<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/arch/x86/entry, branch linux-5.13.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.13.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.13.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2021-07-14T15:06:48Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Split up runtime #VC handler for correct state tracking</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T15:06:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
</author>
<published>2021-06-18T11:54:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=c6362a74da0c6fbe2c0f0507ccef7c5194994edc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c6362a74da0c6fbe2c0f0507ccef7c5194994edc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit be1a5408868af341f61f93c191b5e346ee88c82a ]

Split up the #VC handler code into a from-user and a from-kernel part.
This allows clean and correct state tracking, as the #VC handler needs
to enter NMI-state when raised from kernel mode and plain IRQ state when
raised from user-mode.

Fixes: 62441a1fb532 ("x86/sev-es: Correctly track IRQ states in runtime #VC handler")
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210618115409.22735-3-joro@8bytes.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/xen: Fix noinstr fail in xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall()</title>
<updated>2021-06-22T11:56:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
</author>
<published>2021-06-21T11:12:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=84e60065df9ef03759115a7e48c04bbc0d292165'/>
<id>urn:sha1:84e60065df9ef03759115a7e48c04bbc0d292165</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix:

  vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall()+0x23: call to irq_enter_rcu() leaves .noinstr.text section

Fixes: 359f01d1816f ("x86/entry: Use run_sysvec_on_irqstack_cond() for XEN upcall")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210621120120.532960208@infradead.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/entry: Fix noinstr fail in __do_fast_syscall_32()</title>
<updated>2021-06-22T11:56:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
</author>
<published>2021-06-21T11:12:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=240001d4e3041832e8a2654adc3ccf1683132b92'/>
<id>urn:sha1:240001d4e3041832e8a2654adc3ccf1683132b92</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix:

  vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __do_fast_syscall_32()+0xf5: call to trace_hardirqs_off() leaves .noinstr.text section

Fixes: 5d5675df792f ("x86/entry: Fix entry/exit mismatch on failed fast 32-bit syscalls")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210621120120.467898710@infradead.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>quota: Disable quotactl_path syscall</title>
<updated>2021-05-17T12:39:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
</author>
<published>2021-05-17T12:39:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=5b9fedb31e476693c90d8ee040e7d4c51b3e7cc4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5b9fedb31e476693c90d8ee040e7d4c51b3e7cc4</id>
<content type='text'>
In commit fa8b90070a80 ("quota: wire up quotactl_path") we have wired up
new quotactl_path syscall. However some people in LWN discussion have
objected that the path based syscall is missing dirfd and flags argument
which is mostly standard for contemporary path based syscalls. Indeed
they have a point and after a discussion with Christian Brauner and
Sascha Hauer I've decided to disable the syscall for now and update its
API. Since there is no userspace currently using that syscall and it
hasn't been released in any major release, we should be fine.

CC: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
CC: Sascha Hauer &lt;s.hauer@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210512153621.n5u43jsytbik4yze@wittgenstein
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2021-05-02T01:50:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2021-05-02T01:50:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=17ae69aba89dbfa2139b7f8024b757ab3cc42f59'/>
<id>urn:sha1:17ae69aba89dbfa2139b7f8024b757ab3cc42f59</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
 "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.

  Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.

  From Mickaël's cover letter:
    "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
     global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
     is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
     sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
     system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
     help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
     behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
     process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
     themselves.

     Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
     syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
     use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
     kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
     sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
     Pledge/Unveil.

     In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
     This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
     series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
     combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
     init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"

  The cover letter and v34 posting is here:

      https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/

  See also:

      https://landlock.io/

  This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
  years"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]

* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
  landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
  samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
  selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
  landlock: Add syscall implementations
  arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
  fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
  landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
  landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
  landlock: Add object management
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for_v5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs</title>
<updated>2021-04-29T17:51:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2021-04-29T17:51:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=767fcbc80f63d7f08ff6c0858fe33583e6fdd327'/>
<id>urn:sha1:767fcbc80f63d7f08ff6c0858fe33583e6fdd327</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull quota, ext2, reiserfs updates from Jan Kara:

 - support for path (instead of device) based quotactl syscall
   (quotactl_path(2))

 - ext2 conversion to kmap_local()

 - other minor cleanups &amp; fixes

* tag 'for_v5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  fs/reiserfs/journal.c: delete useless variables
  fs/ext2: Replace kmap() with kmap_local_page()
  ext2: Match up ext2_put_page() with ext2_dotdot() and ext2_find_entry()
  fs/ext2/: fix misspellings using codespell tool
  quota: report warning limits for realtime space quotas
  quota: wire up quotactl_path
  quota: Add mountpath based quota support
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2021-04-28T00:45:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2021-04-28T00:45:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=c6536676c7fe3f572ba55842e59c3c71c01e7fb3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c6536676c7fe3f572ba55842e59c3c71c01e7fb3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Turn the stack canary into a normal __percpu variable on 32-bit which
   gets rid of the LAZY_GS stuff and a lot of code.

 - Add an insn_decode() API which all users of the instruction decoder
   should preferrably use. Its goal is to keep the details of the
   instruction decoder away from its users and simplify and streamline
   how one decodes insns in the kernel. Convert its users to it.

