<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm, branch linux-5.13.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.13.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.13.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2021-07-14T15:06:41Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/elf: Use _BITUL() macro in UAPI headers</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T15:06:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Richey</name>
</author>
<published>2021-05-21T08:58:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=61b720aa441fbeca8ed308c065bab01501bdbf9f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:61b720aa441fbeca8ed308c065bab01501bdbf9f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d06aca989c243dd9e5d3e20aa4e5c2ecfdd07050 ]

Replace BIT() in x86's UAPI header with _BITUL(). BIT() is not defined
in the UAPI headers and its usage may cause userspace build errors.

Fixes: 742c45c3ecc9 ("x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2")
Signed-off-by: Joe Richey &lt;joerichey@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521085849.37676-2-joerichey94@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: nVMX: Properly pad 'struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr'</title>
<updated>2021-05-07T10:06:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vitaly Kuznetsov</name>
</author>
<published>2021-05-03T15:08:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=70f094f4f01dc4d6f78ac6407f85627293a6553c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:70f094f4f01dc4d6f78ac6407f85627293a6553c</id>
<content type='text'>
Eliminate the probably unwanted hole in 'struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr':

Pre-patch:
struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr {
        __u64                      vmxon_pa;             /*     0     8 */
        __u64                      vmcs12_pa;            /*     8     8 */
        struct {
                __u16              flags;                /*    16     2 */
        } smm;                                           /*    16     2 */

        /* XXX 2 bytes hole, try to pack */

        __u32                      flags;                /*    20     4 */
        __u64                      preemption_timer_deadline; /*    24     8 */
};

Post-patch:
struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr {
        __u64                      vmxon_pa;             /*     0     8 */
        __u64                      vmcs12_pa;            /*     8     8 */
        struct {
                __u16              flags;                /*    16     2 */
        } smm;                                           /*    16     2 */
        __u16                      pad;                  /*    18     2 */
        __u32                      flags;                /*    20     4 */
        __u64                      preemption_timer_deadline; /*    24     8 */
};

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20210503150854.1144255-3-vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2021-05-01T17:14:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2021-05-01T17:14:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=152d32aa846835987966fd20ee1143b0e05036a0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:152d32aa846835987966fd20ee1143b0e05036a0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "This is a large update by KVM standards, including AMD PSP (Platform
  Security Processor, aka "AMD Secure Technology") and ARM CoreSight
  (debug and trace) changes.

  ARM:

   - CoreSight: Add support for ETE and TRBE

   - Stage-2 isolation for the host kernel when running in protected
     mode

   - Guest SVE support when running in nVHE mode

   - Force W^X hypervisor mappings in nVHE mode

   - ITS save/restore for guests using direct injection with GICv4.1

   - nVHE panics now produce readable backtraces

   - Guest support for PTP using the ptp_kvm driver

   - Performance improvements in the S2 fault handler

  x86:

   - AMD PSP driver changes

   - Optimizations and cleanup of nested SVM code

   - AMD: Support for virtual SPEC_CTRL

   - Optimizations of the new MMU code: fast invalidation, zap under
     read lock, enable/disably dirty page logging under read lock

   - /dev/kvm API for AMD SEV live migration (guest API coming soon)

   - support SEV virtual machines sharing the same encryption context

   - support SGX in virtual machines

   - add a few more statistics

   - improved directed yield heuristics

   - Lots and lots of cleanups

  Generic:

   - Rework of MMU notifier interface, simplifying and optimizing the
     architecture-specific code

   - a handful of "Get rid of oprofile leftovers" patches

   - Some selftests improvements"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (379 commits)
  KVM: selftests: Speed up set_memory_region_test
  selftests: kvm: Fix the check of return value
  KVM: x86: Take advantage of kvm_arch_dy_has_pending_interrupt()
  KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
  KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()
  KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
  KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
  KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
  KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
  KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported)
  KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
  KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables
  KVM: SEV: Mask CPUID[0x8000001F].eax according to supported features
  KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c
  KVM: SVM: Disable SEV/SEV-ES if NPT is disabled
  KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
  KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
  x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
  KVM: x86: Move reverse CPUID helpers to separate header file
  KVM: x86: Rename GPR accessors to make mode-aware variants the defaults
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-splitlock-2021-04-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2021-04-26T17:09:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2021-04-26T17:09:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=64f8e73de08d11cbe01347340db95b4011872ec5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:64f8e73de08d11cbe01347340db95b4011872ec5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 bus lock detection updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Support for enhanced split lock detection:

  Newer CPUs provide a second mechanism to detect operations with lock
  prefix which go accross a cache line boundary. Such operations have to
  take bus lock which causes a system wide performance degradation when
  these operations happen frequently.

