<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S, branch linux-5.10.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.10.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-5.10.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2021-10-13T08:04:30Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: fix program check interrupt emergency stack path</title>
<updated>2021-10-13T08:04:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
</author>
<published>2021-10-04T14:56:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=411b38fe68ba20a8bbe724b0939762c3f16e16ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:411b38fe68ba20a8bbe724b0939762c3f16e16ca</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3e607dc4df180b72a38e75030cb0f94d12808712 ]

Emergency stack path was jumping into a 3: label inside the
__GEN_COMMON_BODY macro for the normal path after it had finished,
rather than jumping over it. By a small miracle this is the correct
place to build up a new interrupt frame with the existing stack
pointer, so things basically worked okay with an added weird looking
700 trap frame on top (which had the wrong -&gt;nip so it didn't decode
bug messages either).

Fix this by avoiding using numeric labels when jumping over non-trivial
macros.

Before:

 LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 88 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2-00034-ge057cdade6e5 #2637
 NIP:  7265677368657265 LR: c00000000006c0c8 CTR: c0000000000097f0
 REGS: c0000000fffb3a50 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted
 MSR:  9000000000021031 &lt;SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,LE&gt;  CR: 00000700  XER: 20040000
 CFAR: c0000000000098b0 IRQMASK: 0
 GPR00: c00000000006c964 c0000000fffb3cf0 c000000001513800 0000000000000000
 GPR04: 0000000048ab0778 0000000042000000 0000000000000000 0000000000001299
 GPR08: 000001e447c718ec 0000000022424282 0000000000002710 c00000000006bee8
 GPR12: 9000000000009033 c0000000016b0000 00000000000000b0 0000000000000001
 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000ff8
 GPR20: 0000000000001fff 0000000000000007 0000000000000080 00007fff89d90158
 GPR24: 0000000002000000 0000000002000000 0000000000000255 0000000000000300
 GPR28: c000000001270000 0000000042000000 0000000048ab0778 c000000080647e80
 NIP [7265677368657265] 0x7265677368657265
 LR [c00000000006c0c8] ___do_page_fault+0x3f8/0xb10
 Call Trace:
 [c0000000fffb3cf0] [c00000000000bdac] soft_nmi_common+0x13c/0x1d0 (unreliable)
 --- interrupt: 700 at decrementer_common_virt+0xb8/0x230
 NIP:  c0000000000098b8 LR: c00000000006c0c8 CTR: c0000000000097f0
 REGS: c0000000fffb3d60 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted
 MSR:  9000000000021031 &lt;SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,LE&gt;  CR: 22424282  XER: 20040000
 CFAR: c0000000000098b0 IRQMASK: 0
 GPR00: c00000000006c964 0000000000002400 c000000001513800 0000000000000000
 GPR04: 0000000048ab0778 0000000042000000 0000000000000000 0000000000001299
 GPR08: 000001e447c718ec 0000000022424282 0000000000002710 c00000000006bee8
 GPR12: 9000000000009033 c0000000016b0000 00000000000000b0 0000000000000001
 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000ff8
 GPR20: 0000000000001fff 0000000000000007 0000000000000080 00007fff89d90158
 GPR24: 0000000002000000 0000000002000000 0000000000000255 0000000000000300
 GPR28: c000000001270000 0000000042000000 0000000048ab0778 c000000080647e80
 NIP [c0000000000098b8] decrementer_common_virt+0xb8/0x230
 LR [c00000000006c0c8] ___do_page_fault+0x3f8/0xb10
 --- interrupt: 700
 Instruction dump:
 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
 ---[ end trace 6d28218e0cc3c949 ]---

After:

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:491!
 Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
 LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 88 Comm: login Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2-00034-ge057cdade6e5-dirty #2638
 NIP:  c0000000000098b8 LR: c00000000006bf04 CTR: c0000000000097f0
 REGS: c0000000fffb3d60 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted
 MSR:  9000000000021031 &lt;SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,LE&gt;  CR: 24482227  XER: 00040000
 CFAR: c0000000000098b0 IRQMASK: 0
 GPR00: c00000000006bf04 0000000000002400 c000000001513800 c000000001271868
 GPR04: 00000000100f0d29 0000000042000000 0000000000000007 0000000000000009
 GPR08: 00000000100f0d29 0000000024482227 0000000000002710 c000000000181b3c
 GPR12: 9000000000009033 c0000000016b0000 00000000100f0d29 c000000005b22f00
 GPR16: 00000000ffff0000 0000000000000001 0000000000000009 00000000100eed90
 GPR20: 00000000100eed90 0000000010000000 000000001000a49c 00000000100f1430
 GPR24: c000000001271868 0000000002000000 0000000000000215 0000000000000300
 GPR28: c000000001271800 0000000042000000 00000000100f0d29 c000000080647860
 NIP [c0000000000098b8] decrementer_common_virt+0xb8/0x230
 LR [c00000000006bf04] ___do_page_fault+0x234/0xb10
 Call Trace:
 Instruction dump:
 4182000c 39400001 48000008 894d0932 714a0001 39400008 408225fc 718a4000
 7c2a0b78 3821fcf0 41c20008 e82d0910 &lt;0981fcf0&gt; f92101a0 f9610170 f9810178
 ---[ end trace a5dbd1f5ea4ccc51 ]---

