<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/arch/arm64/kernel, branch linux-4.19.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.19.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.19.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2024-12-05T09:59:40Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>arm64: tls: Fix context-switching of tpidrro_el0 when kpti is enabled</title>
<updated>2024-12-05T09:59:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
</author>
<published>2024-11-14T09:53:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=6a3e14ac2856c1ed086e785a99ef5ff8ab517938'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6a3e14ac2856c1ed086e785a99ef5ff8ab517938</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 67ab51cbdfee02ef07fb9d7d14cc0bf6cb5a5e5c upstream.

Commit 18011eac28c7 ("arm64: tls: Avoid unconditional zeroing of
tpidrro_el0 for native tasks") tried to optimise the context switching
of tpidrro_el0 by eliding the clearing of the register when switching
to a native task with kpti enabled, on the erroneous assumption that
the kpti trampoline entry code would already have taken care of the
write.

Although the kpti trampoline does zero the register on entry from a
native task, the check in tls_thread_switch() is on the *next* task and
so we can end up leaving a stale, non-zero value in the register if the
previous task was 32-bit.

Drop the broken optimisation and zero tpidrro_el0 unconditionally when
switching to a native 64-bit task.

Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 18011eac28c7 ("arm64: tls: Avoid unconditional zeroing of tpidrro_el0 for native tasks")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241114095332.23391-1-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:19:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
</author>
<published>2024-10-08T15:58:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=b6a638cb600e13f94b5464724eaa6ab7f3349ca2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b6a638cb600e13f94b5464724eaa6ab7f3349ca2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7 ]

The arm64 uprobes code is broken for big-endian kernels as it doesn't
convert the in-memory instruction encoding (which is always
little-endian) into the kernel's native endianness before analyzing and
simulating instructions. This may result in a few distinct problems:

* The kernel may may erroneously reject probing an instruction which can
  safely be probed.

* The kernel may erroneously erroneously permit stepping an
  instruction out-of-line when that instruction cannot be stepped
  out-of-line safely.

* The kernel may erroneously simulate instruction incorrectly dur to
  interpretting the byte-swapped encoding.

The endianness mismatch isn't caught by the compiler or sparse because:

* The arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields are encoded as arrays of u8, so
  the compiler and sparse have no idea these contain a little-endian
  32-bit value. The core uprobes code populates these with a memcpy()
  which similarly does not handle endianness.

* While the uprobe_opcode_t type is an alias for __le32, both
  arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() and arch_uprobe_skip_sstep() cast from u8[]
  to the similarly-named probe_opcode_t, which is an alias for u32.
  Hence there is no endianness conversion warning.

Fix this by changing the arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields to __le32 and
adding the appropriate __le32_to_cpu() conversions prior to consuming
the instruction encoding. The core uprobes copies these fields as opaque
ranges of bytes, and so is unaffected by this change.

At the same time, remove MAX_UINSN_BYTES and consistently use
AARCH64_INSN_SIZE for clarity.

Tested with the following:

| #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
| #include &lt;stdbool.h&gt;
|
| #define noinline __attribute__((noinline))
|
| static noinline void *adrp_self(void)
| {
|         void *addr;
|
|         asm volatile(
|         "       adrp    %x0, adrp_self\n"
|         "       add     %x0, %x0, :lo12:adrp_self\n"
|         : "=r" (addr));
| }
|
|
| int main(int argc, char *argv)
| {
|         void *ptr = adrp_self();
|         bool equal = (ptr == adrp_self);
|
|         printf("adrp_self   =&gt; %p\n"
|                "adrp_self() =&gt; %p\n"
|                "%s\n",
|                adrp_self, ptr, equal ? "EQUAL" : "NOT EQUAL");
|
|         return 0;
| }

.... where the adrp_self() function was compiled to:

| 00000000004007e0 &lt;adrp_self&gt;:
|   4007e0:       90000000        adrp    x0, 400000 &lt;__ehdr_start&gt;
|   4007e4:       911f8000        add     x0, x0, #0x7e0
|   4007e8:       d65f03c0        ret

Before this patch, the ADRP is not recognized, and is assumed to be
steppable, resulting in corruption of the result:

| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self   =&gt; 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() =&gt; 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self   =&gt; 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() =&gt; 0xffffffffff7e0
| NOT EQUAL

After this patch, the ADRP is correctly recognized and simulated:

| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self   =&gt; 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() =&gt; 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| #
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self   =&gt; 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() =&gt; 0x4007e0
| EQUAL

Fixes: 9842ceae9fa8 ("arm64: Add uprobe support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: probes: Fix simulate_ldr*_literal()</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:19:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
</author>
<published>2024-10-08T15:58:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=19f4d3a94c77295ee3a7bbac91e466955f458671'/>
<id>urn:sha1:19f4d3a94c77295ee3a7bbac91e466955f458671</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 50f813e57601c22b6f26ced3193b9b94d70a2640 upstream.

The simulate_ldr_literal() code always loads a 64-bit quantity, and when
simulating a 32-bit load into a 'W' register, it discards the most
significant 32 bits. For big-endian kernels this means that the relevant
bits are discarded, and the value returned is the the subsequent 32 bits
in memory (i.e. the value at addr + 4).

Additionally, simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() use a
plain C load, which the compiler may tear or elide (e.g. if the target
is the zero register). Today this doesn't happen to matter, but it may
matter in future if trampoline code uses a LDR (literal) or LDRSW
(literal).

Update simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() to use an
appropriately-sized READ_ONCE() to perform the access, which avoids
these problems.

Fixes: 39a67d49ba35 ("arm64: kprobes instruction simulation support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: probes: Remove broken LDR (literal) uprobe support</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:19:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
</author>
<published>2024-10-08T15:58:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=cc86f2e9876c8b5300238cec6bf0bd8c842078ee'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cc86f2e9876c8b5300238cec6bf0bd8c842078ee</id>
<content type='text'>
commit acc450aa07099d071b18174c22a1119c57da8227 upstream.

The simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() functions are
unsafe to use for uprobes. Both functions were originally written for
use with kprobes, and access memory with plain C accesses. When uprobes
was added, these were reused unmodified even though they cannot safely
access user memory.

There are three key problems:

1) The plain C accesses do not have corresponding extable entries, and
   thus if they encounter a fault the kernel will treat these as
   unintentional accesses to user memory, resulting in a BUG() which
   will kill the kernel thread, and likely lead to further issues (e.g.
   lockup or panic()).

2) The plain C accesses are subject to HW PAN and SW PAN, and so when
   either is in use, any attempt to simulate an access to user memory
   will fault. Thus neither simulate_ldr_literal() nor
   simulate_ldrsw_literal() can do anything useful when simulating a
   user instruction on any system with HW PAN or SW PAN.

3) The plain C accesses are privileged, as they run in kernel context,
   and in practice can access a small range of kernel virtual addresses.
   The instructions they simulate have a range of +/-1MiB, and since the
   simulated instructions must itself be a user instructions in the
   TTBR0 address range, these can address the final 1MiB of the TTBR1
   acddress range by wrapping downwards from an address in the first
   1MiB of the TTBR0 address range.

   In contemporary kernels the last 8MiB of TTBR1 address range is
   reserved, and accesses to this will always fault, meaning this is no
   worse than (1).

   Historically, it was theoretically possible for the linear map or
   vmemmap to spill into the final 8MiB of the TTBR1 address range, but
   in practice this is extremely unlikely to occur as this would
   require either:

   * Having enough physical memory to fill the entire linear map all the
     way to the final 1MiB of the TTBR1 address range.

   * Getting unlucky with KASLR randomization of the linear map such
     that the populated region happens to overlap with the last 1MiB of
     the TTBR address range.

   ... and in either case if we were to spill into the final page there
   would be larger problems as the final page would alias with error
   pointers.

Practically speaking, (1) and (2) are the big issues. Given there have
been no reports of problems since the broken code was introduced, it
appears that no-one is relying on probing these instructions with
uprobes.

Avoid these issues by not allowing uprobes on LDR (literal) and LDRSW
(literal), limiting the use of simulate_ldr_literal() and
simulate_ldrsw_literal() to kprobes. Attempts to place uprobes on LDR
(literal) and LDRSW (literal) will be rejected as
arm_probe_decode_insn() will return INSN_REJECTED. In future we can
consider introducing working uprobes support for these instructions, but
this will require more significant work.

Fixes: 9842ceae9fa8 ("arm64: Add uprobe support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: errata: Expand speculative SSBS workaround once more</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:19:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
</author>
<published>2024-10-07T12:20:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2606ccae1e72f426997ecf5945aedb84fd72685a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2606ccae1e72f426997ecf5945aedb84fd72685a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 081eb7932c2b244f63317a982c5e3990e2c7fbdd ]

A number of Arm Ltd CPUs suffer from errata whereby an MSR to the SSBS
special-purpose register does not affect subsequent speculative
instructions, permitting speculative store bypassing for a window of
time.