  The new mechanism is not using the #AC exception. It triggers #DB and
  is restricted to operations in user space. Kernel side split lock
  access can only be detected by the #AC based variant.

  Contrary to the #AC based mechanism the #DB based variant triggers
  _after_ the instruction was executed. The mechanism is CPUID
  enumerated and contrary to the #AC version which is based on the magic
  TEST_CTRL_MSR and model/family based enumeration on the way to become
  architectural"

* tag 'x86-splitlock-2021-04-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  Documentation/admin-guide: Change doc for split_lock_detect parameter
  x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock
  x86/cpufeatures: Enumerate #DB for bus lock detection
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave</title>
<updated>2021-04-20T08:18:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
</author>
<published>2021-04-12T04:21:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=3c0c2ad1ae75963c05bf89ec91918c6a53a72696'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3c0c2ad1ae75963c05bf89ec91918c6a53a72696</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for handling VM-Exits that originate from a guest SGX
enclave.  In SGX, an "enclave" is a new CPL3-only execution environment,
wherein the CPU and memory state is protected by hardware to make the
state inaccesible to code running outside of the enclave.  When exiting
an enclave due to an asynchronous event (from the perspective of the
enclave), e.g. exceptions, interrupts, and VM-Exits, the enclave's state
is automatically saved and scrubbed (the CPU loads synthetic state), and
then reloaded when re-entering the enclave.  E.g. after an instruction
based VM-Exit from an enclave, vmcs.GUEST_RIP will not contain the RIP
of the enclave instruction that trigered VM-Exit, but will instead point
to a RIP in the enclave's untrusted runtime (the guest userspace code
that coordinates entry/exit to/from the enclave).

To help a VMM recognize and handle exits from enclaves, SGX adds bits to
existing VMCS fields, VM_EXIT_REASON.VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE and
GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO.GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR.  Define the
new architectural bits, and add a boolean to struct vcpu_vmx to cache
VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE.  Clear the bit in exit_reason so that
checks against exit_reason do not need to account for SGX, e.g.
"if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)" continues to work.

KVM is a largely a passive observer of the new bits, e.g. KVM needs to
account for the bits when propagating information to a nested VMM, but
otherwise doesn't need to act differently for the majority of VM-Exits
from enclaves.

The one scenario that is directly impacted is emulation, which is for
all intents and purposes impossible[1] since KVM does not have access to
the RIP or instruction stream that triggered the VM-Exit.  The inability
to emulate is a non-issue for KVM, as most instructions that might
trigger VM-Exit unconditionally #UD in an enclave (before the VM-Exit
check.  For the few instruction that conditionally #UD, KVM either never
sets the exiting control, e.g. PAUSE_EXITING[2], or sets it if and only
if the feature is not exposed to the guest in order to inject a #UD,
e.g. RDRAND_EXITING.

But, because it is still possible for a guest to trigger emulation,
e.g. MMIO, inject a #UD if KVM ever attempts emulation after a VM-Exit
from an enclave.  This is architecturally accurate for instruction
VM-Exits, and for MMIO it's the least bad choice, e.g. it's preferable
to killing the VM.  In practice, only broken or particularly stupid
guests should ever encounter this behavior.

Add a WARN in skip_emulated_instruction to detect any attempt to
modify the guest's RIP during an SGX enclave VM-Exit as all such flows
should either be unreachable or must handle exits from enclaves before
getting to skip_emulated_instruction.

[1] Impossible for all practical purposes.  Not truly impossible
    since KVM could implement some form of para-virtualization scheme.

[2] PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING only affects CPL0 and enclaves exist only at
    CPL3, so we also don't need to worry about that interaction.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang &lt;kai.huang@intel.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;315f54a8507d09c292463ef29104e1d4c62e9090.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock</title>
<updated>2021-03-28T20:52:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Fenghua Yu</name>
</author>
<published>2021-03-22T13:53:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=ebb1064e7c2e90b56e4d40ab154ef9796060a1c3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ebb1064e7c2e90b56e4d40ab154ef9796060a1c3</id>
<content type='text'>
Bus locks degrade performance for the whole system, not just for the CPU
that requested the bus lock. Two CPU features "#AC for split lock" and
"#DB for bus lock" provide hooks so that the operating system may choose
one of several mitigation strategies.

#AC for split lock is already implemented. Add code to use the #DB for
bus lock feature to cover additional situations with new options to
mitigate.

split_lock_detect=
		#AC for split lock		#DB for bus lock

off		Do nothing			Do nothing

warn		Kernel OOPs			Warn once per task and
		Warn once per task and		and continues to run.
		disable future checking
	 	When both features are
		supported, warn in #AC

fatal		Kernel OOPs			Send SIGBUS to user.
		Send SIGBUS to user
		When both features are
		supported, fatal in #AC

ratelimit:N	Do nothing			Limit bus lock rate to
						N per second in the
						current non-root user.

Default option is "warn".

Hardware only generates #DB for bus lock detect when CPL&gt;0 to avoid
nested #DB from multiple bus locks while the first #DB is being handled.
So no need to handle #DB for bus lock detected in the kernel.

#DB for bus lock is enabled by bus lock detection bit 2 in DEBUGCTL MSR
while #AC for split lock is enabled by split lock detection bit 29 in
TEST_CTRL MSR.

Both breakpoint and bus lock in the same instruction can trigger one #DB.
The bus lock is handled before the breakpoint in the #DB handler.

Delivery of #DB for bus lock in userspace clears DR6[11], which is set by
the #DB handler right after reading DR6.

Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210322135325.682257-3-fenghua.yu@intel.com

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: Fix various typos in comments</title>
<updated>2021-03-18T14:31:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
</author>
<published>2021-03-18T14:28:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=d9f6e12fb0b7fcded0bac34b8293ec46f80dfc33'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d9f6e12fb0b7fcded0bac34b8293ec46f80dfc33</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix ~144 single-word typos in arch/x86/ code comments.

Doing this in a single commit should reduce the churn.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2021-02-21T21:31:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2021-02-21T21:31:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=3e10585335b7967326ca7b4118cada0d2d00a2ab'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3e10585335b7967326ca7b4118cada0d2d00a2ab</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "x86:

   - Support for userspace to emulate Xen hypercalls

   - Raise the maximum number of user memslots

   - Scalability improvements for the new MMU.

     Instead of the complex "fast page fault" logic that is used in
     mmu.c, tdp_mmu.c uses an rwlock so that page faults are concurrent,
     but the code that can run against page faults is limited. Right now
     only page faults take the lock for reading; in the future this will
     be extended to some cases of page table destruction. I hope to
     switch the default MMU around 5.12-rc3 (some testing was delayed
     due to Chinese New Year).

   - Cleanups for MAXPHYADDR checks

   - Use static calls for vendor-specific callbacks

   - On AMD, use VMLOAD/VMSAVE to save and restore host state

   - Stop using deprecated jump label APIs

   - Workaround for AMD erratum that made nested virtualization
     unreliable

   - Support for LBR emulation in the guest

   - Support for communicating bus lock vmexits to userspace

   - Add support for SEV attestation command

   - Miscellaneous cleanups

  PPC:

   - Support for second data watchpoint on POWER10

   - Remove some complex workarounds for buggy early versions of POWER9

   - Guest entry/exit fixes

  ARM64:

   - Make the nVHE EL2 object relocatable

   - Cleanups for concurrent translation faults hitting the same page

   - Support for the standard TRNG hypervisor call

   - A bunch of small PMU/Debug fixes

   - Simplification of the early init hypercall handling

  Non-KVM changes (with acks):

   - Detection of contended rwlocks (implemented only for qrwlocks,
     because KVM only needs it for x86)

