<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel.git/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy, branch linux-4.4.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.4.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/atom?h=linux-4.4.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/'/>
<updated>2015-06-16T12:18:44Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: extend "mask" policy matching support</title>
<updated>2015-06-16T12:18:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:53:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974</id>
<content type='text'>
The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC.  This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes.  For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition</title>
<updated>2015-06-16T12:18:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:48:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7</id>
<content type='text'>
The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid).  In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.

Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: do not measure or appraise the NSFS filesystem</title>
<updated>2015-05-21T17:28:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
</author>
<published>2015-04-21T20:54:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=cd025f7f94108995383edddfb61fc8afea6c66a9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cd025f7f94108995383edddfb61fc8afea6c66a9</id>
<content type='text'>
Include don't appraise or measure rules for the NSFS filesystem
in the builtin ima_tcb and ima_appraise_tcb policies.

Changelog:
- Update documentation

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: skip measurement of cgroupfs files and update documentation</title>
<updated>2015-05-21T17:27:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
</author>
<published>2015-04-11T15:13:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=6438de9f3fb5180d78a0422695d0b88c687757d3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6438de9f3fb5180d78a0422695d0b88c687757d3</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds a rule in the default measurement policy to skip inodes
in the cgroupfs filesystem. Measurements for this filesystem can be
avoided, as all the digests collected have the same value of the digest of
an empty file.

Furthermore, this patch updates the documentation of IMA policies in
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy to make it consistent with
the policies set in security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;rsassu@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware</title>
<updated>2014-07-25T18:47:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
</author>
<published>2014-07-22T14:39:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b</id>
<content type='text'>
The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.

This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag</title>
<updated>2014-06-03T19:21:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
</author>
<published>2014-05-12T13:28:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=f9b2a735bdddf836214b5dca74f6ca7712e5a08c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f9b2a735bdddf836214b5dca74f6ca7712e5a08c</id>
<content type='text'>
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy.  When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.

The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash.  The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time.  The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem.  Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages.  A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory.  This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.

Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set.  Based on policy, permit or deny file
access.  This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'.  Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.

Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add policy support for file system uuid</title>
<updated>2013-02-06T15:40:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
</author>
<published>2012-09-03T20:23:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=85865c1fa189fcba49089e6254a0226f2269bebc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:85865c1fa189fcba49089e6254a0226f2269bebc</id>
<content type='text'>
The IMA policy permits specifying rules to enable or disable
measurement/appraisal/audit based on the file system magic number.
If, for example, the policy contains an ext4 measurement rule,
the rule is enabled for all ext4 partitions.

Sometimes it might be necessary to enable measurement/appraisal/audit
only for one partition and disable it for another partition of the
same type.  With the existing IMA policy syntax, this can not be done.

This patch provides support for IMA policy rules to specify the file
system by its UUID (eg. fsuuid=397449cd-687d-4145-8698-7fed4a3e0363).

For partitions not being appraised, it might be a good idea to mount
file systems with the 'noexec' option to prevent executing non-verified
binaries.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: added policy support for 'security.ima' type</title>
<updated>2013-01-22T21:10:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
</author>
<published>2012-06-08T10:58:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=0e5a247cb37a97d843ef76d09d5f80deb7893ba3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0e5a247cb37a97d843ef76d09d5f80deb7893ba3</id>
<content type='text'>
The 'security.ima' extended attribute may contain either the file data's
hash or a digital signature.  This patch adds support for requiring a
specific extended attribute type.  It extends the IMA policy with a new
keyword 'appraise_type=imasig'.  (Default is hash.)

Changelog v2:
- Fixed Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy option syntax
Changelog v1:
- Differentiate between 'required' vs. 'actual' extended attribute

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: rename FILE_MMAP to MMAP_CHECK</title>
<updated>2013-01-16T22:49:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
</author>
<published>2012-12-13T16:15:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=16cac49f727621c6b0467ffe15ed72c2febb1296'/>
<id>urn:sha1:16cac49f727621c6b0467ffe15ed72c2febb1296</id>
<content type='text'>
Rename FILE_MMAP hook to MMAP_CHECK to be consistent with the other
hook names.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: support new kernel module syscall</title>
<updated>2012-12-14T02:35:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
</author>
<published>2012-10-16T02:10:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel.git/commit/?id=fdf90729e57812cb12d7938e2dee7c71e875fb08'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fdf90729e57812cb12d7938e2dee7c71e875fb08</id>
<content type='text'>
With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two
arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL
terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and
appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system.

This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an
extensible and consistent manner.

To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional
patches could pass the signature as the first parameter.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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