kernel.git/arch/arm64/crypto, branch linux-4.14.y

crypto: arm64/sha2-ce - correct digest for empty data in finup

2019-07-31T05:28:35Z

commit 6bd934de1e393466b319d29c4427598fda096c57 upstream. The sha256-ce finup implementation for ARM64 produces wrong digest for empty input (len=0). Expected: the actual digest, result: initial value of SHA internal state. The error is in sha256_ce_finup: for empty data `finalize` will be 1, so the code is relying on sha2_ce_transform to make the final round. However, in sha256_base_do_update, the block function will not be called when len == 0. Fix it by setting finalize to 0 if data is empty. Fixes: 03802f6a80b3a ("crypto: arm64/sha2-ce - move SHA-224/256 ARMv8 implementation to base layer") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Elena Petrova Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: arm64/sha1-ce - correct digest for empty data in finup

2019-07-31T05:28:35Z

commit 1d4aaf16defa86d2665ae7db0259d6cb07e2091f upstream. The sha1-ce finup implementation for ARM64 produces wrong digest for empty input (len=0). Expected: da39a3ee..., result: 67452301... (initial value of SHA internal state). The error is in sha1_ce_finup: for empty data `finalize` will be 1, so the code is relying on sha1_ce_transform to make the final round. However, in sha1_base_do_update, the block function will not be called when len == 0. Fix it by setting finalize to 0 if data is empty. Fixes: 07eb54d306f4 ("crypto: arm64/sha1-ce - move SHA-1 ARMv8 implementation to base layer") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Elena Petrova Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv

2019-05-21T16:50:19Z

commit 4a8108b70508df0b6c4ffa4a3974dab93dcbe851 upstream. If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free. xts-aes-neonbs doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more subtle than desired, and unconditionally accessing walk.iv has caused a real problem in other algorithms. Thus, update xts-aes-neonbs to start checking the return value of skcipher_walk_virt(). Fixes: 1abee99eafab ("crypto: arm64/aes - reimplement bit-sliced ARM/NEON implementation for arm64") Cc: # v4.11+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - fix returning final keystream block

2019-03-23T13:35:25Z

commit 12455e320e19e9cc7ad97f4ab89c280fe297387c upstream. The arm64 NEON bit-sliced implementation of AES-CTR fails the improved skcipher tests because it sometimes produces the wrong ciphertext. The bug is that the final keystream block isn't returned from the assembly code when the number of non-final blocks is zero. This can happen if the input data ends a few bytes after a page boundary. In this case the last bytes get "encrypted" by XOR'ing them with uninitialized memory. Fix the assembly code to return the final keystream block when needed. Fixes: 88a3f582bea9 ("crypto: arm64/aes - don't use IV buffer to return final keystream block") Cc: # v4.11+ Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - fix bugs in non-NEON fallback routine

2019-03-23T13:35:18Z

commit 969e2f59d589c15f6aaf306e590dde16f12ea4b3 upstream. Commit 5092fcf34908 ("crypto: arm64/aes-ce-ccm: add non-SIMD generic fallback") introduced C fallback code to replace the NEON routines when invoked from a context where the NEON is not available (i.e., from the context of a softirq taken while the NEON is already being used in kernel process context) Fix two logical flaws in the MAC calculation of the associated data. Reported-by: Eric Biggers Fixes: 5092fcf34908 ("crypto: arm64/aes-ce-ccm: add non-SIMD generic fallback") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - fix logical bug in AAD MAC handling

2019-03-23T13:35:18Z

commit eaf46edf6ea89675bd36245369c8de5063a0272c upstream. The NEON MAC calculation routine fails to handle the case correctly where there is some data in the buffer, and the input fills it up exactly. In this case, we enter the loop at the end with w8 == 0, while a negative value is assumed, and so the loop carries on until the increment of the 32-bit counter wraps around, which is quite obviously wrong. So omit the loop altogether in this case, and exit right away. Reported-by: Eric Biggers Fixes: a3fd82105b9d1 ("arm64/crypto: AES in CCM mode using ARMv8 Crypto ...") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: arm64/crct10dif - revert to C code for short inputs

2019-03-23T13:35:18Z

commit d72b9d4acd548251f55b16843fc7a05dc5c80de8 upstream. The SIMD routine ported from x86 used to have a special code path for inputs < 16 bytes, which got lost somewhere along the way. Instead, the current glue code aligns the input pointer to 16 bytes, which is not really necessary on this architecture (although it could be beneficial to performance to expose aligned data to the the NEON routine), but this could result in inputs of less than 16 bytes to be passed in. This not only fails the new extended tests that Eric has implemented, it also results in the code reading past the end of the input, which could potentially result in crashes when dealing with less than 16 bytes of input at the end of a page which is followed by an unmapped page. So update the glue code to only invoke the NEON routine if the input is at least 16 bytes. Reported-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Fixes: 6ef5737f3931 ("crypto: arm64/crct10dif - port x86 SSE implementation to arm64") Cc: # v4.10+ Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: arm64/aes-ce-cipher - move assembler code to .S file

2018-04-12T10:32:21Z

commit 019cd46984d04703a39924178f503a98436ac0d7 upstream. Most crypto drivers involving kernel mode NEON take care to put the code that actually touches the NEON register file in a separate compilation unit, to prevent the compiler from reordering code that preserves or restores the NEON context with code that may corrupt it. This is necessary because we currently have no way to express the restrictions imposed upon use of the NEON in kernel mode in a way that the compiler understands. However, in the case of aes-ce-cipher, it did not seem unreasonable to deviate from this rule, given how it does not seem possible for the compiler to reorder cross object function calls with asm blocks whose in- and output constraints reflect that it reads from and writes to memory. Now that LTO is being proposed for the arm64 kernel, it is time to revisit this. The link time optimization may replace the function calls to kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() with instantiations of the IR that make up its implementation, allowing further reordering with the asm block. So let's clean this up, and move the asm() blocks into a separate .S file. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-By: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: arm,arm64 - Fix random regeneration of S_shipped

2018-04-08T12:26:32Z

commit 6aaf49b495b446ff6eec0ac983f781ca0dc56a73 upstream. The decision to rebuild .S_shipped is made based on the relative timestamps of .S_shipped and .pl files but git makes this essentially random. This means that the perl script might run anyway (usually at most once per checkout), defeating the whole purpose of _shipped. Fix by skipping the rule unless explicit make variables are provided: REGENERATE_ARM_CRYPTO or REGENERATE_ARM64_CRYPTO. This can produce nasty occasional build failures downstream, for example for toolchains with broken perl. The solution is minimally intrusive to make it easier to push into stable. Another report on a similar issue here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/8/1379 Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez Cc: Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: hash - annotate algorithms taking optional key

2018-02-16T19:23:00Z

commit a208fa8f33031b9e0aba44c7d1b7e68eb0cbd29e upstream. We need to consistently enforce that keyed hashes cannot be used without setting the key. To do this we need a reliable way to determine whether a given hash algorithm is keyed or not. AF_ALG currently does this by checking for the presence of a ->setkey() method. However, this is actually slightly broken because the CRC-32 algorithms implement ->setkey() but can also be used without a key. (The CRC-32 "key" is not actually a cryptographic key but rather represents the initial state. If not overridden, then a default initial state is used.) Prepare to fix this by introducing a flag CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY which indicates that the algorithm has a ->setkey() method, but it is not required to be called. Then set it on all the CRC-32 algorithms. The same also applies to the Adler-32 implementation in Lustre. Also, the cryptd and mcryptd templates have to pass through the flag from their underlying algorithm. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman