Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel. https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.10.y 2017-02-16T15:58:31Z 2017-02-16T15:58:31Z Kees Cook 2017-02-16T00:43:58Z urn:sha1:32b143637e8180f5d5cea54320c769210dea4f19 In commit 76624175dcae ("arm64: uaccess: consistently check object sizes"), the object size checks are moved outside the access_ok() so that bad destinations are detected before hitting the "memset(dest, 0, size)" in the copy_from_user() failure path. This makes the same change for arm, with attention given to possibly extracting the uaccess routines into a common header file for all architectures in the future. Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> 2016-09-15T23:51:56Z Al Viro 2016-09-10T20:44:03Z urn:sha1:91344493b7da9487a8dbc1109d7486e51c8e5235 adjust copy_from_user(), obviously Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> 2016-08-08T21:48:14Z Linus Torvalds 2016-08-08T21:48:14Z urn:sha1:1eccfa090eaea22558570054bbdc147817e1df5e Pull usercopy protection from Kees Cook: "Tbhis implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user and copy_from_user bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and SLUB" * tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy mm: Hardened usercopy mm: Implement stack frame object validation mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page 2016-07-26T21:41:49Z Kees Cook 2016-06-23T22:06:53Z urn:sha1:dfd45b6103c973bfcea2341d89e36faf947dbc33 Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on arm. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> 2016-06-22T18:55:11Z Russell King 2016-02-04T16:54:45Z urn:sha1:9f73bd8bb445e0cbe4bcef6d4cfc788f1e184007 Remove the code duplication between put_user() and __put_user(). The code which selected the implementation based upon the pointer size, and declared the local variable to hold the value to be put are common to both implementations. Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> 2016-06-22T18:55:11Z Robin Murphy 2016-06-09T10:21:20Z urn:sha1:9f85eae622cd9b63dc44b7dcfa958b3881a09cbb Since commit 8c56cc8be5b3 ("ARM: 7449/1: use generic strnlen_user and strncpy_from_user functions"), the definition of __addr_ok() has been languishing unused; eradicate the sucker. Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> 2015-12-15T11:51:02Z Russell King 2015-12-05T13:42:07Z urn:sha1:c014953d84ec21a4df9a43be2378861ea6e9246e The uaccess_with_memcpy() code is currently incompatible with the SW PAN code: it takes locks within the region that we've changed the DACR, potentially sleeping as a result. As we do not save and restore the DACR across co-operative sleep events, can lead to an incorrect DACR value later in this code path. Reported-by: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se> Tested-by: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> 2015-09-03T14:28:37Z Russell King 2015-09-03T14:28:37Z urn:sha1:40d3f02851577da27b5cbb1538888301245ef1e7 2015-08-26T19:34:24Z Russell King 2015-08-19T19:40:41Z urn:sha1:a5e090acbf545c0a3b04080f8a488b17ec41fe02 Provide a software-based implementation of the priviledged no access support found in ARMv8.1. Userspace pages are mapped using a different domain number from the kernel and IO mappings. If we switch the user domain to "no access" when we enter the kernel, we can prevent the kernel from touching userspace. However, the kernel needs to be able to access userspace via the various user accessor functions. With the wrapping in the previous patch, we can temporarily enable access when the kernel needs user access, and re-disable it afterwards. This allows us to trap non-intended accesses to userspace, eg, caused by an inadvertent dereference of the LIST_POISON* values, which, with appropriate user mappings setup, can be made to succeed. This in turn can allow use-after-free bugs to be further exploited than would otherwise be possible. Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> 2015-08-25T15:14:43Z Russell King 2015-08-19T10:02:28Z urn:sha1:3fba7e23f754a9a6e639b640fa2a393712ffe1b8 Provide uaccess_save_and_enable() and uaccess_restore() to permit control of userspace visibility to the kernel, and hook these into the appropriate places in the kernel where we need to access userspace. Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>