Fixes: 0a882e28468f4 ("powerpc/64s/exception: remove bad stack branch")
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211004145642.1331214-2-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s/exception: Clean up a missed SRR specifier</title>
<updated>2021-03-17T16:06:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Axtens</name>
</author>
<published>2021-02-25T03:09:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=372734dc18977e61cb96e86b771389fa9fafa1c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:372734dc18977e61cb96e86b771389fa9fafa1c8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c080a173301ffc62cb6c76308c803c7fee05517a ]

Nick's patch cleaning up the SRR specifiers in exception-64s.S missed
a single instance of EXC_HV_OR_STD. Clean that up.

Caught by clang's integrated assembler.

Fixes: 3f7fbd97d07d ("powerpc/64s/exception: Clean up SRR specifiers")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Acked-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225031006.1204774-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: fix scv entry fallback flush vs interrupt</title>
<updated>2021-01-27T10:55:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
</author>
<published>2021-01-11T06:24:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=062dea906be1f4b79606b9813d50ddbbdb8f933c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:062dea906be1f4b79606b9813d50ddbbdb8f933c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 08685be7761d69914f08c3d6211c543a385a5b9c upstream.

The L1D flush fallback functions are not recoverable vs interrupts,
yet the scv entry flush runs with MSR[EE]=1. This can result in a
timer (soft-NMI) or MCE or SRESET interrupt hitting here and overwriting
the EXRFI save area, which ends up corrupting userspace registers for
scv return.

Fix this by disabling RI and EE for the scv entry fallback flush.

Fixes: f79643787e0a0 ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ which also have flush L1D patch backport
Reported-by: Tulio Magno Quites Machado Filho &lt;tuliom@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210111062408.287092-1-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'powerpc-cve-2020-4788' into fixes</title>
<updated>2020-11-23T10:16:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Ellerman</name>
</author>
<published>2020-11-23T10:16:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=962f8e64cd18a5353c34937436dd06b992f73c0a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:962f8e64cd18a5353c34937436dd06b992f73c0a</id>
<content type='text'>
From Daniel's cover letter:

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern.

This patch series flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry (patch 2) and after the
kernel performs any user accesses (patch 3). It also adds a self-test and
performs some related cleanups.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses</title>
<updated>2020-11-19T12:47:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
</author>
<published>2020-11-17T05:59:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de</id>
<content type='text'>
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry</title>
<updated>2020-11-19T12:47:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
</author>
<published>2020-11-17T05:59:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695</id>
<content type='text'>
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s/exception: KVM Fix for host DSI being taken in HPT guest MMU context</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T02:02:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
</author>
<published>2020-11-17T13:56:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=cd81acc600a9684ea4b4d25a47900d38a3890eab'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cd81acc600a9684ea4b4d25a47900d38a3890eab</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 2284ffea8f0c ("powerpc/64s/exception: Only test KVM in SRR
interrupts when PR KVM is supported") removed KVM guest tests from
interrupts that do not set HV=1, when PR-KVM is not configured.

This is wrong for HV-KVM HPT guest MMIO emulation case which attempts
to load the faulting instruction word with MSR[DR]=1 and MSR[HV]=1 with
the guest MMU context loaded. This can cause host DSI, DSLB interrupts
which must test for KVM guest. Restore this and add a comment.

Fixes: 2284ffea8f0c ("powerpc/64s/exception: Only test KVM in SRR interrupts when PR KVM is supported")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117135617.3521127-1-npiggin@gmail.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: Fix KVM system reset handling when CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES=y</title>
<updated>2020-11-16T00:26:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
</author>
<published>2020-11-14T11:47:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=575cba20c421ecb6b563ae352e4e0468e4ca8b3c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:575cba20c421ecb6b563ae352e4e0468e4ca8b3c</id>
<content type='text'>
pseries guest kernels have a FWNMI handler for SRESET and MCE NMIs,
which is basically the same as the regular handlers for those
interrupts.

The system reset FWNMI handler did not have a KVM guest test in it,
although it probably should have because the guest can itself run
guests.

Commit 4f50541f6703b ("powerpc/64s/exception: Move all interrupt
handlers to new style code gen macros") convert the handler faithfully
to avoid a KVM test with a "clever" trick to modify the IKVM_REAL
setting to 0 when the fwnmi handler is to be generated (PPC_PSERIES=y).
This worked when the KVM test was generated in the interrupt entry
handlers, but a later patch moved the KVM test to the common handler,
and the common handler macro is expanded below the fwnmi entry. This
prevents the KVM test from being generated even for the 0x100 entry
point as well.

The result is NMI IPIs in the host kernel when a guest is running will
use gest registers. This goes particularly badly when an HPT guest is
running and the MMU is set to guest mode.

Remove this trickery and just generate the test always.

Fixes: 9600f261acaa ("powerpc/64s/exception: Move KVM test to common code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201114114743.3306283-1-npiggin@gmail.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'powerpc-5.9-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux</title>
<updated>2020-08-07T17:33:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
</author>
<published>2020-08-07T17:33:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=25d8d4eecace9de5a6a2193e4df1917afbdd3052'/>
<id>urn:sha1:25d8d4eecace9de5a6a2193e4df1917afbdd3052</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:

 - Add support for (optionally) using queued spinlocks &amp; rwlocks.

 - Support for a new faster system call ABI using the scv instruction on
   Power9 or later.

 - Drop support for the PROT_SAO mmap/mprotect flag as it will be
   unsupported on Power10 and future processors, leaving us with no way
   to implement the functionality it requests. This risks breaking
   userspace, though we believe it is unused in practice.

 - A bug fix for, and then the removal of, our custom stack expansion
   checking. We now allow stack expansion up to the rlimit, like other
   architectures.

 - Remove the remnants of our (previously disabled) topology update
   code, which tried to react to NUMA layout changes on virtualised
   systems, but was prone to crashes and other problems.

 - Add PMU support for Power10 CPUs.

 - A change to our signal trampoline so that we don't unbalance the link
   stack (branch return predictor) in the signal delivery path.

 - Lots of other cleanups, refactorings, smaller features and so on as
   usual.

Thanks to: Abhishek Goel, Alastair D'Silva, Alexander A. Klimov, Alexey
Kardashevskiy, Alistair Popple, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju
T Sudhakar, Anton Blanchard, Arnd Bergmann, Athira Rajeev, Balamuruhan
S, Bharata B Rao, Bill Wendling, Bin Meng, Cédric Le Goater, Chris
Packham, Christophe Leroy, Christoph Hellwig, Daniel Axtens, Dan
Williams, David Lamparter, Desnes A. Nunes do Rosario, Erhard F., Finn
Thain, Frederic Barrat, Ganesh Goudar, Gautham R. Shenoy, Geoff Levand,
Greg Kurz, Gustavo A. R. Silva, Hari Bathini, Harish, Imre Kaloz, Joel
Stanley, Joe Perches, John Crispin, Jordan Niethe, Kajol Jain, Kamalesh
Babulal, Kees Cook, Laurent Dufour, Leonardo Bras, Li RongQing, Madhavan
Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mark Cave-Ayland, Michal Suchanek, Milton
Miller, Mimi Zohar, Murilo Opsfelder Araujo, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan
Lynch, Naveen N. Rao, Nayna Jain, Nicholas Piggin, Oliver O'Halloran,
Palmer Dabbelt, Pedro Miraglia Franco de Carvalho, Philippe Bergheaud,
Pingfan Liu, Pratik Rajesh Sampat, Qian Cai, Qinglang Miao, Randy
Dunlap, Ravi Bangoria, Sachin Sant, Sam Bobroff, Sandipan Das, Santosh
Sivaraj, Satheesh Rajendran, Shirisha Ganta, Sourabh Jain, Srikar
Dronamraju, Stan Johnson, Stephen Rothwell, Thadeu Lima de Souza
Cascardo, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Tom Lane, Vaibhav Jain, Vladis Dronov,
Wei Yongjun, Wen Xiong, YueHaibing.