We worked around this for a number of CPUs in commits:

* 7187bb7d0b5c7dfa ("arm64: errata: Add workaround for Arm errata 3194386 and 3312417")
* 75b3c43eab594bfb ("arm64: errata: Expand speculative SSBS workaround")
* 145502cac7ea70b5 ("arm64: errata: Expand speculative SSBS workaround (again)")

Since then, a (hopefully final) batch of updates have been published,
with two more affected CPUs. For the affected CPUs the existing
mitigation is sufficient, as described in their respective Software
Developer Errata Notice (SDEN) documents:

* Cortex-A715 (MP148) SDEN v15.0, erratum 3456084
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2148827/1500/

* Neoverse-N3 (MP195) SDEN v5.0, erratum 3456111
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-3050973/0500/

Enable the existing mitigation by adding the relevant MIDRs to
erratum_spec_ssbs_list, and update silicon-errata.rst and the
Kconfig text accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240930111705.3352047-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
[ Mark: fix conflict in silicon-errata.rst, handle move and rename ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: ACPI: NUMA: initialize all values of acpi_early_node_map to NUMA_NO_NODE</title>
<updated>2024-09-04T11:12:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Haibo Xu</name>
</author>
<published>2024-08-05T03:30:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=2fbc3c6736cb0a1c2738664bf9381d0c96fb7a06'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2fbc3c6736cb0a1c2738664bf9381d0c96fb7a06</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a21dcf0ea8566ebbe011c79d6ed08cdfea771de3 upstream.

Currently, only acpi_early_node_map[0] was initialized to NUMA_NO_NODE.
To ensure all the values were properly initialized, switch to initialize
all of them to NUMA_NO_NODE.

Fixes: e18962491696 ("arm64: numa: rework ACPI NUMA initialization")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.19.x
Reported-by: Andrew Jones &lt;ajones@ventanamicro.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andrew Jones &lt;ajones@ventanamicro.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Haibo Xu &lt;haibo1.xu@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L &lt;sunilvl@ventanamicro.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones &lt;ajones@ventanamicro.com&gt;
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi &lt;lpieralisi@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hanjun Guo &lt;guohanjun@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/853d7f74aa243f6f5999e203246f0d1ae92d2b61.1722828421.git.haibo1.xu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: cpufeature: Fix the visibility of compat hwcaps</title>
<updated>2024-08-19T03:32:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Amit Daniel Kachhap</name>
</author>
<published>2022-11-03T08:22:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=5e1d9d92c5ef03c177422262cce31863af964ef3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5e1d9d92c5ef03c177422262cce31863af964ef3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 85f1506337f0c79a4955edfeee86a18628e3735f upstream.

Commit 237405ebef58 ("arm64: cpufeature: Force HWCAP to be based on the
sysreg visible to user-space") forced the hwcaps to use sanitised
user-space view of the id registers. However, the ID register structures
used to select few compat cpufeatures (vfp, crc32, ...) are masked and
hence such hwcaps do not appear in /proc/cpuinfo anymore for PER_LINUX32
personality.

Add the ID register structures explicitly and set the relevant entry as
visible. As these ID registers are now of type visible so make them
available in 64-bit userspace by making necessary changes in register
emulation logic and documentation.

While at it, update the comment for structure ftr_generic_32bits[] which
lists the ID register that use it.

Fixes: 237405ebef58 ("arm64: cpufeature: Force HWCAP to be based on the sysreg visible to user-space")
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap &lt;amit.kachhap@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221103082232.19189-1-amit.kachhap@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: errata: Expand speculative SSBS workaround (again)</title>
<updated>2024-08-19T03:32:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
</author>
<published>2024-08-09T10:43:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=236f749edbd6c194f6dc8bd1393c8e56fd773f32'/>
<id>urn:sha1:236f749edbd6c194f6dc8bd1393c8e56fd773f32</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit adeec61a4723fd3e39da68db4cc4d924e6d7f641 ]

A number of Arm Ltd CPUs suffer from errata whereby an MSR to the SSBS
special-purpose register does not affect subsequent speculative
instructions, permitting speculative store bypassing for a window of
time.

We worked around this for a number of CPUs in commits:

* 7187bb7d0b5c7dfa ("arm64: errata: Add workaround for Arm errata 3194386 and 3312417")
* 75b3c43eab594bfb ("arm64: errata: Expand speculative SSBS workaround")

Since then, similar errata have been published for a number of other Arm
Ltd CPUs, for which the same mitigation is sufficient. This is described
in their respective Software Developer Errata Notice (SDEN) documents:

* Cortex-A76 (MP052) SDEN v31.0, erratum 3324349
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-885749/3100/

* Cortex-A77 (MP074) SDEN v19.0, erratum 3324348
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1152370/1900/

* Cortex-A78 (MP102) SDEN v21.0, erratum 3324344
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1401784/2100/

* Cortex-A78C (MP138) SDEN v16.0, erratum 3324346
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1707916/1600/

* Cortex-A78C (MP154) SDEN v10.0, erratum 3324347
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2004089/1000/

* Cortex-A725 (MP190) SDEN v5.0, erratum 3456106
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2832921/0500/

* Cortex-X1 (MP077) SDEN v21.0, erratum 3324344
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1401782/2100/

* Cortex-X1C (MP136) SDEN v16.0, erratum 3324346
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1707914/1600/

* Neoverse-N1 (MP050) SDEN v32.0, erratum 3324349
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-885747/3200/

* Neoverse-V1 (MP076) SDEN v19.0, erratum 3324341
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1401781/1900/

Note that due to the manner in which Arm develops IP and tracks errata,
some CPUs share a common erratum number and some CPUs have multiple
erratum numbers for the same HW issue.

On parts without SB, it is necessary to use ISB for the workaround. The
spec_bar() macro used in the mitigation will expand to a "DSB SY; ISB"
sequence in this case, which is sufficient on all affected parts.

Enable the existing mitigation by adding the relevant MIDRs to
erratum_spec_ssbs_list. The list is sorted alphanumerically (involving
moving Neoverse-V3 after Neoverse-V2) so that this is easy to audit and
potentially extend again in future. The Kconfig text is also updated to
clarify the set of affected parts and the mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240801101803.1982459-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
[ Mark: fix conflicts in silicon-errata.rst ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: errata: Expand speculative SSBS workaround</title>
<updated>2024-08-19T03:32:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
</author>
<published>2024-08-09T10:43:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=873b451ffbd4a438d470ec1c95aba110610c09cd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:873b451ffbd4a438d470ec1c95aba110610c09cd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 75b3c43eab594bfbd8184ec8ee1a6b820950819a ]

A number of Arm Ltd CPUs suffer from errata whereby an MSR to the SSBS
special-purpose register does not affect subsequent speculative
instructions, permitting speculative store bypassing for a window of
time.

We worked around this for Cortex-X4 and Neoverse-V3, in commit:

  7187bb7d0b5c7dfa ("arm64: errata: Add workaround for Arm errata 3194386 and 3312417")

... as per their Software Developer Errata Notice (SDEN) documents:

* Cortex-X4 SDEN v8.0, erratum 3194386:
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2432808/0800/

* Neoverse-V3 SDEN v6.0, erratum 3312417:
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2891958/0600/

Since then, similar errata have been published for a number of other Arm Ltd
CPUs, for which the mitigation is the same. This is described in their
respective SDEN documents:

* Cortex-A710 SDEN v19.0, errataum 3324338
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1775101/1900/?lang=en

* Cortex-A720 SDEN v11.0, erratum 3456091
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2439421/1100/?lang=en

* Cortex-X2 SDEN v19.0, erratum 3324338
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1775100/1900/?lang=en

* Cortex-X3 SDEN v14.0, erratum 3324335
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2055130/1400/?lang=en

* Cortex-X925 SDEN v8.0, erratum 3324334
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/109108/800/?lang=en

* Neoverse-N2 SDEN v17.0, erratum 3324339
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1982442/1700/?lang=en

* Neoverse-V2 SDEN v9.0, erratum 3324336
  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2332927/900/?lang=en

Note that due to shared design lineage, some CPUs share the same erratum
number.

Add these to the existing mitigation under CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386.
As listing all of the erratum IDs in the runtime description would be
unwieldy, this is reduced to:

	"SSBS not fully self-synchronizing"

... matching the description of the errata in all of the SDENs.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603111812.1514101-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
[ Mark: fix conflicts and renames ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: errata: Unify speculative SSBS errata logic</title>
<updated>2024-08-19T03:32:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
</author>
<published>2024-08-09T10:43:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=023c0f2e7f168e0c9e6f04c126d404bef6ca3130'/>
<id>urn:sha1:023c0f2e7f168e0c9e6f04c126d404bef6ca3130</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ec768766608092087dfb5c1fc45a16a6f524dee2 ]

Cortex-X4 erratum 3194386 and Neoverse-V3 erratum 3312417 are identical,
with duplicate Kconfig text and some unsightly ifdeffery. While we try
to share code behind CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_SSBS, having
separate options results in a fair amount of boilerplate code, and this
will only get worse as we expand the set of affected CPUs.

To reduce this boilerplate, unify the two behind a common Kconfig
option. This removes the duplicate text and Kconfig logic, and removes
the need for the intermediate ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_SSBS option.
The set of affected CPUs is described as a list so that this can easily
be extended.

I've used ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386 (matching the Neoverse-V3 erratum ID) as
the common option, matching the way we use ARM64_ERRATUM_1319367 to
cover Cortex-A57 erratum 1319537 and Cortex-A72 erratum 1319367.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603111812.1514101-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
[ Mark: fix conflicts &amp; renames, drop unneeded cpucaps.h ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