 - kprobes improvements and fixes

 - Set the maximum DIE per package variable on Hygon

 - Rip out the dynamic NOP selection and simplify all the machinery
   around selecting NOPs. Use the simplified NOPs in objtool now too.

 - Add Xeon Sapphire Rapids to list of CPUs that support PPIN

 - Simplify the retpolines by folding the entire thing into an
   alternative now that objtool can handle alternatives with stack ops.
   Then, have objtool rewrite the call to the retpoline with the
   alternative which then will get patched at boot time.

 - Document Intel uarch per models in intel-family.h

 - Make Sub-NUMA Clustering topology the default and Cluster-on-Die the
   exception on Intel.

* tag 'x86_core_for_v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits)
  x86, sched: Treat Intel SNC topology as default, COD as exception
  x86/cpu: Comment Skylake server stepping too
  x86/cpu: Resort and comment Intel models
  objtool/x86: Rewrite retpoline thunk calls
  objtool: Skip magical retpoline .altinstr_replacement
  objtool: Cache instruction relocs
  objtool: Keep track of retpoline call sites
  objtool: Add elf_create_undef_symbol()
  objtool: Extract elf_symbol_add()
  objtool: Extract elf_strtab_concat()
  objtool: Create reloc sections implicitly
  objtool: Add elf_create_reloc() helper
  objtool: Rework the elf_rebuild_reloc_section() logic
  objtool: Fix static_call list generation
  objtool: Handle per arch retpoline naming
  objtool: Correctly handle retpoline thunk calls
  x86/retpoline: Simplify retpolines
  x86/alternatives: Optimize optimize_nops()
  x86: Add insn_decode_kernel()
  x86/kprobes: Move 'inline' to the beginning of the kprobe_is_ss() declaration
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-vdso-2021-04-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2021-04-26T17:17:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2021-04-26T17:17:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=69f737ed3a1c0e7619565bb4c01dff5ec8991d85'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69f737ed3a1c0e7619565bb4c01dff5ec8991d85</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 vdso update from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A single fix for the x86 VDSO build infrastructure to address a
  compiler warning on 32bit hosts due to a fprintf() modifier/argument
  mismatch."

* tag 'x86-vdso-2021-04-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/vdso: Use proper modifier for len's format specifier in extract()
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-entry-2021-04-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2021-04-26T17:02:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2021-04-26T17:02:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=eea2647e74cd7bd5d04861ce55fa502de165de14'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eea2647e74cd7bd5d04861ce55fa502de165de14</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull entry code update from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Provide support for randomized stack offsets per syscall to make
  stack-based attacks harder which rely on the deterministic stack
  layout.

  The feature is based on the original idea of PaX's RANDSTACK feature,
  but uses a significantly different implementation.

  The offset does not affect the pt_regs location on the task stack as
  this was agreed on to be of dubious value. The offset is applied
  before the actual syscall is invoked.

  The offset is stored per cpu and the randomization happens at the end
  of the syscall which is less predictable than on syscall entry.

  The mechanism to apply the offset is via alloca(), i.e. abusing the
  dispised VLAs. This comes with the drawback that
  stack-clash-protection has to be disabled for the affected compilation
  units and there is also a negative interaction with stack-protector.

  Those downsides are traded with the advantage that this approach does
  not require any intrusive changes to the low level assembly entry
  code, does not affect the unwinder and the correct stack alignment is
  handled automatically by the compiler.

  The feature is guarded with a static branch which avoids the overhead
  when disabled.

  Currently this is supported for X86 and ARM64"

* tag 'x86-entry-2021-04-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
  lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets
  x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
  stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
  init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
  jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2021-04-26T16:25:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2021-04-26T16:25:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=ea5bc7b977fc7cd2be4065ef41824adc976c807f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ea5bc7b977fc7cd2be4065ef41824adc976c807f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc x86 cleanups from Borislav Petkov:
 "Trivial cleanups and fixes all over the place"

* tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  MAINTAINERS: Remove me from IDE/ATAPI section
  x86/pat: Do not compile stubbed functions when X86_PAT is off
  x86/asm: Ensure asm/proto.h can be included stand-alone
  x86/platform/intel/quark: Fix incorrect kernel-doc comment syntax in files
  x86/msr: Make locally used functions static
  x86/cacheinfo: Remove unneeded dead-store initialization
  x86/process/64: Move cpu_current_top_of_stack out of TSS
  tools/turbostat: Unmark non-kernel-doc comment
  x86/syscalls: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings from COND_SYSCALL()
  x86/fpu/math-emu: Fix function cast warning
  x86/msr: Fix wr/rdmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu() prototypes
  x86: Fix various typos in comments, take #2
  x86: Remove unusual Unicode characters from comments
  x86/kaslr: Return boolean values from a function returning bool
  x86: Fix various typos in comments
  x86/setup: Remove unused RESERVE_BRK_ARRAY()
  stacktrace: Move documentation for arch_stack_walk_reliable() to header
  x86: Remove duplicate TSC DEADLINE MSR definitions
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