* tag 'powerpc-5.9-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (337 commits)
  selftests/powerpc: Fix pkey syscall redefinitions
  powerpc: Fix circular dependency between percpu.h and mmu.h
  powerpc/powernv/sriov: Fix use of uninitialised variable
  selftests/powerpc: Skip vmx/vsx/tar/etc tests on older CPUs
  powerpc/40x: Fix assembler warning about r0
  powerpc/papr_scm: Add support for fetching nvdimm 'fuel-gauge' metric
  powerpc/papr_scm: Fetch nvdimm performance stats from PHYP
  cpuidle: pseries: Fixup exit latency for CEDE(0)
  cpuidle: pseries: Add function to parse extended CEDE records
  cpuidle: pseries: Set the latency-hint before entering CEDE
  selftests/powerpc: Fix online CPU selection
  powerpc/perf: Consolidate perf_callchain_user_[64|32]()
  powerpc/pseries/hotplug-cpu: Remove double free in error path
  powerpc/pseries/mobility: Add pr_debug() for device tree changes
  powerpc/pseries/mobility: Set pr_fmt()
  powerpc/cacheinfo: Warn if cache object chain becomes unordered
  powerpc/cacheinfo: Improve diagnostics about malformed cache lists
  powerpc/cacheinfo: Use name@unit instead of full DT path in debug messages
  powerpc/cacheinfo: Set pr_fmt()
  powerpc: fix function annotations to avoid section mismatch warnings with gcc-10
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s/hash: Fix hash_preload running with interrupts enabled</title>
<updated>2020-07-27T07:02:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
</author>
<published>2020-07-27T06:09:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=909adfc66b9a1db21b5e8733e9ebfa6cd5135d74'/>
<id>urn:sha1:909adfc66b9a1db21b5e8733e9ebfa6cd5135d74</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 2f92447f9f96 ("powerpc/book3s64/hash: Use the pte_t address from the
caller") removed the local_irq_disable from hash_preload, but it was
required for more than just the page table walk: the hash pte busy bit is
effectively a lock which may be taken in interrupt context, and the local
update flag test must not be preempted before it's used.

This solves apparent lockups with perf interrupting __hash_page_64K. If
get_perf_callchain then also takes a hash fault on the same page while it
is already locked, it will loop forever taking hash faults, which looks like
this:

  cpu 0x49e: Vector: 100 (System Reset) at [c00000001a4f7d70]
      pc: c000000000072dc8: hash_page_mm+0x8/0x800
      lr: c00000000000c5a4: do_hash_page+0x24/0x38
      sp: c0002ac1cc69ac70
     msr: 8000000000081033
    current = 0xc0002ac1cc602e00
    paca    = 0xc00000001de1f280   irqmask: 0x03   irq_happened: 0x01
      pid   = 20118, comm = pread2_processe
  Linux version 5.8.0-rc6-00345-g1fad14f18bc6
  49e:mon&gt; t
  [c0002ac1cc69ac70] c00000000000c5a4 do_hash_page+0x24/0x38 (unreliable)
  --- Exception: 300 (Data Access) at c00000000008fa60 __copy_tofrom_user_power7+0x20c/0x7ac
  [link register   ] c000000000335d10 copy_from_user_nofault+0xf0/0x150
  [c0002ac1cc69af70] c00032bf9fa3c880 (unreliable)
  [c0002ac1cc69afa0] c000000000109df0 read_user_stack_64+0x70/0xf0
  [c0002ac1cc69afd0] c000000000109fcc perf_callchain_user_64+0x15c/0x410
  [c0002ac1cc69b060] c000000000109c00 perf_callchain_user+0x20/0x40
  [c0002ac1cc69b080] c00000000031c6cc get_perf_callchain+0x25c/0x360
  [c0002ac1cc69b120] c000000000316b50 perf_callchain+0x70/0xa0
  [c0002ac1cc69b140] c000000000316ddc perf_prepare_sample+0x25c/0x790
  [c0002ac1cc69b1a0] c000000000317350 perf_event_output_forward+0x40/0xb0
  [c0002ac1cc69b220] c000000000306138 __perf_event_overflow+0x88/0x1a0
  [c0002ac1cc69b270] c00000000010cf70 record_and_restart+0x230/0x750
  [c0002ac1cc69b620] c00000000010d69c perf_event_interrupt+0x20c/0x510
  [c0002ac1cc69b730] c000000000027d9c performance_monitor_exception+0x4c/0x60
  [c0002ac1cc69b750] c00000000000b2f8 performance_monitor_common_virt+0x1b8/0x1c0
  --- Exception: f00 (Performance Monitor) at c0000000000cb5b0 pSeries_lpar_hpte_insert+0x0/0x160
  [link register   ] c0000000000846f0 __hash_page_64K+0x210/0x540
  [c0002ac1cc69ba50] 0000000000000000 (unreliable)
  [c0002ac1cc69bb00] c000000000073ae0 update_mmu_cache+0x390/0x3a0
  [c0002ac1cc69bb70] c00000000037f024 wp_page_copy+0x364/0xce0
  [c0002ac1cc69bc20] c00000000038272c do_wp_page+0xdc/0xa60
  [c0002ac1cc69bc70] c0000000003857bc handle_mm_fault+0xb9c/0x1b60
  [c0002ac1cc69bd50] c00000000006c434 __do_page_fault+0x314/0xc90
  [c0002ac1cc69be20] c00000000000c5c8 handle_page_fault+0x10/0x2c
  --- Exception: 300 (Data Access) at 00007fff8c861fe8
  SP (7ffff6b19660) is in userspace

Fixes: 2f92447f9f96 ("powerpc/book3s64/hash: Use the pte_t address from the caller")
Reported-by: Athira Rajeev &lt;atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reported-by: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200727060947.10060-1-npiggin@gmail.com
</content>
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