<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/arch/x86/entry, branch linux-4.19.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.19.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.19.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2023-08-16T16:13:00Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm: Fix VDSO and VVAR placement on 5-level paging machines</title>
<updated>2023-08-16T16:13:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
</author>
<published>2023-08-03T15:16:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=97319157e2905e00a6e801874b264c99064e53b8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97319157e2905e00a6e801874b264c99064e53b8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1b8b1aa90c9c0e825b181b98b8d9e249dc395470 upstream.

Yingcong has noticed that on the 5-level paging machine, VDSO and VVAR
VMAs are placed above the 47-bit border:

8000001a9000-8000001ad000 r--p 00000000 00:00 0                          [vvar]
8000001ad000-8000001af000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]

This might confuse users who are not aware of 5-level paging and expect
all userspace addresses to be under the 47-bit border.

So far problem has only been triggered with ASLR disabled, although it
may also occur with ASLR enabled if the layout is randomized in a just
right way.

The problem happens due to custom placement for the VMAs in the VDSO
code: vdso_addr() tries to place them above the stack and checks the
result against TASK_SIZE_MAX, which is wrong. TASK_SIZE_MAX is set to
the 56-bit border on 5-level paging machines. Use DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW
instead.

Fixes: b569bab78d8d ("x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace")
Reported-by: Yingcong Wu &lt;yingcong.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230803151609.22141-1-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit: Add and use make_task_dead.</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:49:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
</author>
<published>2023-02-03T00:27:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=7d5de91a9ae564c7b5869310192ab6cb72ea4c6b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7d5de91a9ae564c7b5869310192ab6cb72ea4c6b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0e25498f8cd43c1b5aa327f373dd094e9a006da7 upstream.

There are two big uses of do_exit.  The first is it's design use to be
the guts of the exit(2) system call.  The second use is to terminate
a task after something catastrophic has happened like a NULL pointer
in kernel code.

Add a function make_task_dead that is initialy exactly the same as
do_exit to cover the cases where do_exit is called to handle
catastrophic failure.  In time this can probably be reduced to just a
light wrapper around do_task_dead. For now keep it exactly the same so
that there will be no behavioral differences introducing this new
concept.

Replace all of the uses of do_exit that use it for catastraphic
task cleanup with make_task_dead to make it clear what the code
is doing.

As part of this rename rewind_stack_do_exit
rewind_stack_and_make_dead.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/entry/64: Add instruction suffix to SYSRET</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:49:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Beulich</name>
</author>
<published>2019-12-16T10:40:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=8397ce73e06c987c30ebe4115226e4d9f4df0f16'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8397ce73e06c987c30ebe4115226e4d9f4df0f16</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b2b1d94cdfd4e906d3936dab2850096a4a0c2017 upstream.

ignore_sysret() contains an unsuffixed SYSRET instruction. gas correctly
interprets this as SYSRETL, but leaving it up to gas to guess when there
is no register operand that implies a size is bad practice, and upstream
gas is likely to warn about this in the future. Use SYSRETL explicitly.
This does not change the assembled output.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/038a7c35-062b-a285-c6d2-653b56585844@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n</title>
<updated>2022-11-23T06:53:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
</author>
<published>2022-11-17T09:19:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=ca47b5c598c2772aadd6bd5626ac531e640cd477'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ca47b5c598c2772aadd6bd5626ac531e640cd477</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce upstream.

If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants
to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be
silently disabled.

There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling.  Remove the
CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo &lt;cascardo@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal &lt;suleiman@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation</title>
<updated>2022-11-23T06:53:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
</author>
<published>2022-11-17T09:19:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=9e03416b022e83c73bbbdc275f1df1c3e88e3155'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9e03416b022e83c73bbbdc275f1df1c3e88e3155</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2dbb887e875b1de3ca8f40ddf26bcfe55798c609 upstream.

Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB
underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware.

Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than
UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET
itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means
IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET.

Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
[cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S, skip_r11rcx]
[cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S]
[cascardo: conflict fixups, no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR]
[cascardo: entry fixups because of missing UNTRAIN_RET]
[cascardo: conflicts on fsgsbase]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo &lt;cascardo@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal &lt;suleiman@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx</title>
<updated>2022-11-23T06:53:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
</author>
<published>2022-11-17T09:19:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=310aee6c371b076f86b61f764fe77de0e2913edd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:310aee6c371b076f86b61f764fe77de0e2913edd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1b331eeea7b8676fc5dbdf80d0a07e41be226177 upstream.

Yes, r11 and rcx have been restored previously, but since they're being
popped anyway (into rsi) might as well pop them into their own regs --
setting them to the value they already are.

Less magical code.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506121631.365070674@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo &lt;cascardo@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal &lt;suleiman@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: link vdso and boot with -z noexecstack --no-warn-rwx-segments</title>
<updated>2022-08-25T09:14:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Desaulniers</name>
</author>
<published>2022-08-10T22:24:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=fd161af70c821a0f84fe9b505871c8f5e6b0b9ed'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fd161af70c821a0f84fe9b505871c8f5e6b0b9ed</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ffcf9c5700e49c0aee42dcba9a12ba21338e8136 upstream.

Users of GNU ld (BFD) from binutils 2.39+ will observe multiple
instances of a new warning when linking kernels in the form:

  ld: warning: arch/x86/boot/pmjump.o: missing .note.GNU-stack section implies executable stack
  ld: NOTE: This behaviour is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of the linker
  ld: warning: arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux has a LOAD segment with RWX permissions

Generally, we would like to avoid the stack being executable.  Because
there could be a need for the stack to be executable, assembler sources
have to opt-in to this security feature via explicit creation of the
.note.GNU-stack feature (which compilers create by default) or command
line flag --noexecstack.  Or we can simply tell the linker the
production of such sections is irrelevant and to link the stack as
--noexecstack.

LLVM's LLD linker defaults to -z noexecstack, so this flag isn't
strictly necessary when linking with LLD, only BFD, but it doesn't hurt
to be explicit here for all linkers IMO.  --no-warn-rwx-segments is
currently BFD specific and only available in the current latest release,
so it's wrapped in an ld-option check.

While the kernel makes extensive usage of ELF sections, it doesn't use
permissions from ELF segments.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/3af4127a-f453-4cf7-f133-a181cce06f73@kernel.dk/
Link: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=ba951afb99912da01a6e8434126b8fac7aa75107
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/57009
Reported-and-tested-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Suggested-by: Fangrui Song &lt;maskray@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: Fix return value of __setup handlers</title>
<updated>2022-06-14T14:59:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
</author>
<published>2022-03-14T01:27:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=61967ac7ba2814fefd033eb3979058057a18edc1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:61967ac7ba2814fefd033eb3979058057a18edc1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 12441ccdf5e2f5a01a46e344976cbbd3d46845c9 ]

__setup() handlers should return 1 to obsolete_checksetup() in
init/main.c to indicate that the boot option has been handled. A return
of 0 causes the boot option/value to be listed as an Unknown kernel
parameter and added to init's (limited) argument (no '=') or environment
(with '=') strings. So return 1 from these x86 __setup handlers.

Examples:

  Unknown kernel command line parameters "apicpmtimer
    BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc8 vdso=1 ring3mwait=disable", will be
    passed to user space.

  Run /sbin/init as init process
   with arguments:
     /sbin/init
     apicpmtimer
   with environment:
     HOME=/
     TERM=linux
     BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc8
     vdso=1
     ring3mwait=disable

Fixes: 2aae950b21e4 ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu")
Fixes: 77b52b4c5c66 ("x86: add "debugpat" boot option")
Fixes: e16fd002afe2 ("x86/cpufeature: Enable RING3MWAIT for Knights Landing")
Fixes: b8ce33590687 ("x86_64: convert to clock events")
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov &lt;i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314012725.26661-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX if RDTSCP *or* RDPID is supported</title>
<updated>2021-05-22T08:59:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
</author>
<published>2021-05-04T22:56:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=bd1b3b2bd4dae57e5a2e06c340531137af633368'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd1b3b2bd4dae57e5a2e06c340531137af633368</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b6b4fbd90b155a0025223df2c137af8a701d53b3 upstream.

Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX with CPU node information if RDTSCP or RDPID is
supported.  This fixes a bug where vdso_read_cpunode() will read garbage
via RDPID if RDPID is supported but RDTSCP is not.  While no known CPU
supports RDPID but not RDTSCP, both Intel's SDM and AMD's APM allow for
RDPID to exist without RDTSCP, e.g. it's technically a legal CPU model
for a virtual machine.

Note, technically MSR_TSC_AUX could be initialized if and only if RDPID
is supported since RDTSCP is currently not used to retrieve the CPU node.
But, the cost of the superfluous WRMSR is negigible, whereas leaving
MSR_TSC_AUX uninitialized is just asking for future breakage if someone
decides to utilize RDTSCP.

Fixes: a582c540ac1b ("x86/vdso: Use RDPID in preference to LSL when available")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210504225632.1532621-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/unwind/orc: Fix premature unwind stoppage due to IRET frames</title>
<updated>2020-05-14T05:57:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
</author>
<published>2020-04-25T10:06:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=12082f1ea9ea35e3dedf3ac0e58e97cada8a520c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:12082f1ea9ea35e3dedf3ac0e58e97cada8a520c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 81b67439d147677d844d492fcbd03712ea438f42 upstream.

The following execution path is possible:

  fsnotify()
    [ realign the stack and store previous SP in R10 ]
    &lt;IRQ&gt;
      [ only IRET regs saved ]
      common_interrupt()
        interrupt_entry()
	  &lt;NMI&gt;
	    [ full pt_regs saved ]
	    ...
	    [ unwind stack ]

When the unwinder goes through the NMI and the IRQ on the stack, and
then sees fsnotify(), it doesn't have access to the value of R10,
because it only has the five IRET registers.  So the unwind stops
prematurely.

However, because the interrupt_entry() code is careful not to clobber
R10 before saving the full regs, the unwinder should be able to read R10
from the previously saved full pt_regs associated with the NMI.

Handle this case properly.  When encountering an IRET regs frame
immediately after a full pt_regs frame, use the pt_regs as a backup
which can be used to get the C register values.

Also, note that a call frame resets the 'prev_regs' value, because a
function is free to clobber the registers.  For this fix to work, the
IRET and full regs frames must be adjacent, with no FUNC frames in
between.  So replace the FUNC hint in interrupt_entry() with an
IRET_REGS hint.

Fixes: ee9f8fce9964 ("x86/unwind: Add the ORC unwinder")
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;dsj@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/97a408167cc09f1cfa0de31a7b70dd88868d743f.1587808742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