   - Allow __DISABLE_EXPORTS from assembly code

   - Provide a saner follow_pfn replacements for modules"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (192 commits)
  KVM: x86/xen: Explicitly pad struct compat_vcpu_info to 64 bytes
  KVM: selftests: Don't bother mapping GVA for Xen shinfo test
  KVM: selftests: Fix hex vs. decimal snafu in Xen test
  KVM: selftests: Fix size of memslots created by Xen tests
  KVM: selftests: Ignore recently added Xen tests' build output
  KVM: selftests: Add missing header file needed by xAPIC IPI tests
  KVM: selftests: Add operand to vmsave/vmload/vmrun in svm.c
  KVM: SVM: Make symbol 'svm_gp_erratum_intercept' static
  locking/arch: Move qrwlock.h include after qspinlock.h
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix host radix SLB optimisation with hash guests
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Ensure radix guest has no SLB entries
  KVM: PPC: Don't always report hash MMU capability for P9 &lt; DD2.2
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Save and restore FSCR in the P9 path
  KVM: PPC: remove unneeded semicolon
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Use POWER9 SLBIA IH=6 variant to clear SLB
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: No need to clear radix host SLB before loading HPT guest
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix radix guest SLB side channel
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Remove support for running HPT guest on RPT host without mixed mode support
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Introduce new capability for 2nd DAWR
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add infrastructure to support 2nd DAWR
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: VMX: Enable bus lock VM exit</title>
<updated>2021-02-04T10:27:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Chenyi Qiang</name>
</author>
<published>2020-11-06T09:03:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=fe6b6bc802b40081e8a7a1abe8d32b88d10a03e1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fe6b6bc802b40081e8a7a1abe8d32b88d10a03e1</id>
<content type='text'>
Virtual Machine can exploit bus locks to degrade the performance of
system. Bus lock can be caused by split locked access to writeback(WB)
memory or by using locks on uncacheable(UC) memory. The bus lock is
typically &gt;1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache
line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for
the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can
complete).

To address the threat, bus lock VM exit is introduced to notify the VMM
when a bus lock was acquired, allowing it to enforce throttling or other
policy based mitigations.

A VMM can enable VM exit due to bus locks by setting a new "Bus Lock
Detection" VM-execution control(bit 30 of Secondary Processor-based VM
execution controls). If delivery of this VM exit was preempted by a
higher priority VM exit (e.g. EPT misconfiguration, EPT violation, APIC
access VM exit, APIC write VM exit, exception bitmap exiting), bit 26 of
exit reason in vmcs field is set to 1.

In current implementation, the KVM exposes this capability through
KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT. The user can get the supported mode bitmap
(i.e. off and exit) and enable it explicitly (disabled by default). If
bus locks in guest are detected by KVM, exit to user space even when
current exit reason is handled by KVM internally. Set a new field
KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK in vcpu-&gt;run-&gt;flags to inform the user space that there
is a bus lock detected in guest.

Document for Bus Lock VM exit is now available at the latest "Intel
Architecture Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference".

Document Link:
https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-architecture-instruction-set-extensions-programming-reference.html

Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li &lt;xiaoyao.li@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li &lt;xiaoyao.li@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang &lt;chenyi.qiang@intel.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20201106090315.18606-4-chenyi.qiang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/vm86/32: Remove VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP support</title>
<updated>2021-01-21T19:08:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
</author>
<published>2021-01-19T17:40:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=8ece53ef7f428ee3f8eab936268b1a3fe2725e6b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8ece53ef7f428ee3f8eab936268b1a3fe2725e6b</id>
<content type='text'>
The implementation was rather buggy.  It unconditionally marked PTEs
read-only, even for VM_SHARED mappings.  I'm not sure whether this is
actually a problem, but it certainly seems unwise.  More importantly, it
released the mmap lock before flushing the TLB, which could allow a racing
CoW operation to falsely believe that the underlying memory was not
writable.

I can't find any users at all of this mechanism, so just remove it.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Stas Sergeev &lt;stsp2@yandex.ru&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3086de0babcab36f69949b5780bde851f719bc8.1611078018.git.luto@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
