kernel.git/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile, branch linux-5.13.y

x86/sev-es: Rename sev-es.{ch} to sev.{ch}

2021-05-10T05:40:27Z

SEV-SNP builds upon the SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware protection. Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds new NAE events that are SEV-SNP specific. Rename the sev-es.{ch} to sev.{ch} so that all SEV* functionality can be consolidated in one place. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Joerg Roedel Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210427111636.1207-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/paravirt: Have only one paravirt patch function

2021-03-11T19:11:09Z

There is no need any longer to have different paravirt patch functions for native and Xen. Eliminate native_patch() and rename paravirt_patch_default() to paravirt_patch(). Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210311142319.4723-15-jgross@suse.com

x86/apb_timer: Remove driver for deprecated platform

2021-02-09T14:28:37Z

Intel Moorestown and Medfield are quite old Intel Atom based 32-bit platforms, which were in limited use in some Android phones, tablets and consumer electronics more than eight years ago. There are no bugs or problems ever reported outside from Intel for breaking any of that platforms for years. It seems no real users exists who run more or less fresh kernel on it. Commit 05f4434bc130 ("ASoC: Intel: remove mfld_machine") is also in align with this theory. Due to above and to reduce a burden of supporting outdated drivers, remove the support for outdated platforms completely. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Acked-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki

ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures

2020-11-06T06:40:42Z

Move the x86 IMA arch code into security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c, so that we will be able to wire it up for arm64 in a future patch. Co-developed-by: Chester Lin Signed-off-by: Chester Lin Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel

x86/head/64: Disable stack protection for head$(BITS).o

2020-10-19T11:11:00Z

On 64-bit, the startup_64_setup_env() function added in 866b556efa12 ("x86/head/64: Install startup GDT") has stack protection enabled because of set_bringup_idt_handler(). This happens when CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is enabled. It also currently needs CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled because then set_bringup_idt_handler() is not an empty stub but that might change in the future, when the other vendor adds their similar technology. At this point, %gs is not yet initialized, and this doesn't cause a crash only because the #PF handler from the decompressor stub is still installed and handles the page fault. Disable stack protection for the whole file, and do it on 32-bit as well to avoid surprises. [ bp: Extend commit message with the exact explanation how it happens. ] Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201008191623.2881677-6-nivedita@alum.mit.edu

Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2020-10-14T17:21:34Z

Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov: "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks. With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared between the guest and the hypervisor. Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself, brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled one. The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two SEV-ES-specific files: arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES setups. Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others" * tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits) x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events ...

x86/sev-es: Setup GHCB-based boot #VC handler

2020-09-09T09:32:27Z

Add the infrastructure to handle #VC exceptions when the kernel runs on virtual addresses and has mapped a GHCB. This handler will be used until the runtime #VC handler takes over. Since the handler runs very early, disable instrumentation for sev-es.c. [ bp: Make vc_ghcb_invalidate() __always_inline so that it can be inlined in noinstr functions like __sev_es_nmi_complete(). ] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908123816.GB3764@8bytes.org

x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image

2020-09-09T08:44:46Z

Setup sev-es.c and include the code from the pre-decompression stage to also build it into the image of the running kernel. Temporarily add __maybe_unused annotations to avoid build warnings until the functions get used. [ bp: Use the non-tracing rd/wrmsr variants because: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_nmi_complete()+0x11f: \ call to do_trace_write_msr() leaves .noinstr.text section as __sev_es_nmi_complete() is noinstr due to being called from the NMI handler exc_nmi(). ] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-39-joro@8bytes.org

x86/static_call: Add out-of-line static call implementation

2020-09-01T07:58:05Z

Add the x86 out-of-line static call implementation. For each key, a permanent trampoline is created which is the destination for all static calls for the given key. The trampoline has a direct jump which gets patched by static_call_update() when the destination function changes. [peterz: fixed trampoline, rewrote patching code] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200818135804.804315175@infradead.org

Rebase locking/kcsan to locking/urgent

2020-06-11T18:02:46Z

Merge the state of the locking kcsan branch before the read/write_once() and the atomics modifications got merged. Squash the fallout of the rebase on top of the read/write once and atomic fallback work into the merge. The history of the original branch is preserved in tag locking-kcsan-2020-06-02. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner