kernel.git/arch/arm64/crypto, branch linux-5.6.y

crypto: arch/lib - limit simd usage to 4k chunks

2020-05-14T05:59:22Z

commit 706024a52c614b478b63f7728d202532ce6591a9 upstream. The initial Zinc patchset, after some mailing list discussion, contained code to ensure that kernel_fpu_enable would not be kept on for more than a 4k chunk, since it disables preemption. The choice of 4k isn't totally scientific, but it's not a bad guess either, and it's what's used in both the x86 poly1305, blake2s, and nhpoly1305 code already (in the form of PAGE_SIZE, which this commit corrects to be explicitly 4k for the former two). Ard did some back of the envelope calculations and found that at 5 cycles/byte (overestimate) on a 1ghz processor (pretty slow), 4k means we have a maximum preemption disabling of 20us, which Sebastian confirmed was probably a good limit. Unfortunately the chunking appears to have been left out of the final patchset that added the glue code. So, this commit adds it back in. Fixes: 84e03fa39fbe ("crypto: x86/chacha - expose SIMD ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: b3aad5bad26a ("crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: a44a3430d71b ("crypto: arm/chacha - expose ARM ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: d7d7b8535662 ("crypto: x86/poly1305 - wire up faster implementations for kernel") Fixes: f569ca164751 ("crypto: arm64/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Fixes: a6b803b3ddc7 ("crypto: arm/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Fixes: ed0356eda153 ("crypto: blake2s - x86_64 SIMD implementation") Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: arch/nhpoly1305 - process in explicit 4k chunks

2020-05-14T05:59:22Z

commit a9a8ba90fa5857c2c8a0e32eef2159cec717da11 upstream. Rather than chunking via PAGE_SIZE, this commit changes the arch implementations to chunk in explicit 4k parts, so that calculations on maximum acceptable latency don't suddenly become invalid on platforms where PAGE_SIZE isn't 4k, such as arm64. Fixes: 0f961f9f670e ("crypto: x86/nhpoly1305 - add AVX2 accelerated NHPoly1305") Fixes: 012c82388c03 ("crypto: x86/nhpoly1305 - add SSE2 accelerated NHPoly1305") Fixes: a00fa0c88774 ("crypto: arm64/nhpoly1305 - add NEON-accelerated NHPoly1305") Fixes: 16aae3595a9d ("crypto: arm/nhpoly1305 - add NEON-accelerated NHPoly1305") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6

2020-03-23T22:55:21Z

Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu: "This fixes a correctness bug in the ARM64 version of ChaCha for lib/crypto used by WireGuard" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: arm64/chacha - correctly walk through blocks

crypto: arm64/chacha - correctly walk through blocks

2020-03-20T03:35:27Z

Prior, passing in chunks of 2, 3, or 4, followed by any additional chunks would result in the chacha state counter getting out of sync, resulting in incorrect encryption/decryption, which is a pretty nasty crypto vuln: "why do images look weird on webpages?" WireGuard users never experienced this prior, because we have always, out of tree, used a different crypto library, until the recent Frankenzinc addition. This commit fixes the issue by advancing the pointers and state counter by the actual size processed. It also fixes up a bug in the (optional, costly) stride test that prevented it from running on arm64. Fixes: b3aad5bad26a ("crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as library function") Reported-and-tested-by: Emil Renner Berthing Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+ Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6

2020-01-28T23:38:56Z

Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - Removed CRYPTO_TFM_RES flags - Extended spawn grabbing to all algorithm types - Moved hash descsize verification into API code Algorithms: - Fixed recursive pcrypt dead-lock - Added new 32 and 64-bit generic versions of poly1305 - Added cryptogams implementation of x86/poly1305 Drivers: - Added support for i.MX8M Mini in caam - Added support for i.MX8M Nano in caam - Added support for i.MX8M Plus in caam - Added support for A33 variant of SS in sun4i-ss - Added TEE support for Raven Ridge in ccp - Added in-kernel API to submit TEE commands in ccp - Added AMD-TEE driver - Added support for BCM2711 in iproc-rng200 - Added support for AES256-GCM based ciphers for chtls - Added aead support on SEC2 in hisilicon" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (244 commits) crypto: arm/chacha - fix build failured when kernel mode NEON is disabled crypto: caam - add support for i.MX8M Plus crypto: x86/poly1305 - emit does base conversion itself crypto: hisilicon - fix spelling mistake "disgest" -> "digest" crypto: chacha20poly1305 - add back missing test vectors and test chunking crypto: x86/poly1305 - fix .gitignore typo tee: fix memory allocation failure checks on drv_data and amdtee crypto: ccree - erase unneeded inline funcs crypto: ccree - make cc_pm_put_suspend() void crypto: ccree - split overloaded usage of irq field crypto: ccree - fix PM race condition crypto: ccree - fix FDE descriptor sequence crypto: ccree - cc_do_send_request() is void func crypto: ccree - fix pm wrongful error reporting crypto: ccree - turn errors to debug msgs crypto: ccree - fix AEAD decrypt auth fail crypto: ccree - fix typo in comment crypto: ccree - fix typos in error msgs crypto: atmel-{aes,sha,tdes} - Retire crypto_platform_data crypto: x86/sha - Eliminate casts on asm implementations ...

crypto: {arm,arm64,mips}/poly1305 - remove redundant non-reduction from emit

2020-01-16T07:18:12Z

This appears to be some kind of copy and paste error, and is actually dead code. Pre: f = 0 ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0 f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[0]); Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³² put_unaligned_le32(f, dst); Pre: 0 ≤ f < 2³² ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0 f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[1]); Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³² put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 4); Pre: 0 ≤ f < 2³² ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0 f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[2]); Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³² put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 8); Pre: 0 ≤ f < 2³² ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0 f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[3]); Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³² put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 12); Therefore this sequence is redundant. And Andy's code appears to handle misalignment acceptably. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN

2020-01-09T03:30:53Z

The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors. However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless. Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key. Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309, rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/. Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths. So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs. -EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys". That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test. So just remove this flag. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: arm64 - Use modern annotations for assembly functions

2019-12-20T06:58:35Z

In an effort to clarify and simplify the annotation of assembly functions in the kernel new macros have been introduced. These replace ENTRY and ENDPROC and also add a new annotation for static functions which previously had no ENTRY equivalent. Update the annotations in the crypto code to the new macros. There are a small number of files imported from OpenSSL where the assembly is generated using perl programs, these are not currently annotated at all and have not been modified. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: arm64/ghash-neon - bump priority to 150

2019-12-11T08:36:55Z

The SIMD based GHASH implementation for arm64 is typically much faster than the generic one, and doesn't use any lookup tables, so it is clearly preferred when available. So bump the priority to reflect that. Fixes: 5a22b198cd527447 ("crypto: arm64/ghash - register PMULL variants ...") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: arm64/sha - fix function types

2019-12-11T08:36:55Z

Instead of casting pointers to callback functions, add C wrappers to avoid type mismatch failures with Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) checking. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu