kernel.git/arch/arm64/kernel, branch linux-rolling-stable

KVM: arm64: pkvm: Don't reprobe for ICH_VTR_EL2.TDS on CPU hotplug

2026-03-19T15:15:02Z

commit a79f7b4aeb8e7562cd6dbf9c223e2c2a04b1a85f upstream. Hotplugging a CPU off and back on fails with pKVM, as we try to probe for ICH_VTR_EL2.TDS. In a non-VHE setup, this is achieved by using an EL2 stub helper. However, the stubs are out of reach once pKVM has deprivileged the kernel. The CPU never boots. Since pKVM doesn't allow late onlining of CPUs, we can detect that protected mode is enforced early on, and return the current state of the capability. Fixes: 2a28810cbb8b2 ("KVM: arm64: GICv3: Detect and work around the lack of ICV_DIR_EL1 trapping") Reported-by: Vincent Donnefort Tested-by: Vincent Donnefort Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310085433.3936742-1-maz@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kbuild: Split .modinfo out from ELF_DETAILS

2026-03-12T11:09:39Z

commit 8678591b47469fe16357234efef9b260317b8be4 upstream. Commit 3e86e4d74c04 ("kbuild: keep .modinfo section in vmlinux.unstripped") added .modinfo to ELF_DETAILS while removing it from COMMON_DISCARDS, as it was needed in vmlinux.unstripped and ELF_DETAILS was present in all architecture specific vmlinux linker scripts. While this shuffle is fine for vmlinux, ELF_DETAILS and COMMON_DISCARDS may be used by other linker scripts, such as the s390 and x86 compressed boot images, which may not expect to have a .modinfo section. In certain circumstances, this could result in a bootloader failing to load the compressed kernel [1]. Commit ddc6cbef3ef1 ("s390/boot/vmlinux.lds.S: Ensure bzImage ends with SecureBoot trailer") recently addressed this for the s390 bzImage but the same bug remains for arm, parisc, and x86. The presence of .modinfo in the x86 bzImage was the root cause of the issue worked around with commit d50f21091358 ("kbuild: align modinfo section for Secureboot Authenticode EDK2 compat"). misc.c in arch/x86/boot/compressed includes lib/decompress_unzstd.c, which in turn includes lib/xxhash.c and its MODULE_LICENSE / MODULE_DESCRIPTION macros due to the STATIC definition. Split .modinfo out from ELF_DETAILS into its own macro and handle it in all vmlinux linker scripts. Discard .modinfo in the places where it was previously being discarded from being in COMMON_DISCARDS, as it has never been necessary in those uses. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3e86e4d74c04 ("kbuild: keep .modinfo section in vmlinux.unstripped") Reported-by: Ed W Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/587f25e0-a80e-46a5-9f01-87cb40cfa377@wildgooses.com/ [1] Tested-by: Ed W # x86_64 Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225-separate-modinfo-from-elf-details-v1-1-387ced6baf4b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

arm64: io: Rename ioremap_prot() to __ioremap_prot()

2026-03-12T11:09:20Z

[ Upstream commit f6bf47ab32e0863df50f5501d207dcdddb7fc507 ] Rename our ioremap_prot() implementation to __ioremap_prot() and convert all arch-internal callers over to the new function. ioremap_prot() remains as a #define to __ioremap_prot() for generic_access_phys() and will be subsequently extended to handle user permissions in 'prot'. Cc: Zeng Heng Cc: Jinjiang Tu Cc: Catalin Marinas Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Stable-dep-of: 8f098037139b ("arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

arm64: poe: fix stale POR_EL0 values for ptrace

2026-03-04T12:21:28Z

[ Upstream commit 1f3b950492db411e6c30ee0076b61ef2694c100a ] If a process wrote to POR_EL0 and then crashed before a context switch happened, the coredump would contain an incorrect value for POR_EL0. The value read in poe_get() would be a stale value left in thread.por_el0. Fix this by reading the value from the system register, if the target thread is the current thread. This matches what gcs/fpsimd do. Fixes: 175198199262 ("arm64/ptrace: add support for FEAT_POE") Reported-by: David Spickett Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly Cc: Kevin Brodsky Cc: Mark Rutland Reviewed-by: Kevin Brodsky Acked-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

