kernel.git/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h, branch linux-4.19.y

ARM: fix co-processor register typo

2022-03-11T09:15:12Z

commit 33970b031dc4653cc9dc80f2886976706c4c8ef1 upstream. In the recent Spectre BHB patches, there was a typo that is only exposed in certain configurations: mcr p15,0,XX,c7,r5,4 should have been mcr p15,0,XX,c7,c5,4 Reported-by: kernel test robot Fixes: b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround") Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround

2022-03-11T09:15:12Z

commit b9baf5c8c5c356757f4f9d8180b5e9d234065bc3 upstream. Workaround the Spectre BHB issues for Cortex-A15, Cortex-A57, Cortex-A72, Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75. We also include Brahma B15 as well to be safe, which is affected by Spectre V2 in the same ways as Cortex-A15. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) [changes due to lack of SYSTEM_FREEING_INITMEM - gregkh] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: uaccess: consolidate uaccess asm to asm/uaccess-asm.h

2020-06-03T06:19:34Z

[ Upstream commit 747ffc2fcf969eff9309d7f2d1d61cb8b9e1bb40 ] Consolidate the user access assembly code to asm/uaccess-asm.h. This moves the csdb, check_uaccess, uaccess_mask_range_ptr, uaccess_enable, uaccess_disable, uaccess_save, uaccess_restore macros, and creates two new ones for exception entry and exit - uaccess_entry and uaccess_exit. This makes the uaccess_save and uaccess_restore macros private to asm/uaccess-asm.h. Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: 8843/1: use unified assembler in headers

2020-06-03T06:19:34Z

[ Upstream commit c001899a5d6c2d7a0f3b75b2307ddef137fb46a6 ] Use unified assembler syntax (UAL) in headers. Divided syntax is considered deprecated. This will also allow to build the kernel using LLVM's integrated assembler. Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: 8796/1: spectre-v1,v1.1: provide helpers for address sanitization

2019-02-20T09:25:37Z

Commit afaf6838f4bc896a711180b702b388b8cfa638fc upstream. Introduce C and asm helpers to sanitize user address, taking the address range they target into account. Use asm helper for existing sanitization in __copy_from_user(). Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: David A. Long Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Merge branches 'fixes', 'misc' and 'spectre' into for-linus

2018-08-13T15:28:50Z

Conflicts: arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h Signed-off-by: Russell King

ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses

2018-08-02T16:41:38Z

Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code: index = load(user-manipulated pointer); access(base + index * stride); In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been loaded. On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory. The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data, and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory. Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access. This also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used by a subsequent access. Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer. This prevents get_user() being used as the load() step above. As a side effect, put_user() will also be affected even though it isn't implicated. Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds. Acked-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Russell King

Merge branches 'fixes', 'misc' and 'spectre' into for-linus

2018-06-05T09:03:27Z

ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros

2018-05-31T22:27:16Z

Add assembly and C macros for the new CSDB instruction. Signed-off-by: Russell King Acked-by: Mark Rutland Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren

ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions

2018-05-19T10:35:56Z

Since do_undefinstr() uses get_user to get the undefined instruction, it can be called before kprobes processes recursive check. This can cause an infinit recursive exception. Prohibit probing on get_user functions. Fixes: 24ba613c9d6c ("ARM kprobes: core code") Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Russell King