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<title>kernel.git/arch/s390/crypto, branch linux-4.14.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.14.y</id>
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<updated>2022-07-07T15:31:16Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>s390/archrandom: simplify back to earlier design and initialize earlier</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:31:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
</author>
<published>2022-06-10T22:20:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:836a2cea5b226eb384e364c36d04d0c4246f0141</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e4f74400308cb8abde5fdc9cad609c2aba32110c upstream.

s390x appears to present two RNG interfaces:
- a "TRNG" that gathers entropy using some hardware function; and
- a "DRBG" that takes in a seed and expands it.

Previously, the TRNG was wired up to arch_get_random_{long,int}(), but
it was observed that this was being called really frequently, resulting
in high overhead. So it was changed to be wired up to arch_get_random_
seed_{long,int}(), which was a reasonable decision. Later on, the DRBG
was then wired up to arch_get_random_{long,int}(), with a complicated
buffer filling thread, to control overhead and rate.

Fortunately, none of the performance issues matter much now. The RNG
always attempts to use arch_get_random_seed_{long,int}() first, which
means a complicated implementation of arch_get_random_{long,int}() isn't
really valuable or useful to have around. And it's only used when
reseeding, which means it won't hit the high throughput complications
that were faced before.

So this commit returns to an earlier design of just calling the TRNG in
arch_get_random_seed_{long,int}(), and returning false in arch_get_
random_{long,int}().

Part of what makes the simplification possible is that the RNG now seeds
itself using the TRNG at bootup. But this only works if the TRNG is
detected early in boot, before random_init() is called. So this commit
also causes that check to happen in setup_arch().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Franzki &lt;ifranzki@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Christ &lt;jchrist@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610222023.378448-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev &lt;agordeev@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: xts-aes-s390 fix extra run-time crypto self tests finding</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T10:48:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
</author>
<published>2019-09-05T07:38:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a1a362c4d8115cc63edffaf00c9b4dabc0f94c52</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9e323d45ba94262620a073a3f9945ca927c07c71 ]

With 'extra run-time crypto self tests' enabled, the selftest
for s390-xts fails with

  alg: skcipher: xts-aes-s390 encryption unexpectedly succeeded on
  test vector "random: len=0 klen=64"; expected_error=-22,
  cfg="random: inplace use_digest nosimd src_divs=[2.61%@+4006,
  84.44%@+21, 1.55%@+13, 4.50%@+344, 4.26%@+21, 2.64%@+27]"

This special case with nbytes=0 is not handled correctly and this
fix now makes sure that -EINVAL is returned when there is en/decrypt
called with 0 bytes to en/decrypt.

Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Fix return code checking in cbc_paes_crypt()</title>
<updated>2018-09-26T06:38:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Franzki</name>
</author>
<published>2018-08-27T12:28:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:51e8d7d77ca8e6da9fb5162d5090bc06b8957cd8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b81126e01a8c6048249955feea46c8217ebefa91 upstream.

The return code of cpacf_kmc() is less than the number of
bytes to process in case of an error, not greater.
The crypt routines for the other cipher modes already have
this correctly.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+
Fixes: 279378430768 ("s390/crypt: Add protected key AES module")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki &lt;ifranzki@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crc32-vx: use expoline for indirect branches</title>
<updated>2018-05-25T14:17:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin Schwidefsky</name>
</author>
<published>2018-05-23T16:22:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d7aa3f13e146418b7cbf12e64f1e2cb0261681ca</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 467a3bf219cee12259182c5cb4821f88fd518a51 ]

The return from the crc32_le_vgfm_16/crc32c_le_vgfm_16 and the
crc32_be_vgfm_16 functions are done with "br %r14". These are indirect
branches as well and need to use execute trampolines for CONFIG_EXPOLINE=y.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Fixes: f19fbd5ed6 ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches")
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner &lt;brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: hash - annotate algorithms taking optional key</title>
<updated>2018-02-16T19:23:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
</author>
<published>2018-01-03T19:16:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8d906d183bce4b0eb812e5766ee5016f16dc201c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a208fa8f33031b9e0aba44c7d1b7e68eb0cbd29e upstream.

We need to consistently enforce that keyed hashes cannot be used without
setting the key.  To do this we need a reliable way to determine whether
a given hash algorithm is keyed or not.  AF_ALG currently does this by
checking for the presence of a -&gt;setkey() method.  However, this is
actually slightly broken because the CRC-32 algorithms implement
-&gt;setkey() but can also be used without a key.  (The CRC-32 "key" is not
actually a cryptographic key but rather represents the initial state.
If not overridden, then a default initial state is used.)

Prepare to fix this by introducing a flag CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY which
indicates that the algorithm has a -&gt;setkey() method, but it is not
required to be called.  Then set it on all the CRC-32 algorithms.

The same also applies to the Adler-32 implementation in Lustre.

Also, the cryptd and mcryptd templates have to pass through the flag
from their underlying algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:10:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
</author>
<published>2017-11-01T14:07:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: fix aes/paes Kconfig dependeny</title>
<updated>2017-06-12T14:25:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
</author>
<published>2017-05-11T15:15:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=c4684f98d3453dd07cc7ce67e0e795330eeec9c5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c4684f98d3453dd07cc7ce67e0e795330eeec9c5</id>
<content type='text'>
The s390_paes and the s390_aes kernel module used just one
config symbol CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES. As paes has a dependency
to PKEY and this requires ZCRYPT the aes module also had
a dependency to the zcrypt device driver which is not true.
Fixed by introducing a new config symbol CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES
which has dependencies to PKEY and ZCRYPT. Removed the
dependency for the aes module to ZCRYPT.

Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390: add missing header includes for type checking</title>
<updated>2017-06-12T14:25:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Heiko Carstens</name>
</author>
<published>2017-05-09T09:01:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=92acfb7406171038ae4e3b6041576642cb75b529'/>
<id>urn:sha1:92acfb7406171038ae4e3b6041576642cb75b529</id>
<content type='text'>
Add missing include statements to make sure that prototypes match
implementation. As reported by sparse:

arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c:18:1:
  warning: symbol 's390_arch_random_available' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/s390/kernel/traps.c:279:13: warning:
  symbol 'trap_init' was not declared. Should it be static?

Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypt: use the correct module alias for paes_s390.</title>
<updated>2017-04-26T14:52:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
</author>
<published>2017-04-26T11:56:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=284c43e6af415515865d2900d18d1382979c777c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:284c43e6af415515865d2900d18d1382979c777c</id>
<content type='text'>
For automatic module loading (e.g. as it is used with cryptsetup)
an alias "paes" for the paes_s390 kernel module is needed.
Correct the paes_s390 module alias from "aes-all" to "paes".

Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Provide s390 specific arch random functionality.</title>
<updated>2017-04-26T11:41:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
</author>
<published>2017-03-17T09:46:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=4c637cd8de43416c1b1eef6113e7aa06abacf18d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4c637cd8de43416c1b1eef6113e7aa06abacf18d</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch introduces s390 specific arch random functionality.
There exists a generic kernel API for arch specific random
number implementation (see include/linux/random.h). Here
comes the header file and a very small static code part
implementing the arch_random_* API based on the TRNG
subfunction coming with the reworked PRNG instruction.

The arch random implementation hooks into the kernel
initialization and checks for availability of the TRNG
function. In accordance to the arch random API all functions
return false if the TRNG is not available. Otherwise the new
high quality entropy source provides fresh random on each
invocation.

The s390 arch random feature build is controlled via
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM. This config option located in
arch/s390/Kconfig is enabled by default and appears
as entry "s390 architectural random number generation API"
in the submenu "Processor type and features" for s390 builds.

Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