arm64: kernel: initialize missing kexec_buf->random field

2026-03-04T12:21:06Z

[ Upstream commit 15dd20dda979ebab72f6df97845828e78d63ab91 ] Commit bf454ec31add ("kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly") introduced the kexec_buf->random field to enable random placement of kexec_buf. However, this field was never properly initialized for kexec images that do not need to be placed randomly, leading to the following UBSAN warning: [ +0.364528] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000019] UBSAN: invalid-load in ./include/linux/kexec.h:210:12 [ +0.000131] load of value 2 is not a valid value for type 'bool' (aka '_Bool') [ +0.000003] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 927 Comm: kexec Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(full) [ +0.000002] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ +0.000000] Call trace: [ +0.000001] show_stack+0x24/0x40 (C) [ +0.000006] __dump_stack+0x28/0x48 [ +0.000002] dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xb0 [ +0.000002] dump_stack+0x18/0x34 [ +0.000001] ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x50 [ +0.000002] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0xc8/0xd0 [ +0.000003] locate_mem_hole_callback+0x28c/0x2a0 [ +0.000003] kexec_locate_mem_hole+0xf4/0x2f0 [ +0.000001] kexec_add_buffer+0xa8/0x178 [ +0.000002] image_load+0xf0/0x258 [ +0.000001] __arm64_sys_kexec_file_load+0x510/0x718 [ +0.000002] invoke_syscall+0x68/0xe8 [ +0.000001] el0_svc_common+0xb0/0xf8 [ +0.000002] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x48 [ +0.000001] el0_svc+0x40/0xe8 [ +0.000002] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x140 [ +0.000002] el0t_64_sync+0x1bc/0x1c0 To address this, initialise kexec_buf->random field properly. Fixes: bf454ec31add ("kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly") Suggested-by: Breno Leitao Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/oninomspajhxp4omtdapxnckxydbk2nzmrix7rggmpukpnzadw@c67o7njgdgm3/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250825180531.94bfb86a26a43127c0a1296f@linux-foundation.org/ [2] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250826-akpm-v1-1-3c831f0e3799@debian.org Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao Suggested-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Reviewed-by: Pratyush Yadav Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

arm64: Add support for TSV110 Spectre-BHB mitigation

2026-03-04T12:19:36Z

[ Upstream commit e3baa5d4b361276efeb87b20d8beced451a7dbd5 ] The TSV110 processor is vulnerable to the Spectre-BHB (Branch History Buffer) attack, which can be exploited to leak information through branch prediction side channels. This commit adds the MIDR of TSV110 to the list for software mitigation. Signed-off-by: Jinqian Yang Reviewed-by: Zenghui Yu Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

2026-01-24T17:02:56Z

Pull arm64 kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini: - Ensure early return semantics are preserved for pKVM fault handlers - Fix case where the kernel runs with the guest's PAN value when CONFIG_ARM64_PAN is not set - Make stage-1 walks to set the access flag respect the access permission of the underlying stage-2, when enabled - Propagate computed FGT values to the pKVM view of the vCPU at vcpu_load() - Correctly program PXN and UXN privilege bits for hVHE's stage-1 page tables - Check that the VM is actually using VGICv3 before accessing the GICv3 CPU interface - Delete some unused code * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: KVM: arm64: Invert KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_HANDLE_FAULT to fix pKVM walkers KVM: arm64: Don't blindly set set PSTATE.PAN on guest exit KVM: arm64: nv: Respect stage-2 write permssion when setting stage-1 AF KVM: arm64: Remove unused vcpu_{clear,set}_wfx_traps() KVM: arm64: Remove unused parameter in synchronize_vcpu_pstate() KVM: arm64: Remove extra argument for __pvkm_host_{share,unshare}_hyp() KVM: arm64: Inject UNDEF for a register trap without accessor KVM: arm64: Copy FGT traps to unprotected pKVM VCPU on VCPU load KVM: arm64: Fix EL2 S1 XN handling for hVHE setups KVM: arm64: gic: Check for vGICv3 when clearing TWI

arm64: Set __nocfi on swsusp_arch_resume()

2026-01-23T18:13:07Z

A DABT is reported[1] on an android based system when resume from hiberate. This happens because swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() is marked with SYM_CODE_*() and does not have a CFI hash, but swsusp_arch_resume() will attempt to verify the CFI hash when calling a copy of swsusp_arch_suspend_exit(). Given that there's an existing requirement that the entrypoint to swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() is the first byte of the .hibernate_exit.text section, we cannot fix this by marking swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() with SYM_FUNC_*(). The simplest fix for now is to disable the CFI check in swsusp_arch_resume(). Mark swsusp_arch_resume() as __nocfi to disable the CFI check. [1] [ 22.991934][ T1] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000109170ffc [ 22.991934][ T1] Mem abort info: [ 22.991934][ T1] ESR = 0x0000000096000007 [ 22.991934][ T1] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 22.991934][ T1] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 22.991934][ T1] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 22.991934][ T1] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault [ 22.991934][ T1] Data abort info: [ 22.991934][ T1] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 22.991934][ T1] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 22.991934][ T1] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 22.991934][ T1] [0000000109170ffc] user address but active_mm is swapper [ 22.991934][ T1] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 22.991934][ T1] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 22.991934][ T1] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 22.991934][ T1] Modules linked in: [ 22.991934][ T1] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.98-android15-8-g0b1d2aee7fc3-dirty-4k #1 688c7060a825a3ac418fe53881730b355915a419 [ 22.991934][ T1] Hardware name: Unisoc UMS9360-base Board (DT) [ 22.991934][ T1] pstate: 804000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 22.991934][ T1] pc : swsusp_arch_resume+0x2ac/0x344 [ 22.991934][ T1] lr : swsusp_arch_resume+0x294/0x344 [ 22.991934][ T1] sp : ffffffc08006b960 [ 22.991934][ T1] x29: ffffffc08006b9c0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 22.991934][ T1] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000820 [ 22.991934][ T1] x23: ffffffd0817e3000 x22: ffffffd0817e3000 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 22.991934][ T1] x20: ffffff8089171000 x19: ffffffd08252c8c8 x18: ffffffc080061058 [ 22.991934][ T1] x17: 00000000529c6ef0 x16: 00000000529c6ef0 x15: 0000000000000004 [ 22.991934][ T1] x14: ffffff8178c88000 x13: 0000000000000006 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 22.991934][ T1] x11: 0000000000000015 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffffffd082533000 [ 22.991934][ T1] x8 : 0000000109171000 x7 : 205b5d3433393139 x6 : 392e32322020205b [ 22.991934][ T1] x5 : 000000010916f000 x4 : 000000008164b000 x3 : ffffff808a4e0530 [ 22.991934][ T1] x2 : ffffffd08058e784 x1 : 0000000082326000 x0 : 000000010a283000 [ 22.991934][ T1] Call trace: [ 22.991934][ T1] swsusp_arch_resume+0x2ac/0x344 [ 22.991934][ T1] hibernation_restore+0x158/0x18c [ 22.991934][ T1] load_image_and_restore+0xb0/0xec [ 22.991934][ T1] software_resume+0xf4/0x19c [ 22.991934][ T1] software_resume_initcall+0x34/0x78 [ 22.991934][ T1] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x370 [ 22.991934][ T1] do_initcall_level+0xc8/0x19c [ 22.991934][ T1] do_initcalls+0x70/0xc0 [ 22.991934][ T1] do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28 [ 22.991934][ T1] kernel_init_freeable+0xe0/0x148 [ 22.991934][ T1] kernel_init+0x20/0x1a8 [ 22.991934][ T1] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 22.991934][ T1] Code: a9400a61 f94013e0 f9438923 f9400a64 (b85fc110) Co-developed-by: Jeson Gao Signed-off-by: Jeson Gao Signed-off-by: Zhaoyang Huang Acked-by: Will Deacon Acked-by: Mark Rutland Cc: [catalin.marinas@arm.com: commit log updated by Mark Rutland] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas

arm64/fpsimd: signal: Fix restoration of SVE context

2026-01-22T10:10:39Z

When SME is supported, Restoring SVE signal context can go wrong in a few ways, including placing the task into an invalid state where the kernel may read from out-of-bounds memory (and may potentially take a fatal fault) and/or may kill the task with a SIGKILL. (1) Restoring a context with SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM set can place the task into an invalid state where SVCR.SM is set (and sve_state is non-NULL) but TIF_SME is clear, consequently resuting in out-of-bounds memory reads and/or killing the task with SIGKILL. This can only occur in unusual (but legitimate) cases where the SVE signal context has either been modified by userspace or was saved in the context of another task (e.g. as with CRIU), as otherwise the presence of an SVE signal context with SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM implies that TIF_SME is already set. While in this state, task_fpsimd_load() will NOT configure SMCR_ELx (leaving some arbitrary value configured in hardware) before restoring SVCR and attempting to restore the streaming mode SVE registers from memory via sve_load_state(). As the value of SMCR_ELx.LEN may be larger than the task's streaming SVE vector length, this may read memory outside of the task's allocated sve_state, reading unrelated data and/or triggering a fault. While this can result in secrets being loaded into streaming SVE registers, these values are never exposed. As TIF_SME is clear, fpsimd_bind_task_to_cpu() will configure CPACR_ELx.SMEN to trap EL0 accesses to streaming mode SVE registers, so these cannot be accessed directly at EL0. As fpsimd_save_user_state() verifies the live vector length before saving (S)SVE state to memory, no secret values can be saved back to memory (and hence cannot be observed via ptrace, signals, etc). When the live vector length doesn't match the expected vector length for the task, fpsimd_save_user_state() will send a fatal SIGKILL signal to the task. Hence the task may be killed after executing userspace for some period of time. (2) Restoring a context with SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM clear does not clear the task's SVCR.SM. If SVCR.SM was set prior to restoring the context, then the task will be left in streaming mode unexpectedly, and some register state will be combined inconsistently, though the task will be left in legitimate state from the kernel's PoV. This can only occur in unusual (but legitimate) cases where ptrace has been used to set SVCR.SM after entry to the sigreturn syscall, as syscall entry clears SVCR.SM. In these cases, the the provided SVE register data will be loaded into the task's sve_state using the non-streaming SVE vector length and the FPSIMD registers will be merged into this using the streaming SVE vector length. Fix (1) by setting TIF_SME when setting SVCR.SM. This also requires ensuring that the task's sme_state has been allocated, but as this could contain live ZA state, it should not be zeroed. Fix (2) by clearing SVCR.SM when restoring a SVE signal context with SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM clear. For consistency, I've pulled the manipulation of SVCR, TIF_SVE, TIF_SME, and fp_type earlier, immediately after the allocation of sve_state/sme_state, before the restore of the actual register state. This makes it easier to ensure that these are always modified consistently, even if a fault is taken while reading the register data from the signal context. I do not expect any software to depend on the exact state restored when a fault is taken while reading the context. Fixes: 85ed24dad290 ("arm64/sme: Implement streaming SVE signal handling") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Cc: Cc: Mark Brown Cc: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas

arm64/fpsimd: signal: Allocate SSVE storage when restoring ZA

2026-01-22T10:10:33Z

The code to restore a ZA context doesn't attempt to allocate the task's sve_state before setting TIF_SME. Consequently, restoring a ZA context can place a task into an invalid state where TIF_SME is set but the task's sve_state is NULL. In legitimate but uncommon cases where the ZA signal context was NOT created by the kernel in the context of the same task (e.g. if the task is saved/restored with something like CRIU), we have no guarantee that sve_state had been allocated previously. In these cases, userspace can enter streaming mode without trapping while sve_state is NULL, causing a later NULL pointer dereference when the kernel attempts to store the register state: | # ./sigreturn-za | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 | Mem abort info: | ESR = 0x0000000096000046 | EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits | SET = 0, FnV = 0 | EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 | FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault | Data abort info: | ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000046, ISS2 = 0x00000000 | CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 | GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 | user pgtable: 4k pages, 52-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000101f47c00 | [0000000000000000] pgd=08000001021d8403, p4d=0800000102274403, pud=0800000102275403, pmd=0000000000000000 | Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000046 [#1] SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 153 Comm: sigreturn-za Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1 #1 PREEMPT | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 214000c9 (nzCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : sve_save_state+0x4/0xf0 | lr : fpsimd_save_user_state+0xb0/0x1c0 | sp : ffff80008070bcc0 | x29: ffff80008070bcc0 x28: fff00000c1ca4c40 x27: 63cfa172fb5cf658 | x26: fff00000c1ca5228 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: 0000000000000000 x22: fff00000c1ca4c40 x21: fff00000c1ca4c40 | x20: 0000000000000020 x19: fff00000ff6900f0 x18: 0000000000000000 | x17: fff05e8e0311f000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 028fca8f3bdaf21c | x14: 0000000000000212 x13: fff00000c0209f10 x12: 0000000000000020 | x11: 0000000000200b20 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : fff00000ff69dcc0 | x8 : 00000000000003f2 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : fff00000c1ca5b48 | x5 : fff05e8e0311f000 x4 : 0000000008000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 | x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : fff00000c1ca5970 x0 : 0000000000000440 | Call trace: | sve_save_state+0x4/0xf0 (P) | fpsimd_thread_switch+0x48/0x198 | __switch_to+0x20/0x1c0 | __schedule+0x36c/0xce0 | schedule+0x34/0x11c | exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x124/0x188 | el0_interrupt+0xc8/0xd8 | __el0_irq_handler_common+0x18/0x24 | el0t_64_irq_handler+0x10/0x1c | el0t_64_irq+0x198/0x19c | Code: 54000040 d51b4408 d65f03c0 d503245f (e5bb5800) | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix this by having restore_za_context() ensure that the task's sve_state is allocated, matching what we do when taking an SME trap. Any live SVE/SSVE state (which is restored earlier from a separate signal context) must be preserved, and hence this is not zeroed. Fixes: 39782210eb7e ("arm64/sme: Implement ZA signal handling") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Cc: Cc: Mark Brown Cc: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas