are disabled x86_pred_cmd is not being used anyway. ] Signed-off-by: David Kaplan Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240904150711.193022-1-david.kaplan@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Merge tag 'x86-cpu-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2024-05-14T01:44:44Z

Pull x86 cpu updates from Ingo Molnar: - Rework the x86 CPU vendor/family/model code: introduce the 'VFM' value that is an 8+8+8 bit concatenation of the vendor/family/model value, and add macros that work on VFM values. This simplifies the addition of new Intel models & families, and simplifies existing enumeration & quirk code. - Add support for the AMD 0x80000026 leaf, to better parse topology information - Optimize the NUMA allocation layout of more per-CPU data structures - Improve the workaround for AMD erratum 1386 - Clear TME from /proc/cpuinfo as well, when disabled by the firmware - Improve x86 self-tests - Extend the mce_record tracepoint with the ::ppin and ::microcode fields - Implement recovery for MCE errors in TDX/SEAM non-root mode - Misc cleanups and fixes * tag 'x86-cpu-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (34 commits) x86/mm: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/tsc_msr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/tsc: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/resctrl: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/microcode/intel: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/mce: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/cpu/intel_epb: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/aperfmperf: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/apic: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines perf/x86/msr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines perf/x86/intel/uncore: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines perf/x86/intel/pt: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines perf/x86/lbr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines perf/x86/intel/cstate: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/bugs: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/bugs: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines x86/cpu/vfm: Update arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h x86/cpu/vfm: Add new macros to work with (vendor/family/model) values ...

x86/bugs: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines

2024-04-25T10:27:25Z

New CPU #defines encode vendor and family as well as model. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424181506.41673-1-tony.luck@intel.com

x86/bugs: Fix BHI retpoline check

2024-04-14T09:10:05Z

Confusingly, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE doesn't mean retpolines are enabled, as it also includes the original "AMD retpoline" which isn't a retpoline at all. Also replace cpu_feature_enabled() with boot_cpu_has() because this is before alternatives are patched and cpu_feature_enabled()'s fallback path is slower than plain old boot_cpu_has(). Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ad3807424a3953f0323c011a643405619f2a4927.1712944776.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org

x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI

2024-04-12T10:05:54Z

For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a single CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI option. [ mingo: Fix ] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Nikolay Borisov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3833812ea63e7fdbe36bf8b932e63f70d18e2a2a.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org

x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto

2024-04-12T10:05:54Z

Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/412e9dc87971b622bbbaf64740ebc1f140bff343.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org

x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation

2024-04-11T08:30:33Z

While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still other low-hanging fruit remaining. Don't classify it as a mitigation and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't have a HW or SW mitigation enabled. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Sean Christopherson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5951dae3fdee7f1520d5136a27be3bdfe95f88b.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org

x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA

2024-04-11T08:30:33Z

The ARCH_CAP_RRSBA check isn't correct: RRSBA may have already been disabled by the Spectre v2 mitigation (or can otherwise be disabled by the BHI mitigation itself if needed). In that case retpolines are fine. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Sean Christopherson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6f56f13da34a0834b69163467449be7f58f253dc.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org

x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr'

2024-04-11T08:30:33Z

So we are using the 'ia32_cap' value in a number of places, which got its name from MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR register. But there's very little 'IA32' about it - this isn't 32-bit only code, nor does it originate from there, it's just a historic quirk that many Intel MSR names are prefixed with IA32_. This is already clear from the helper method around the MSR: x86_read_arch_cap_msr(), which doesn't have the IA32 prefix. So rename 'ia32_cap' to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' to be consistent with its role and with the naming of the helper function. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Nikolay Borisov Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Sean Christopherson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org

x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES

2024-04-11T08:30:33Z

There's no need to keep reading MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES over and over. It's even read in the BHI sysfs function which is a big no-no. Just read it once and cache it. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Sean Christopherson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org