kernel.git/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c, branch linux-5.3.y

um: Remove obsolete reenable_XX calls

2018-12-27T21:48:35Z

reenable_fd has been a NOP since the introduction of the EPOLL based interrupt controller. reenable_channel() is no longer needed as the flow control is now handled via the write IRQs on the channel. Signed-off-by: Anton Ivanov Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger

mconsole_proc(): don't mess with file->f_pos

2018-02-10T03:28:01Z

Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mconsole: switch to kernel_read

2017-09-04T23:05:16Z

Instead of playing with address limits. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Al Viro

sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to

2017-03-02T07:42:34Z

We are going to split out of , which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder file that just maps to to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Mike Galbraith Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Replace with globally

2016-12-24T19:46:01Z

This was entirely automated, using the script by Al: PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*' sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include !" \ $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h) to do the replacement at the end of the merge window. Requested-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/coredump: prevent fsuid=0 dumps into user-controlled directories

2016-03-22T22:36:02Z

This commit fixes the following security hole affecting systems where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: - The fs.suid_dumpable sysctl is set to 2. - The kernel.core_pattern sysctl's value starts with "/". (Systems where kernel.core_pattern starts with "|/" are not affected.) - Unprivileged user namespace creation is permitted. (This is true on Linux >=3.8, but some distributions disallow it by default using a distro patch.) Under these conditions, if a program executes under secure exec rules, causing it to run with the SUID_DUMP_ROOT flag, then unshares its user namespace, changes its root directory and crashes, the coredump will be written using fsuid=0 and a path derived from kernel.core_pattern - but this path is interpreted relative to the root directory of the process, allowing the attacker to control where a coredump will be written with root privileges. To fix the security issue, always interpret core_pattern for dumps that are written under SUID_DUMP_ROOT relative to the root directory of init. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Al Viro Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul()

2016-01-04T15:29:45Z

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

um: Get rid of thread_struct->saved_task

2013-11-17T10:27:35Z

As we have a sane show_stack() now, we can drop the ->saved_task hack. Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger

mconsole: we'd better initialize pos before passing it to vfs_read()...

2013-06-19T08:37:57Z

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

UM: Adjust printk in create_proc_mconsole()

2013-04-09T18:16:38Z

Adjust printk in create_proc_mconsole() to reflect it is now using proc_create() not create_proc_mconsole(). Signed-off-by: David Howells